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1 Introduction
The present work focuses on the role of noise traders in financial markets. First and
foremost, this task requires to define the term noise traders. There is a broad variety of
definitions for noise traders in the literature (see Dow & Gorton (2006)). Subsequently,
we adopt the two definitions of noise traders by Kyle (1985) and De Long et al. (1990).
In chapter 2 we characterize noise traders as agents who trade randomly, whereas we
describe them as agents who choose their demand dependent on past price changes in
chapter 3.
Before taking a closer look at the behavior of noise traders, we discuss the role of noise
in financial markets. Following Grossman (1976), noise is needed to solve the no trade
argument put forward by Migrom & Stokey (1982). By this argument a market agent,
even though he has additional private information, cannot profit from it. An agent
with superior information is interested in buying an asset if the value of the asset,
conditional on his information, exceeds its price. Thus, the price which is offered by
the buyer is smaller than or equal to the value of the asset. The seller, who does not
have additional information on the asset, knows that the buyer would not demand the
asset if the price exceeded its value. Hence, no one trades since the seller is not worse
off if he keeps the asset.
A formal framework for that issue is a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) model.
Agents in an REE model fully understand the model economy and the market mech-
anisms. If an informed agent uses his information for trading, it has an influence on
the price. Therefore also uninformed agents learn from that information since they can
deduce informed agents’ information from the price. The price that forms in equilib-
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rium reflects all information in the market. If information is costly, then no one has an
incentive to gather information since the price already incorporates the “best” available
information (see Grossman (1976)). One way to give informed agents the possibility to
benefit from their additional information is the implementation of noise, for example
via a stochastic asset supply (brought forward in Grossman (1976)). The price in this
setup is not fully, but only partially revealing the information of informed agents. This
idea of a noisy asset supply is also used in models by Grossman & Stiglitz (1980) and
Hellwig (1980) which we adopt in the first section of this dissertation. The random
supply, however, will be interpreted as the outcome of noise traders. Following Kyle
(1985), it is assumed that these noise traders trade randomly and independently from
the price. We will examine how noise traders perform in the market (via expected final
wealth) and how different model parameters affect their performance. The definition of
noise traders adopted here was used by Gloston & Milgrom (1985) as well, who explain
the random trading behavior of noise traders by exogenous shocks like job losses or
promotions. This definition of noise traders is worth a discussion which is outlined in
section 2.5.
A result of chapter 2 is that noise traders’ expected total wealth is decreasing. If
noise traders performance is on average “bad” it gives rise to the question why they
should survive in the market. One explanation is that arbitrage opportunities are
limited. Reasons for that could be a limited time horizon (Dow & Gorton (1994)) or
professional market agents (Shleifer & Vishny (1997) and Arnold (2009)). Nonetheless,
section 2 does not focus on that issue since we consider a two-period model and not a
long time horizon.
Since the learning process of market agents and the price formation in a REE model
occur simultaneously, strategic behavior is absent. We will analyze an example for
strategic behavior in the second part of this work by extending the model of De Long
et al. (1990) (henceforth: DSSW) who introduce positive feedback traders. These are
market agents that determine their demand by observing past price changes. If the
price increased in the past, they demand the asset, if it decreased, they sell it. There
may be different reasons for that behavior: it may come for example “from extrapol-
2
Introduction
ative expectations about prices, or trend chasing” (Shleifer, 2000, p.155). A rational
agent can exploit this behavior: if he receives a positive signal about the future pay-
off, he knows that the price will increase tomorrow. This price increase will lead to
a future positive demand of positive feedback traders. Anticipating this positive de-
mand, rational agents will drive the prices even to a higher level and then sell the asset
tomorrow. The presence of rational agents therefore has a rather destabilizing than
stabilizing effect on the price. In section 3 we present an extension of the DSSW model
by applying another time structure and adding a second signal.
3

2 Noise traders and information
The aim of this section is to analyze the performance of noise traders by considering
their expected final wealth. We will see that the amount of expected wealth that
noise traders lose is gained by rational agents. Hence, there is a transfer of expected
wealth from noise traders to rational agents. Interestingly, this transfer decreases as
the fraction of informed agents in the market increases.
For the remainder of this chapter we follow Kyle (1985) and describe noise traders as
agents who randomly purchase or sell assets no matter what the price of the asset is.
Their behavior can be explained by exogenous shocks (see Gloston & Milgrom (1985)).
Since we do not assume a specific utility function for noise traders, our measure of how
good or how bad they perform is the expected value of their final wealth. The only
assumption we make is that a higher expected wealth is better for them.
In section 2.1 we present our model following Grossman & Stiglitz (1980) and Hellwig
(1980). After that, we are in the position to give an expression for the expected transfer
of wealth from noise traders to rational agents (section 2.2). We also examine the effect
of different parameters on the expected final wealth. In section 2.3 we take a look at
the expected utility of rational agents. The results there are in line with Grossman &
Stiglitz (1980). Another distribution of the initial wealth will be discussed in section
2.4.
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2.1 Model setup
The model we use is a modified version of the partially revealing REE model used by
Grossman & Stiglitz (1980) with the notation of Hellwig (1980). There is a continuum
of agents on the interval [0, 1]. Following Grossman & Stiglitz (1980) and Hellwig
(1980), agents can allocate their initial wealth to one riskless and one risky asset,
where the former pays one unit and the latter X units of a single consumption good.
Let p denote the price of the risky asset and take the riskfree asset to be numeraire.
The initial endowment of agent i consists of a constant part w0i and a given amount
Z¯ of the risky asset. The final wealth of agent i holding zi units of the risky assets is
given by
w1i = w0i + pZ¯ + zi(X − p). (2.1)
Following Grossman & Stiglitz (1980), we assume that agents maximize their expected
utility E[U ], with
U = −e−ρw1i , 1
where ρ is a parameter for absolute risk aversion.
2.1.1 Asset supply
According to both papers cited above, we assume that the supply is risky. We explain
this random supply by noise traders. Given a fixed amount of 2Z¯ assets where one half
(= Z¯) is held by the agents we introduced above (RAT) and the other half (= Z¯) is
possessed by agents we call noise traders (NT) (upper panel of figure 2.1). As already
stated in the beginning of this chapter, noise traders are hit by exogenous shocks and
therefore randomly2 buy or sell the asset. The total supply of noise traders is given by
1The choice of this specific utility function (CARA) used by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) is consistent
with assumption A1 in (Hellwig, 1980, p.479).
2On the one hand side there are noise traders that demand the asset. On the other hand side some
noise traders sell it. We are just interested in the overall reaction of noise traders. Also note, that
noise traders are not interested in the price of the asset. They just sell or purchase the asset.
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rational investors noise traders
0 Z¯ 2Z¯
rational investors noise traders
0 Z¯Z 2Z¯
Z − Z¯ < 0
rational investors noise traders
0 Z¯ Z 2Z¯
Z − Z¯ > 0
Figure 2.1: Initial (top) and final (middle and bottom) asset allocation for two different
realizations of Z
Z − Z¯ ∼ N(0,∆2). Hence, on average the amount of assets supplied or demanded by
noise traders is zero. In the case of a positive realization of Z − Z¯ (see lower panel of
figure 2.1) noise traders sell part of their assets, whereas if Z−Z¯ is negative (see middle
panel of figure 2.1) they purchase assets. Therefore, the total (stochastic) supply of
assets for rational agents is given by
Z¯︸︷︷︸
assets held by RAT
+ (Z − Z¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
total supply of NT
= Z ∼ N(Z¯,∆2).3
Recall that we refrain from using a specific utility function for noise traders and instead
consider their final wealth
w1,NT =
(
Z¯ − (Z − Z¯))︸ ︷︷ ︸
assets held by NT at date 1
X +
(
Z − Z¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
assets NT sold to/bought from RAT
p
= XZ¯ − (Z − Z¯)(X − p),
3By assuming that Z¯ is “large enough” we can neglect the cases where the total supply is negative.
For example if Z¯ = 3∆, the probability that the realization of Z is non-negative is 99.865%
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which depends on the realizations of the payoff X and the supply Z. Hence, expected
wealth is
E[w1,NT ] = E[XZ¯ − (Z − Z¯)(X − p)]
= X¯Z¯ − E[(Z − Z¯)(X − p)]
= X¯Z¯ − E[(Z − Z¯)]E[(X − p)]− Cov[Z − Z¯,X − p]
= X¯Z¯ − (Z¯ − Z¯)E[(X − p)]− Cov[Z − Z¯,X − p]
= X¯Z¯ − Cov[Z − Z¯,X − p].
Note, that the expected wealth E[w1,NT ] is decreasing in the covariance between Z− Z¯
and X−p.4 If the covariance is not equal to zero there is a transfer of expected wealth
from noise traders to rational agents. To verify this, we consider the expected total
final wealth of rational agents. Recall that the final wealth of a rational agent is
w1i = w0i + pZ¯ + zi(X − p).
The total final wealth of all rational agents in equilibrium is therefore
w1,RAT = w0 + pZ¯ + Z(X − p),
where w0 =
1∫
0
w0i di and
1∫
0
zi di = Z.
5 Hence, the expected total final wealth of rational
agents is
E[w1,RAT ] = E[w0 + Z¯p+ Z(X − p)]
= E[w0 + Z¯X + (Z − Z¯)(X − p)]
= w0 + Z¯X¯ + E[(Z − Z¯)(X − p)]
= w0 + Z¯X¯ + E[Z − Z¯]E[X − p] + Cov[Z − Z¯,X − p]
= w0 + Z¯X¯ + Cov[Z − Z¯,X − p].
So, in contrast to noise traders’ expected wealth, the expected wealth of rational agents
is increasing in the covariance between Z− Z¯ and X−p. Note, that the total expected
4This is also true for alternative partitions of the 2Z¯ assets among NT and RAT (see section 2.4).
5This is the market clearing condition we will specify later.
8
Noise traders and information
wealth of both groups is
E[w1,NT ] + E[w1,RAT ] = X¯Z¯ − Cov[Z − Z¯,X − p] + w0 + Z¯X¯ + Cov[Z − Z¯,X − p]
= w0 + 2Z¯X¯
which is the constant initial wealth of rational agents w0 plus the total of assets 2Z¯
multiplied by the expected value X¯. This means that the amount of expected wealth
which noise traders lose is gained by rational agents and vice versa. The following table
gives an overview over the initial and final holdings and the corresponding wealth.
rational speculators noise traders total
initial holdings Z¯ Z¯ 2Z¯
initial wealth w0 + pZ¯ pZ¯ w0 + 2pZ¯
final holdings Z¯ + (Z − Z¯) = Z Z¯ − (Z − Z¯) = 2Z¯ − Z 2Z¯
final wealth w0 +XZ¯ + (X − p)(Z − Z¯) XZ¯ − (X − p)(Z − Z¯) w0 + 2XZ¯
In order to specify the covariance (and therefore the transfer of wealth) more precisely,
we will now continue with the presentation of the model.
2.1.2 Asset demand
We subdivide rational agents into two groups: a fraction of 1− τ type-A agents and a
fraction of τ type-B agents. We will use the superscripts A and B to indicate that the
parameter refers to the corresponding agent.6 Both types of agents use information
to rationally form expectations of the future payoff of the risky asset. Heterogeneity
among the two groups of agents is induced by the amount of information they use.
Specifically, we assume that type-A agents are only able to learn from the price, whereas
type-B agents additionally have the ability to process7 a private signal yi = X + i,
6Type-A agents correspond to the uninformed agents in Grossman & Stiglitz (1980), type-B agents
to informed agents.
7We refrain from introducing costs for gathering information as in Grossman & Stiglitz (1980). In
our context some agents have the ability to process information, whereas others have not.
9
Noise traders and information
where i ∼ N(0, σ2 ) ∀i. Therefore, the individual demand of type-A and type-B agents
is8
zAi =
E[X|p]− p
ρV ar[X|p] (2.2)
and
zBi =
E[X|p, yi]− p
ρV ar[X|p, yi] . (2.3)
2.1.3 Price
Before taking a closer look at the expectations of the two types of agents, we have to
consider the price. For given information, agents derive their expectation of X based
on p (type A) and p and yi (type B), respectively. As outlined in Hellwig (1980),
“expectations formation and market clearing cannot be treated separately” (Hellwig,
1980, p.480). When agents form their expectations, they consider the price of the asset.
The expectations influence the market clearing condition and therefore the price. Thus,
expectations formation and market clearing must be considered simultaneously. This
is a fixed-point problem that has a linear solution. Following Hellwig (1980), we first
assume that the price is linear in X and Z, i.e.
p = pi0 + pi1X − γZ, (2.4)
where pi0, pi1 and γ are constant. Using this assumption, we will see later that the price
is in fact a linear combination of X and Z. Anticipating the form of the price function,
we can now take a closer look at the expectations on X of the two different types of
agents.
2.1.4 Expectation formation
Agents of type A
As stated above, type-A agents form their expectations conditional only on the price.
8For a derivation see for example Grossman (1976) or Grossman & Stiglitz (1980).
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The variance-covariance-matrix of the normal vector X
p

with mean  X¯
pi0 + pi1X¯ − γZ¯

is given by
V A =
 σ2X pi1σ2X
pi1σ
2
X pi
2
1σ
2
X + γ
2∆2
 .
Therefore, following Raiffa & Schlaifer (1961), the conditional distribution of X given
p is also normal with mean
E[X|p] = αA0i + αA2ip (2.5)
and variance V ar[X|p] = βAi .9 Since, by assumption, all agents of type A are identical
the subscript i can be omitted. Specifically,
E[X|p] = X¯ + pi1σ
2
X
pi21σ
2
X + γ
2∆2
(p− pi0 − pi1X¯ + γZ¯)
=
pi21σ
2
XX¯ + γ
2∆2X¯ − pi0pi1σ2X − pi21σ2XX¯ + pi1γσ2XZ¯
pi21σ
2
X + γ
2∆2
+
pi1σ
2
X
pi21σ
2
X + γ
2∆2
p
=
γ2∆2X¯ − pi0pi1σ2X + pi1γσ2XZ¯
pi21σ
2
X + γ
2∆2
+
pi1σ
2
X
pi21σ
2
X + γ
2∆2
p
9Let (X,S) ∼ N(µ,Σ) be a n−dimensional random variable with
µ =
 µX
µS
 and Σ =
 ΣX,X ΣX,S
ΣS,X ΣS,S
 .
Then
(X|S = s) ∼ N
(
µX + ΣX,SΣ
−1
S,S(s− µS),ΣX,X − ΣX,SΣ−1S,SΣS,X
)
. (2.6)
(Raiffa & Schlaifer, 1961, p.250).
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and
V ar[X|p] = σ2X −
pi21σ
4
X
pi21σ
2
X + γ
2∆2
=
pi21σ
4
X + γ
2∆2σ2X − pi21σ4X
pi21σ
2
X + γ
2∆2
=
γ2∆2σ2X
pi21σ
2
X + γ
2∆2
= βA. (2.7)
Therefore,
αA0 =
γ2∆2X¯ − pi0pi1σ2X + pi1γσ2XZ¯
pi21σ
2
X + γ
2∆2
(2.8)
and
αA2 =
pi1σ
2
X
pi21σ
2
X + γ
2∆2
. (2.9)
Agents of type B
In contrast to type-A agents, agents of type B form their expectation of the payoff
dependent not only on the price p but also conditional on a private signal yi. Hence,
the conditional expectation given p and yi is
E[X|yi, p] = αB0i + αB1iyi + αB2ip (2.10)
with variance V ar[X|yi, p] = βBi . Since we assume that the private signal has the same
variance for all agents of type B, the subscript i at αB0i, α
B
1i, α
B
2i, and β
B
i can be omitted.
The variance-covariance matrix of the normal vector
X
yi
p

with mean 
X¯
X¯
pi0 + pi1X¯ − γZ¯

is
V B =

σ2X σ
2
X pi1σ
2
X
σ2X σ
2
X + σ
2
 pi1σ
2
X
pi1σ
2
X pi1σ
2
X pi
2
1σ
2
X + γ
2∆2
 .
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Following again Raiffa & Schlaifer (1961), E[X|yi, p] and V ar[X|yi, p] are given by10
E[X|yi, p] = X¯ +
(
σ2X pi1σ
2
X
) σ2X + σ2 pi1σ2X
pi1σ
2
X pi
2
1σ
2
X + γ
2∆2
−1
 yi − X¯
p− pi0 − pi1X¯ + γZ¯

= X¯ +
1
(σ2X + σ
2
 )(pi
2
1σ
2
X + γ
2∆2)− pi21σ4X(
σ2X pi1σ
2
X
) pi21σ2X + γ2∆2 −pi1σ2X
−pi1σ2X σ2X + σ2
 yi − X¯
p− pi0 − pi1X¯ + γZ¯

= X¯ +
1
σ2γ
2∆2 + σ2X(pi
2
1σ
2
 + γ
2∆2) σ2X(pi21σ2X + γ2∆2)− pi21σ4X
−pi1σ4X + pi1σ2X(σ2X + σ2 )
t yi − X¯
p− pi0 − pi1X¯ + γZ¯

= X¯ − γ
2∆2σ2XX¯ + pi1σ
2
Xσ
2
 (pi0 + pi1X¯ − γZ¯)
σ2γ
2∆2 + σ2X(pi
2
1σ
2
 + γ
2∆2)
+
γ2∆2σ2X
σ2γ
2∆2 + σ2X(pi
2
1σ
2
 + γ
2∆2)
yi
+
pi1σ
2
Xσ
2

σ2γ
2∆2 + σ2X(pi
2
1σ
2
 + γ
2∆2)
p
and
V ar[X|yi, p] = σ2X −
(
σ2X pi1σ
2
X
) σ2X + σ2 pi1σ2X
pi1σ
2
X pi
2
1σ
2
X + γ
2∆2
−1 σ2X
pi1σ
2
X

= σ2X −
(
γ2∆2σ2X
σ2 γ
2∆2+σ2X(pi
2
1σ
2
+γ
2∆2)
pi1σ2Xσ
2

σ2 γ
2∆2+σ2X(pi
2
1σ
2
+γ
2∆2)
) σ2X
pi1σ
2
X

=
γ2∆2σ2Xσ
2

σ2γ
2∆2 + σ2X(pi
2
1σ
2
 + γ
2∆2)
= βB. (2.11)
10
 a b
c d
−1 = 1ad−bc
 d −b
−c a

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Therefore,
αB0 = X¯ −
γ2∆2σ2XX¯ + pi1σ
2
Xσ
2
 (pi0 + pi1X¯ − γZ¯)
σ2γ
2∆2 + σ2X(pi
2
1σ
2
 + γ
2∆2)
=
γ2∆2σ2 X¯ − pi0pi1σ2Xσ2 + γpi1σ2Xσ2 Z¯
σ2γ
2∆2 + σ2X(pi
2
1σ
2
 + γ
2∆2)
, (2.12)
αB1 =
γ2∆2σ2X
σ2γ
2∆2 + σ2X(pi
2
1σ
2
 + γ
2∆2)
(2.13)
and
αB2 =
pi1σ
2
Xσ
2

σ2γ
2∆2 + σ2X(pi
2
1σ
2
 + γ
2∆2)
. (2.14)
2.1.5 Market clearing
Given the demand of both types of agents zAi and z
B
i and the supply Z of the asset,
market clearing requires
Z =
τ∫
0
zBi di+
1∫
τ
zAi di.
Note, that since agents of type A all have the same information about the future payoff
(i.e. the price)
1∫
τ
zAi di = (1− τ)zAi .
Using (2.2), (2.3), (2.5), and (2.10) the market clearing condition becomes
Z = (1− τ)E[X|p]− p
ρβA
+
τ∫
0
E[X|yi, p]− p
ρβB
= (1− τ)α
A
0 + (α
A
2 − 1)p
ρβA
+ τ
αB0 + α
B
1 X + (α
B
2 − 1)p
ρβB
=
(1− τ)αA0 βB + ταB0 βA +
(
(1− τ)(αA2 − 1)βB + τ(αB2 − 1)βA
)
p+ ταB1 β
AX
ρβAβB
.
Solving for p, we get
p = − (1− τ)α
A
0 β
B + ταB0 β
A
(1− τ)(αA2 − 1)βB + τ(αB2 − 1)βA
− τα
B
1 β
A
(1− τ)(αA2 − 1)βB + τ(αB2 − 1)βA
X
+
ρβAβB
(1− τ)(αA2 − 1)βB + τ(αB2 − 1)βA
Z.
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Hence,
pi0 = − (1− τ)α
A
0 β
B + ταB0 β
A
(1− τ)(αA2 − 1)βB + τ(αB2 − 1)βA
,
pi1 = − τα
B
1 β
A
(1− τ)(αA2 − 1)βB + τ(αB2 − 1)βA
and
γ = − ρβ
AβB
(1− τ)(αA2 − 1)βB + τ(αB2 − 1)βA
.
It can be seen that a linear price in X and Z actually solves our problem.
Plugging (2.7), (2.8), (2.9), (2.11), (2.12), (2.13), and (2.14) in the three preceding
equations we get11
pi0 =
(1− τ)αA0 βB + ταB0 βA
(1− τ)(1− αA2 )βB + τ(1− αB2 )βA
=
σ2
(
γ2∆2X¯ + pi1σ
2
X
(
γZ¯ − pi0
))
γ2∆2σ2 + σ
2
X (γ
2∆2τ + (pi1 − 1) pi1σ2 )
, (2.15)
pi1 =
ταB1 β
A
(1− τ)(1− αA2 )βB + τ(1− αB2 )βA
=
γ2∆2τσ2X
γ2∆2σ2 + σ
2
X (γ
2∆2τ + (pi1 − 1)pi1σ2 )
(2.16)
and
γ =
ρβAβB
(1− τ)(1− αA2 )βB + τ(1− αB2 )βA
=
γ2∆2ρσ2Xσ
2

γ2∆2σ2 + σ
2
X (γ
2∆2τ + (pi1 − 1)pi1σ2 )
. (2.17)
Solving (2.15) for pi0 leads to
pi0 =
γσ2
(
γ∆2X¯ + pi1Z¯σ
2
X
)
γ2∆2σ2 + σ
2
X (γ
2∆2τ + pi21σ
2
 )
. (2.18)
We have to solve equations (2.16) and (2.17) simultaneously because both contain γ
and pi1. Since the right hand sides in both equations have the same denominator we
11These calculations are very extensive so we handle them in appendix 2.A.
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get12
γ2∆2ρσ2Xσ
2

γ
=
γ2∆2τσ2X
pi1
⇔ γ2∆2ρσ2Xσ2pi1 = γ2∆2ρσ2Xσ2γ
⇔ γ = ρσ
2
pi1
τ
. (2.19)
Plugging (2.19) in (2.16) and solving for pi1 (see appendix 2.A) we get
pi1 =
τσ2X (∆
2ρ2σ2 + τ)
∆2ρ2σ4 + τσ
2
X (∆
2ρ2σ2 + τ)
. (2.20)
Using this together with (2.19) we obtain
γ =
ρσ2
τ
τσ2X (∆
2ρ2σ2 + τ)
∆2ρ2σ4 + τσ
2
X (∆
2ρ2σ2 + τ)
=
ρσ2Xσ
2
 (∆
2ρ2σ2 + τ)
∆2ρ2σ4 + τσ
2
X (∆
2ρ2σ2 + τ)
. (2.21)
Finally, we can plug pi1 and γ in equation (2.18) yielding
pi0 =
ρσ2
(
∆2ρX¯σ2 + τZ¯σ
2
X
)
∆2ρ2σ4 + τσ
2
X (∆
2ρ2σ2 + τ)
. (2.22)
2.2 The transfer of wealth from noise traders to
rational investors
In section 2.1.1 we have shown that the expected value of the final wealth is
E[w1,RAT ] = w0 + Z¯X¯ + Cov[Z − Z¯,X − p]
for rational agents and
E[w1,NT ] = Z¯X¯ − Cov[Z − Z¯,X − p]
for noise traders. Hence, the transfer of expected wealth from noise traders to rational
agents is exactly the covariance between Z− Z¯ and X − p. Since we have specified the
12Note, that pi0 = γ = 0 also solves (2.19). However, this does not solve equations (2.16) and (2.17)
since the right hand side of both equations is not defined for pi1 = γ = 0.
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price function and its parameters, we are now in the position to calculate the covariance
Cov[Z − Z¯,X − p] = Cov[Z,X − pi0 − pi1X + γZ]
= Cov[Z, γZ]
= γ∆2
=
ρσ2Xσ
2
∆
2 (∆2ρ2σ2 + τ)
∆2ρ2σ4 + τσ
2
X (∆
2ρ2σ2 + τ)
,
since Z¯ is constant and X and Z are uncorrelated. This covariance is in fact always
positive since ρ > 0, τ ∈ [0, 1], and all variances are positive. Therefore, noise traders
lose expected wealth and this is actually transferred to rational speculators. To un-
derstand that, we compare the final wealth for realizations Z > Z¯ and Z < Z¯ and
compare it to the case when the realization of Z is equal to Z¯. Recall that the price is
p = pi0 + pi1X − γZ.
Since γ > 0, the price increases as Z decreases and vice versa. Consider that we have
realizations Z and X. If Z > Z¯, noise traders overall sell assets (actually Z − Z¯ > 0
assets). This increased supply to rational agents decreases (compared to Z = Z¯) the
price via γ. Thus the rational agents buy a positive amount Z − Z¯ for a “lower” price.
If in contrast Z < Z¯, noise traders demand the asset (exactly Z¯ − Z assets) and the
reduced supply to rational agents increases the price via γ (again compared to the
realization Z = Z¯). Thus, rational agents sell the asset at a “higher” price. In both
cases rational agents are better off than in the case when the realization of Z is Z¯.
This explains why rational agents’ expected wealth (less w0) is always larger than noise
traders’ expected wealth.
In the following we examine the effect of the different parameters on the variance. We
therefore differentiate γ∆2 with respect to the corresponding parameter.
The influence of σ2X on the transfer of wealth
First, we examine the effect of the variance of the risky asset on the transfer of wealth.
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Considering
∂(γ∆2)
∂σ2X
=
ρσ2∆
2 (∆2ρ2σ2 + τ) (∆
2ρ2σ4 + τσ
2
X (∆
2ρ2σ2 + τ))
(∆2ρ2σ4 + τσ
2
X (∆
2ρ2σ2 + τ))
2
−ρσ
2
Xσ
2
∆
2 (∆2ρ2σ2 + τ) τ(∆
2ρ2σ2 + τ)
(∆2ρ2σ4 + τσ
2
X (∆
2ρ2σ2 + τ))
2
=
ρ3∆4σ6 (∆
2ρ2σ2 + τ)
(∆2ρ2σ4 + τσ
2
X (∆
2ρ2σ2 + τ))
2 > 0,
we see that the transfer of wealth is increasing in the variance of X. We have seen in
the price function that the future payoff X of the asset has an impact on the price. An
increase in σ2X decreases the price since the price incorporates more risk. Hence, the
price decreases such that noise traders are paid worse for the assets they sell.
The influence of ∆2 on the transfer of wealth
Next, we study the effect of an increased variance in the supply on the expected wealth
of noise traders. The derivative of γ∆2 with respect to ∆2 is
∂γ∆2
∂∆2
=
(∆2ρ2σ4 + τσ
2
X (∆
2ρ2σ2 + τ)) (2∆
2ρ3σ2Xσ
4
 + τρσ
2
Xσ
2
∆
2)
(∆2ρ2σ4 + τσ
2
X (∆
2ρ2σ2 + τ))
2
−(ρ
2σ4 + τσ
2
Xρ
2σ2 ) ρσ
2
Xσ
2
∆
2 (∆2ρ2σ2 + τ)
(∆2ρ2σ4 + τσ
2
X (∆
2ρ2σ2 + τ))
2
=
∆4ρ5σ2Xσ
8
 + ρτσ
4
Xσ
2
 (∆
2ρ2σ2 + τ)
2
(∆2ρ2σ4 + τσ
2
X (∆
2ρ2σ2 + τ))
2 > 0.
Here happens the same as in the case when the variance of the payoff increases. An
increase in ∆2 increases the risk that is incorporated in the price. This decreases the
price and therefore noise traders sell their assets at a cheaper price. So their expected
wealth decreases in ∆2.
The influence of τ on the transfer of wealth
The last issue to analyze is the effect of τ on the expected wealth of noise traders.
Therefore, we consider
∂γ∆2
∂τ
=
(∆2ρ2σ4 + τσ
2
X (∆
2ρ2σ2 + τ)) ρσ
2
Xσ
2
∆
2
(∆2ρ2σ4 + τσ
2
X (∆
2ρ2σ2 + τ))
2
−(τρ
2σ2X∆
2σ2 + 2τσ
2
X) ρσ
2
Xσ
2
∆
2 (∆2ρ2σ2 + τ)
(∆2ρ2σ4 + τσ
2
X (∆
2ρ2σ2 + τ))
2
= −∆
2ρσ2Xσ
2
 (σ
2
X (∆
2ρ2σ2 + τ)
2 −∆2ρ2σ4 )
(∆2ρ2σ4 + τσ
2
X (∆
2ρ2σ2 + τ))
2 .
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This derivative is negative if and only if
σ2X
(
∆2ρ2σ2 + τ
)
2 −∆2ρ2σ4 > 0⇔ σ2X
(
∆2ρ2σ2 + τ
)
2 > ∆2ρ2σ4 .
The function
σ2X
(
∆2ρ2σ2 + τ
)
2 −∆2ρ2σ4
is a upward open parabola in τ which is monotonically increasing for τ > 0 since the
apex (−∆2ρ2σ2 ,−∆2ρ2σ4 ) is in the third quadrant. Therefore, it is sufficient to show
that the function is positive for τ = 0. In that case we have
σ2X∆
4ρ4σ4 −∆2ρ2σ4 > 0⇔ σ2X∆2ρ2 > 1.
If we assume that the latter inequality holds,13 the transfer of wealth decreases as τ
increases. So the higher the fraction of informed investors ( = investors that learn from
the price and a private signal (type-B)) in the market, the lower is the transfer of wealth
from noise traders to rational agents. At first sight one might think that the other way
round is true: the more informed rational agents, the better the opportunities for them
to exploit noise traders. The reason why that is not the case is the following: if the
number of type-B agents increases, the price incorporates more information and less
risk. This decline of risk increases the price. Therefore noise traders get a higher price
for their assets.
2.3 Expected utility
For completeness, we also consider the expected utility of rational agents similar as in
Grossman & Stiglitz (1980). As stated in the model presentation, agents are maxim-
izing their expected utility. Recall, that
U = −e−ρw1i = −e−ρ(w0i+Z¯p+zi(X−p)).
Since zi and X − p are normally distributed, the exponent of U contains a product of
two normal distributed random variables. Following Brunnermeier (2001) we compute
expected utility by using the following lemma:
13This assumption is not too unrealistic since we use a risk aversion parameter ρ larger than one.
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Lemma 1. Let w ∼ N(0,Σ) be a multinomial random variable with positive definite
variance-covariance-matrix. Then
E[ew
tAw+btw+d] = |I − 2ΣA| 12 e 12 (I−2ΣA)−1Σb+d,
where I is the identity matrix, A is a symmetric matrix, b a vector, d a scalar, and | . |
the determinant (Brunnermeier, 2001, p.64).
The expected utilities of both types of agents have to be derived separately because
the amount of shares held by agents of type A and type B are different.
Agents of type A
In order to apply lemma 1, w1i has to be brought in the appropriate form:
w1i = w0i + z
A
i (X − p) + Z¯p
= w0i + (z
A
i − z¯Ai )(X − p) + z¯Ai (X − p) + Z¯(p− p¯) + Z¯p¯
= w0i + (z
A
i − z¯Ai )(X − p− (X¯ − p¯)) + (zAi − z¯Ai )(X¯ − p¯)
+z¯Ai (X − p− (X¯ − p¯)) + z¯Ai (X¯ − p¯) + Z¯(p− p¯) + Z¯p¯
=
(
zAi − z¯Ai X − p− (X¯ − p¯) p− p¯
)
0 1
2
0
1
2
0 0
0 0 0


zAi − z¯Ai
X − p− (X¯ − p¯)
p− p¯

+
(
X¯ − p¯ z¯Ai Z¯
)
zAi − z¯Ai
X − p− (X¯ − p¯)
p− p¯
+ w0i + z¯Ai (X¯ − p¯) + Z¯p¯ (2.23)
where z¯Ai , X¯, and p¯ are the means of z
A
i , X, and p. Using
A =

0 −ρ
2
0
−ρ
2
0 0
0 0 0
 ,
b =

−ρ(X¯ − p¯)
−ρz¯Ai
−ρZ¯
 ,
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d = −ρ (w0i + z¯Ai (X¯ − p¯) + Z¯p¯) ,
and
Σ =

σ2
zAi
Cov[zAi , X − p] Cov[zAi , p]
Cov[zAi , X − p] σ2X−p Cov[X − p, p]
Cov[zAi , p] Cov[X − p, p] σ2p

we are able to calculate the expected utility.14 The final thing to determine are the
entries in the matrix Σ which are
σ2zAi
= V ar
[
αA0 + (α
A
2 − 1)(pi0 + pi1X − γZ)
ρβA
]
=
(
(αA2 − 1)pi1
ρβA
)2
σ2X +
(
(αA2 − 1)γ
ρβA
)2
∆2,
Cov[zAi , X − p] = Cov
[
αA0 + (α
A
2 − 1)(pi0 + pi1X − γZ)
ρβA
, X − pi0 − pi1X + γZ
]
=
(αA2 − 1)pi1
ρβA
(1− pi1)σ2X −
(αA2 − 1)γ2
ρβA
∆2,
Cov[zAi , p] = Cov
[
αA0 + (α
A
2 − 1)(pi0 + pi1X − γZ)
ρβA
, pi0 + pi1X − γZ
]
=
(αA2 − 1)pi21
ρβA
σ2X +
(αA2 − 1)γ2
ρβA
∆2,
σ2X−p = V ar[X − pi0 − pi1X + γZ]
= (1− pi1)2σ2X + γ2∆2,
Cov[X − p, p] = Cov[X − pi0 − pi1X + γZ, pi0 + pi1X − γZ]
= (1− pi1)pi1σ2X − γ2∆2
and
σ2p = V ar[pi0 + pi1X − γZ]
= pi21σ
2
X + γ
2∆2.
For the ease of exposition we plot (see figure 2.2)15 the expected utility for the example16
ρ = 5, σX = 1, X¯ = 5, Z¯ = 5, ∆ = 1, σ =
1
10
, and w0 = 1 over the fraction of type-B
14Note, that another decomposition is also possible. To check that the results are correct we used
another decomposition with the variable vector
(
X − X¯ Z − Z¯
)t
(see appendix 2.B).
15Figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 were produced using Wolfram Mathematica. The source code can be found
in appendix 2.C.
16We choose X¯ and Z¯ large enough (five times the standard deviation) so that the probability of a
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Figure 2.2: Expected utility for type-A agents
agents (τ ∈ (0, 1]).17
Agents of type B
By rearranging w1i
18 as in (2.23), we get
A =

0 −ρ
2
0
−ρ
2
0 0
0 0 0
 ,
b =

−ρ(X¯ − p¯)
−ρz¯Bi
−ρZ¯
 ,
d = −ρ (w0i + z¯Bi (X¯ − p¯) + Z¯p¯)
negative realization of X and Z is negligible (2.86652× 10−5 percent).
17The expected utility drops very steeply at the beginning for small values of τ . The reason for that is
that the variance of the signal is very small. If σ2 increases, the expected utility function becomes
flatter since the price does not become informative “so fast”. This is in line with the results in
Grossman & Stiglitz (1980) since “[a]n increase in the quality of information [...] increases the
informativeness of the price system” (Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980, p.399).
18We also checked the results with another decomposition where the normal vector was(
X − X¯ Z − Z¯ i
)t
(see appendix 2.B).
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and
Σ =

σ2
zBi
Cov[zBi , X − p] Cov[zBi , p]
Cov[zBi , X − p] σ2X−p Cov[X − p, p]
Cov[zBi , p] Cov[X − p, p] σ2p
 .
The entries in the matrix Σ are
σ2zBi
= V ar
[
αB0 + α
B
1 (X + i) + (α
B
2 − 1)(pi0 + pi1X − γZ)
ρβB
]
=
(
αB1 + (α
B
2 − 1)pi1
ρβB
)2
σ2X +
(
(αB2 − 1)γ
ρβB
)2
∆2 +
(
αB1
ρβB
)2
σ2 ,
Cov[zBi , X − p] = Cov
[
αB0 + α
B
1 (X + i) + (α
B
2 − 1)(pi0 + pi1X − γZ)
ρβB
,
X − pi0 − pi1X + γZ]
=
αB1 + (α
B
2 − 1)pi1
ρβB
(1− pi1)σ2X −
(αB2 − 1)γ
ρβB
γ∆2,
Cov[zBi , p] = Cov
[
αB0 + α
B
1 (X + i) + (α
B
2 − 1)(pi0 + pi1X − γZ)
ρβB
,
pi0 + pi1X − γZ]
=
αB1 + (α
B
2 − 1)pi1
ρβB
pi1σ
2
X +
(αB2 − 1)γ
ρβB
γ∆2,
σ2X−p = V ar[X − pi0 − pi1X + γZ]
= (1− pi1)2σ2X + γ2∆2,
Cov[X − p, p] = Cov[X − pi0 − pi1X + γZ, pi0 + pi1X − γZ]
= (1− pi1)pi1σ2X − γ2∆2,
and
σ2p = V ar[pi0 + pi1X − γZ]
= pi21σ
2
X + γ
2∆2.
Again, the expected utility is plotted as a function of τ using the same parameters as
in the previous paragraph (figure 2.3).
Comparison of type-A and type-B agents
When we draw both expected utility functions in a E[U ] − τ−diagram (figure 2.4),
we see that agents who are able to process additional information (type B) are always
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Figure 2.3: Expected utility for type-B agents
better off compared to agents who form their expectations using only the price (type
A). This is different to the model of Grossman & Stiglitz (1980). The reason is that we
do not consider costs of information for type-B agents. We assume that some agents
have the ability to process information whereas others have not. If we introduced costs
of information, the upper curve would be shifted downwards and, hence, there would
exist a point where the expected utilities of both groups are identical.
Although rational agents’ expected wealth is increasing in τ (see sections 2.1.1 and
2.2), their expected utility is decreasing in our example for both groups of rational
agents. As τ increases, the number of agents that additionally learn from a private
signal is increasing. If there are more agents who can process information then the
price contains more information and rather reflects the future value X of the asset.
Therefore, the price becomes more appropriate and the exploitation of noise traders
decreases (which is in line with our results in section 2.2).
2.4 Other distributions of the 2Z¯ assets
All results stated above where made on the assumption that in the beginning both
noise traders and rational agents hold Z¯ assets. In this section we will show that other
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Figure 2.4: Expected utility for type-A (lower line) and type-B (upper line) agents
initial distributions of the 2Z¯ have an impact on the expected wealth but do not change
our results qualitatively.
Let us assume that rational agents’ initial endowment of the risky asset is θ2Z¯ and
that noise traders hold (1− θ)2Z¯ where θ ∈ [0, 1]. So initial wealth of these two groups
is w0 + 2θZ¯p and 2(1− θ)Z¯p, respectively.
Noise traders are again hit by exogenous shocks and therefore demand or sell the
asset. Before they are hit by the shock they hold 2(1 − θ)Z¯ whereas they possess
2Z¯ − Z ∼ N(Z¯,∆2) assets later. The difference is
2Z¯ − Z︸ ︷︷ ︸
final holdings (NT)
− 2(1− θ)Z¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
initial holdings (NT)
= 2θZ¯ − Z,
which is the net supply/demand of noise traders. If 2θZ¯ > Z, noise traders demand
the asset, if 2θZ¯ < Z they sell it. Note, that if θ = 1
2
we are in the situation from
section 2.1.1 and the expected transfer of assets is equal to zero. Since rational agents
hold 2θZ¯ assets in the beginning, their total supply is
2θZ¯︸︷︷︸
initial holdings (RAT)
− (2θZ¯ − Z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
transfer from/to NT
= Z.
An initial (upper panel) and a final (middle and lower panel) asset allocation for two
different realizations of Z are depicted in figure 2.5. Rational agents’ wealth is
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rational investors noise traders
0 2θZ¯ Z¯ 2Z¯
rational investors
expected change in holdings
deviation from the mean
noise traders
0 Z¯
Z2θZ¯
2Z¯
Z < Z¯
rational investors
expected change in holdings deviation from the mean
noise traders
0 Z¯ Z2θZ¯ 2Z¯
Z > Z¯
Figure 2.5: Initial (top) and final (middle and bottom) asset allocation for different
realizations of Z.
w1,RAT = w0 + 2θZ¯X − (2θZ¯ − Z)(X − p)
= w0 + 2θZ¯X − (2θZ¯ − Z + Z¯ − Z¯)(X − p)
= w0 + 2θZ¯X + (Z − Z¯)(X − p) + (Z¯ − 2θZ¯)(X − p).
The first part w0 + 2θZ¯X is the initial wealth of the rational agents. The fourth
summand (Z¯ − 2θZ¯)(X − p) is the expected change in the holdings of rational agents
and the third summand (Z − Z¯)(X − p) is the deviation from the expected holding Z¯.
Recall, that noise traders’ final holdings are
2(1− θ)Z¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
initial holdings (NT)
+ 2θZ¯ − Z︸ ︷︷ ︸
transfer from/to RAT
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and their final wealth is
w1,NT = 2(1− θ)Z¯X + (2θZ¯ − Z)(X − p)
= 2(1− θ)Z¯X + (2θZ¯ − Z + Z¯ + Z¯ − 2Z¯)(X − p)
= 2(1− θ)Z¯X − (Z − Z¯)(X − p)− (2(1− θ)Z¯ − Z¯)(X − p).
The first summand 2(1 − θ)Z¯X is the value of the initial asset holdings in the end.
The third summand is the expected change of asset holdings multiplied by its worth
and the second summand is the value of the deviation from the expected asset holding
Z¯. Summing up the wealth of the two groups we get the total final wealth
wt1 = w1,RAT + w1,NT
= w0 + 2θXZ¯ + (Z − Z¯)(X − p) + (Z¯ − 2θZ¯)(X − p)
+2(1− θ)XZ¯ − (Z − Z¯)(X − p)− (2(1− θ)Z¯ − Z¯)(X − p)
= w0 + 2θXZ¯ + 2(1− θ)XZ¯
= w0 + 2XZ¯
which is just the total amount of assets 2Z¯ times the payoff X plus rational speculators’
constant part of the initial wealth w0. The following table gives an overview over the
initial and final number of assets and the initial and final wealth of the two groups of
agents:19
rational speculators noise traders total
initial number 2θZ¯ 2(1− θ)Z¯ 2Z¯
of assets
initial wealth w0 + 2θZ¯p 2(1− θ)Z¯p w0 + 2Z¯p
final number 2θZ¯ − (2θZ¯ − Z) = Z 2(1− θ)Z¯ + (2θZ¯ − Z) 2Z¯
of assets = 2Z¯ − Z
final wealth w0 + 2θXZ¯ 2(1− θ)XZ¯ − (Z − Z¯)(X − p) w0 + 2XZ¯
+(Z − Z¯)(X − p) −(2(1− θ)Z¯ − Z¯)(X − p)
+(Z¯ − 2θZ¯)(X − p)
19For θ = 12 this table coincides with the table in section 2.1.1.
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As in section 2.1.1, we consider the expected final wealth of the two groups of agents:
E[w1,RAT ] = E[w0 + 2θXZ¯ + (Z − Z¯)(X − p) + (Z¯ − 2θZ¯)(X − p)]
= w0 + 2θX¯Z¯ + E[(Z − Z¯)(X − p)] + E[(Z¯ − 2θZ¯)(X − p)]
= w0 + 2θX¯Z¯ + E[Z − Z¯]E[X − p] + Cov[Z − Z¯,X − p]
+(Z¯ − 2θZ¯)E[X − p]
= w0 + 2θX¯Z¯ + Cov[Z − Z¯,X − p] + (Z¯ − 2θZ¯)(X¯ − p¯)
and
E[w1,NT ] = E[2(1− θ)XZ¯ − (Z − Z¯)(X − p)− (2(1− θ)Z¯ − Z¯)(X − p)]
= 2(1− θ)X¯Z¯ − E[(Z − Z¯)(X − p)]− (2(1− θ)Z¯ − Z¯)E[X − p]
= 2(1− θ)X¯Z¯ − E[(Z − Z¯)]E[(X − p)]− Cov[Z − Z¯,X − p]
−(2(1− θ)Z¯ − Z¯)(X¯ − p¯)
= 2(1− θ)X¯Z¯ − Cov[Z − Z¯,X − p]− (2(1− θ)Z¯ − Z¯)(X¯ − p¯).
The expected wealth of rational speculators consists of their initial wealth at date 1
w0 + 2θX¯Z¯, the wealth change that comes from the expected change in asset holdings
and the covariance between the deviation of Z from Z¯ and the excess return X − p.
Note again, that if θ = 1
2
we have the special case from above since Z¯ − 2θZ¯ and
2(1− θ)Z¯ − Z¯ cancel out.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter we presented the REE model by Grossman & Stiglitz (1980). We
interpreted the stochastic supply as noise traders and showed that their expected wealth
is transferred to rational market agents. This transfer decreases as the fraction of
informed agents in the market increases. If there are more informed agents in the
market, the price becomes more informative. Therefore it incorporates less risk and
noise traders trade the asset to a more appropriate price.
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Although we introduced noise traders, we were not too specific about their identity.
Following Gloston & Milgrom (1985) we explained their trading behavior via exogenous
events like job losses, job promotions or marriage and childbirth. This interpretation
is worth discussing. A point of criticism is mentioned by Dow & Gorton (2006). They
state that the probability of having to sell an asset is not equal to the probability
of buying an asset. This idea is intuitive since when someone needs money he has
to sell assets, whereas if someone has earned money it is not necessary to purchase
assets. Therefore, assuming that noise traders’ expected change in holdings Z − Z¯ is
equal to zero might be disputable. Using another decomposition of the 2Z¯ assets (with
(1−θ)2Z¯ > Z¯ ⇔ θ < 1
2
) solves this problem since in that case noise traders on average
sell a portion of their asset holdings.
Before considering strategic behavior of rational market agents to exploit noise traders
in the next chapter we present the specific calculations that were skipped so far. Since
the calculations are extensive, a mathematica source code is presented in the end where
we compared our calculations with the ones calculated by mathematica.
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2.A Calculations
In this section we present the calculations from section 2.1.5 and prove equations (2.15),
(2.16) and (2.17) before we show that (2.20) and (2.22) hold. Since the denominators
of (2.15), (2.16) and (2.17) are all equal we first simplify that term.
(1− τ) (1− αA2 ) βB + τ (1− αB2 ) βA
= (1− τ)
(
1− pi1σ
2
X
pi21σ
2
X + γ
2∆2
)
γ2∆2σ2Xσ
2

σ2γ
2∆2 + σ2X(pi
2
1σ
2
 + γ
2∆2)
+τ
(
1− pi1σ
2
Xσ
2

σ2γ
2∆2 + σ2X(pi
2
1σ
2
 + γ
2∆2)
)
γ2∆2σ2X
pi21σ
2
X + γ
2∆2
=
(1− τ) (pi21σ2X + γ2∆2 − pi1σ2X) γ2∆2σ2Xσ2
(pi21σ
2
X + γ
2∆2) (σ2γ
2∆2 + σ2X (pi
2
1σ
2
 + γ
2∆2))
+
τ (σ2γ
2∆2 + σ2Xpi
2
1σ
2
 + σ
2
Xγ
2∆2 − pi1σ2Xσ2 ) γ2∆2σ2X
(pi21σ
2
X + γ
2∆2) (σ2γ
2∆2 + σ2X (pi
2
1σ
2
 + γ
2∆2))
=
(pi21σ
2
X + γ
2∆2 − pi1σ2X) γ2∆2σ2Xσ2 + τσ4X∆4γ4
(pi21σ
2
X + γ
2∆2) (σ2γ
2∆2 + σ2X (pi
2
1σ
2
 + γ
2∆2))
=
γ2∆2σ2X (γ
2∆2σ2 + σ
2
X (γ
2∆2τ + (pi1 − 1) pi1σ2 ))
(pi21σ
2
X + γ
2∆2) (σ2γ
2∆2 + σ2X (pi
2
1σ
2
 + γ
2∆2))
.
The numerators in equations (2.15), (2.16) and (2.17) are
(1− τ)αA0 βB + ταB0 βA = (1− τ)
(
γ2∆2X¯ − pi0pi1σ2X + pi1γσ2XZ¯
)
γ2∆2σ2Xσ
2

(pi21σ
2
X + γ
2∆2) (σ2γ
2∆2 + σ2X(pi
2
1σ
2
 + γ
2∆2))
+τ
(
γ2∆2σ2 X¯ − pi0pi1σ2Xσ2 + γpi1σ2Xσ2 Z¯
)
γ2∆2σ2X
(σ2γ
2∆2 + σ2X(pi
2
1σ
2
 + γ
2∆2)) (pi21σ
2
X + γ
2∆2)
=
(
γ2∆2X¯ − pi0pi1σ2X + pi1γσ2XZ¯
)
γ2∆2σ2Xσ
2

(pi21σ
2
X + γ
2∆2) (σ2γ
2∆2 + σ2X(pi
2
1σ
2
 + γ
2∆2))
,
ταB1 β
A = τ
γ2∆2σ2X
σ2γ
2∆2 + σ2X(pi
2
1σ
2
 + γ
2∆2)
γ2∆2σ2X
pi21σ
2
X + γ
2∆2
=
τ∆4γ4σ4X
(pi21σ
2
X + γ
2∆2) (σ2γ
2∆2 + σ2X(pi
2
1σ
2
 + γ
2∆2))
,
and
ρβAβB = ρ
γ2∆2σ2X
pi21σ
2
X + γ
2∆2
γ2∆2σ2Xσ
2

σ2γ
2∆2 + σ2X(pi
2
1σ
2
 + γ
2∆2)
=
ρσ2γ
4∆4σ4X
(pi21σ
2
X + γ
2∆2) (σ2γ
2∆2 + σ2X(pi
2
1σ
2
 + γ
2∆2))
,
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respectively. So we have
pi0 =
(γ2∆2X¯−pi0pi1σ2X+pi1γσ2X Z¯)γ2∆2σ2Xσ2
(pi21σ2X+γ2∆2)(σ2 γ2∆2+σ2X(pi21σ2+γ2∆2))
γ2∆2σ2X(γ2∆2σ2+σ2X(γ2∆2τ+(pi1−1)pi1σ2 ))
(pi21σ2X+γ2∆2)(σ2 γ2∆2+σ2X(pi21σ2+γ2∆2))
=
(
γ2∆2X¯ − pi0pi1σ2X + pi1γσ2XZ¯
)
γ2∆2σ2Xσ
2

γ2∆2σ2X (γ
2∆2σ2 + σ
2
X (γ
2∆2τ + (pi1 − 1) pi1σ2 ))
=
(
γ2∆2X¯ − pi0pi1σ2X + pi1γσ2XZ¯
)
σ2
γ2∆2σ2 + σ
2
X (γ
2∆2τ + (pi1 − 1) pi1σ2 )
,
pi1 =
τ∆4γ4σ4X
(pi21σ2X+γ2∆2)(σ2 γ2∆2+σ2X(pi21σ2+γ2∆2))
γ2∆2σ2X(γ2∆2σ2+σ2X(γ2∆2τ+(pi1−1)pi1σ2 ))
(pi21σ2X+γ2∆2)(σ2 γ2∆2+σ2X(pi21σ2+γ2∆2))
=
τ∆4γ4σ4X
γ2∆2σ2X (γ
2∆2σ2 + σ
2
X (γ
2∆2τ + (pi1 − 1) pi1σ2 ))
=
τ∆2γ2σ2X
γ2∆2σ2 + σ
2
X (γ
2∆2τ + (pi1 − 1) pi1σ2 )
,
and
γ =
ρσ2 γ
4∆4σ4X
(pi21σ2X+γ2∆2)(σ2 γ2∆2+σ2X(pi21σ2+γ2∆2))
γ2∆2σ2X(γ2∆2σ2+σ2X(γ2∆2τ+(pi1−1)pi1σ2 ))
(pi21σ2X+γ2∆2)(σ2 γ2∆2+σ2X(pi21σ2+γ2∆2))
=
ρσ2γ
4∆4σ4X
γ2∆2σ2X (γ
2∆2σ2 + σ
2
X (γ
2∆2τ + (pi1 − 1) pi1σ2 ))
=
ρσ2γ
2∆2σ2X
γ2∆2σ2 + σ
2
X (γ
2∆2τ + (pi1 − 1) pi1σ2 )
.
Rearranging (2.15) yields (2.18) since
⇔ pi0 (γ2∆2σ2 + σ2X (γ2∆2τ + (pi1 − 1) pi1σ2 )) =
(
γ2∆2X¯ − pi0pi1σ2X + pi1γσ2XZ¯
)
σ2
⇔ pi0 (γ2∆2σ2 + σ2X (γ2∆2τ + pi21σ2 )) =
(
γ2∆2X¯ + pi1γσ
2
XZ¯
)
σ2
⇔ pi0 =
γσ2
(
γ∆2X¯ + pi1σ
2
XZ¯
)
γ2∆2σ2 + σ
2
X (γ
2∆2τ + pi21σ
2
 )
.
Now we come to equation (2.20). Plugging (2.19) in (2.16), we get
pi1 =
ρσ2
(
ρσ2pi1
τ
)2
∆2σ2X(
ρσ2pi1
τ
)2
∆2σ2 + σ
2
X
((
ρσ2pi1
τ
)2
∆2τ + (pi1 − 1) pi1σ2
) .
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Rearranging yields20
1
τ2
ρ2σ4∆
2τσ2Xpi
2
1 =
1
τ 2
ρ2σ6∆
2pi31 +
1
τ 2
ρ2σ2σ
2
X∆
2τpi31 + σ
2
Xσ
2
pi
2
1 − σ2Xσ2pi21
⇔ ρ2σ4∆2τσ2X + σ2Xσ2 τ 2 =
(
ρ2σ6∆
2 + ρ2σ2σ
2
X∆
2τ + τ 2σ2Xσ
2

)
pi1
⇔ pi1 = τσ
2
Xσ
2
 (∆
2ρ2σ2 + τ)
σ2 (ρ
2∆2σ4 + τσ
2
X(∆
2ρ2σ2 + τ))
=
τσ2X (∆
2ρ2σ2 + τ)
ρ2∆2σ4 + τσ
2
X (∆
2ρ2σ2 + τ)
.
Finally we show that equation (2.22) holds. Plugging (2.19) in (2.15), we have21
pi0 =
ρσ2pi1
τ
σ2
(
ρσ2pi1
τ
∆2X¯ + pi1Z¯σ
2
X
)
(
ρσ2pi1
τ
)2
∆2σ2 + σ
2
X
((
ρσ2pi1
τ
)2
∆2τ + pi21σ
2

)
=
pi21
τ2
ρσ4
(
ρσ2∆
2X¯ + τZ¯σ2X
)
pi21
τ2
(ρ∆2σ6 + σ
2
X (ρσ
4
∆
2τ + σ2 τ
2))
=
ρσ2
(
ρσ2∆
2X¯ + τZ¯σ2X
)
ρ∆2σ4 + τσ
2
X (ρσ
2
∆
2 + τ)
.
2.B Alternative decompositions of the final wealth
We mentioned in footnote 14 and 18 that there are also other decompositions of the
final wealth which lead to the same expected utility. To make sure that there is no
mistake in the mathematica file, it contains another decomposition of the final wealth.
It is shown in appendix 2.C that both decompositions lead to the same expected utility.
These other decompositions are presented in this section. We will see that the matrix
A, the vector b and the scalar d from lemma 1 will be much more complicated than
before but the variance-covariance-matrix will be pretty simple.
Type-A agents
As mentioned in footnote 14, we consider the vector
(
X − X¯ Z − Z¯
)t
of random
variables. The initial wealth was w1i = w0i + z
A
i (X − p) + Z¯p. Using equations (2.2),
20Recall from footnote 12 that pi1 6= 0.
21Assuming again that pi0 6= 0 6= γ.
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(2.4), and (2.5) we get
w1i = w0i +
αA0 + (α
A
2 − 1)(pi0 + pi1X − γZ)
ρβA
(X − pi0 − pi1X + γZ)
+Z¯(pi0 + pi1X − γZ)
= w0i − α
A
0 + (α
A
2 − 1)pi0
ρβA
pi0 + Z¯pi0 +
(αA2 − 1)pi1
ρβA
(1− pi1)X2
−(α
A
2 − 1)γ
ρβA
γZ2 +
(
(αA2 − 1)pi1
ρβA
γ − (α
A
2 − 1)γ
ρβA
(1− pi1)
)
XZ
+
(
αA0 + (α
A
2 − 1)pi0
ρβA
(1− pi1)− (α
A
2 − 1)pi1
ρβA
pi0 + Z¯pi1
)
X
+
(
(αA2 − 1)γ
ρβA
pi0 − α
A
0 + (α
A
2 − 1)pi0
ρβA
γ − Z¯γ
)
Z.
Using that
XZ = X(Z − Z¯) +XZ¯ = (X − X¯)(Z − Z¯) + X¯(Z − Z¯) + (X − X¯)Z¯ + X¯Z¯, (2.24)
we get
w1i =
(αA2 − 1)pi1
ρβA
(1− pi1)(X − X¯)2 −
(
(αA2 − 1)γ
ρβA
γ
)
(Z − Z¯)2
+
(
(αA2 − 1)pi1
ρβA
γ − (α
A
2 − 1)γ
ρβA
(1− pi1)
)
(X − X¯)(Z − Z¯)
+
(
2X¯
(αA2 − 1)pi1
ρβA
(1− pi1) +
(
(αA2 − 1)pi1
ρβA
γ − (α
A
2 − 1)γ
ρβA
(1− pi1)
)
Z¯
+
(
αA0 + (α
A
2 − 1)pi0
ρβA
(1− pi1)− (α
A
2 − 1)pi1
ρβA
pi0 + Z¯pi1
))
(X − X¯)
+
(
−2Z¯ (α
A
2 − 1)γ
ρβA
γ +
(
(αA2 − 1)pi1
ρβA
γ − (α
A
2 − 1)γ
ρβA
(1− pi1)
)
X¯
+
(
(αA2 − 1)γ
ρβA
pi0 − α
A
0 + (α
A
2 − 1)pi0
ρβA
γ − Z¯γ
))
(Z − Z¯)
+w0i − α
A
0 + (α
A
2 − 1)pi0
ρβA
pi0 + Z¯pi0 +
(αA2 − 1)pi1
ρβA
(1− pi1)X¯2
+
(
(αA2 − 1)pi1
ρβA
γ − (α
A
2 − 1)γ
ρβA
(1− pi1)
)
X¯Z¯ − (α
A
2 − 1)γ
ρβA
γZ¯2
+
(
αA0 + (α
A
2 − 1)pi0
ρβA
(1− pi1)− (α
A
2 − 1)pi1
ρβA
pi0 + Z¯pi1
)
X¯
+
(
(αA2 − 1)γ
ρβA
pi0 − α
A
0 + (α
A
2 − 1)pi0
ρβA
γ − Z¯γ
)
Z¯.
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So
A =
 −ρ (αA2 −1)pi1ρβA (1− pi1) −ρ2 ( (αA2 −1)pi1ρβA γ − (αA2 −1)γρβA (1− pi1))
−ρ
2
(
(αA2 −1)pi1
ρβA
γ − (αA2 −1)γ
ρβA
(1− pi1)
)
ρ
(
(αA2 −1)γ2
ρβA
)
 ,
b =

−ρ
(
2X¯
(αA2 −1)pi1(1−pi1)
ρβA
+
(
(αA2 −1)pi1γ
ρβA
− (αA2 −1)γ(1−pi1)
ρβA
)
Z¯
+
(
(αA0 +(αA2 −1)pi0)(1−pi1)
ρβA
− (αA2 −1)pi1pi0
ρβA
+ Z¯pi1
))
−ρ
((
(αA2 −1)pi1
ρβA
γ − (αA2 −1)γ
ρβA
(1− pi1)
)
X¯
+
(
(αA2 −1)γ
ρβA
pi0 − α
A
0 +(α
A
2 −1)pi0
ρβA
γ − Z¯γ
)
− 2Z¯ (αA2 −1)γ
ρβA
γ
)

and
d = w0i − α
A
0 + (α
A
2 − 1)pi0
ρβA
pi0 + Z¯pi0 +
(αA2 − 1)pi1
ρβA
(1− pi1)X¯2
+
(
(αA2 − 1)pi1
ρβA
γ − (α
A
2 − 1)γ
ρβA
(1− pi1)
)
X¯Z¯ − (α
A
2 − 1)γ
ρβA
γZ¯2
+
(
αA0 + (α
A
2 − 1)pi0
ρβA
(1− pi1)− (α
A
2 − 1)pi1
ρβA
pi0 + Z¯pi1
)
X¯
+
(
(αA2 − 1)γ
ρβA
pi0 − α
A
0 + (α
A
2 − 1)pi0
ρβA
γ − Z¯γ
)
Z¯.
The variance-covariance-matrix in this case is
Σ =
 σ2X 0
0 ∆2
 .
Type-B agents
Recall footnote 18 where we mentioned the vector
(
X − X¯ Z − Z¯ i
)t
of random
variables. Plugging equations (2.3), (2.4), and (2.10) final wealth of a type-B agent
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becomes
w1i = w0i + Z¯p+ z
B
i (X − p)
= w0i + Z¯(pi0 + pi1X − γZ)
+
αB0 + α
B
1 (X + i) + (α
B
2 − 1)(pi0 + pi1X − γZ)
ρβB
(X − pi0 − pi1X + γZ)
= w0i + Z¯pi0 − α
B
0 + (α
B
2 − 1)pi0
ρβB
pi0 +
αB1 + (α
B
2 − 1)pi1
ρβB
(1− pi1)X2
−(α
B
2 − 1)γ2
ρβB
Z2 +
(
αB1 + (α
B
2 − 1)pi1
ρβB
γ − (α
B
2 − 1)γ
ρβB
(1− pi1)
)
XZ
+
αB1 (1− pi1)
ρβB
Xi +
αB1 γ
ρβB
Zi − α
B
1
ρβB
pi0i
+
(
αB0 + (α
B
2 − 1)pi0
ρβB
(1− pi1)− α
B
1
ρβB
pi0 + Z¯pi1
)
X
+
(
αB0 + (α
B
2 − 1)pi0
ρβB
γ +
(αB2 − 1)γ
ρβB
pi0 − Z¯γ
)
Z.
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Using again equation (2.24), we have
w1i =
αB1 + (α
B
2 − 1)pi1
ρβB
(1− pi1)(X − X¯)2 − (α
B
2 − 1)γ2
ρβB
(Z − Z¯)2
+
(
αB1 + (α
B
2 − 1)pi1
ρβB
γ − (α
B
2 − 1)γ
ρβB
(1− pi1)
)
(X − X¯)(Z − Z¯)
+
αB1 (1− pi1)
ρβB
(X − X¯)i + α
B
1 γ
ρβB
(Z − Z¯)i
+
((
αB1 + (α
B
2 − 1)pi1
ρβB
γ − (α
B
2 − 1)γ
ρβB
(1− pi1)
)
Z¯
+ 2X¯
αB1 + (α
B
2 − 1)pi1
ρβB
(1− pi1)
+
(
αB0 + (α
B
2 − 1)pi0
ρβB
(1− pi1)− α
B
1
ρβB
pi0 + Z¯pi1
))
(X − X¯)
+
((
αB1 + (α
B
2 − 1)pi1
ρβB
γ − (α
B
2 − 1)γ
ρβB
(1− pi1)
)
X¯ − 2Z¯ (α
B
2 − 1)γ2
ρβB
+
(
αB0 + (α
B
2 − 1)pi0
ρβB
γ +
(αB2 − 1)γ
ρβB
pi0 − Z¯γ
))
(Z − Z¯)
+
(
αB1 (1− pi1)
ρβB
X¯ +
αB1 γ
ρβB
Z¯ − α
B
1
ρβB
pi0
)
i
+w0i + Z¯pi0 − α
B
0 + (α
B
2 − 1)pi0
ρβB
pi0 +
αB1 + (α
B
2 − 1)pi1
ρβB
(1− pi1)X¯2
−(α
B
2 − 1)γ2
ρβB
Z¯2
+
(
αB1 + (α
B
2 − 1)pi1
ρβB
γ − (α
B
2 − 1)γ
ρβB
(1− pi1)
)
X¯Z¯
+
(
αB0 + (α
B
2 − 1)pi0
ρβB
(1− pi1)− α
B
1
ρβB
pi0 + Z¯pi1
)
X¯
+
(
αB0 + (α
B
2 − 1)pi0
ρβB
γ +
(αB2 − 1)γ
ρβB
pi0 − Z¯γ
)
Z¯.
So
A =

−αB1 +(αB2 −1)pi1
βB
(1− pi1) −(α
B
1 +(α
B
2 −1)pi1)γ−(αB2 −1)γ(1−pi1)
2βB
−αB1 (1−pi1)
2βB
−(α
B
1 +(α
B
2 −1)pi1)γ−(αB2 −1)γ(1−pi1)
2βB
(αB2 −1)γ2
βB
−αB1 γ
2βB
−αB1 (1−pi1)
2βB
−αB1 γ
2βB
0
 ,
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b =

−ρ
((
αB1 +(α
B
2 −1)pi1
ρβB
γ − (αB2 −1)γ
ρβB
(1− pi1)
)
Z¯ + 2X¯
αB1 +(α
B
2 −1)pi1
ρβB
(1− pi1)+(
αB0 +(α
B
2 −1)pi0
ρβB
(1− pi1)− α
B
1
ρβB
pi0 + Z¯pi1
))
−ρ
((
αB1 +(α
B
2 −1)pi1
ρβB
γ − (αB2 −1)γ
ρβB
(1− pi1)
)
X¯ − 2Z¯ (αB2 −1)γ2
ρβB
+(
αB0 +(α
B
2 −1)pi0
ρβB
γ +
(αB2 −1)γ
ρβB
pi0 − Z¯γ
))
−ρ
(
αB1 (1−pi1)
ρβB
X¯ +
αB1 γ
ρβB
Z¯ − αB1
ρβB
pi0
)

and
d = w0i + Z¯pi0 − α
B
0 + (α
B
2 − 1)pi0
ρβB
pi0
+
αB1 + (α
B
2 − 1)pi1
ρβB
(1− pi1)X¯2 − (α
B
2 − 1)γ2
ρβB
Z¯2
+
(
αB1 + (α
B
2 − 1)pi1
ρβB
γ − (α
B
2 − 1)γ
ρβB
(1− pi1)
)
X¯Z¯
+
(
αB0 + (α
B
2 − 1)pi0
ρβB
(1− pi1)− α
B
1
ρβB
pi0 + Z¯pi1
)
X¯
+
(
αB0 + (α
B
2 − 1)pi0
ρβB
γ +
(αB2 − 1)γ
ρβB
pi0 − Z¯γ
)
Z¯.
The variance-covariance matrix is again very simple:
Σ =

σ2X 0 0
0 ∆2 0
0 0 σ2
 .
2.C Mathematica source code
On the next pages is the commented (expressions in (* *) are comments) mathematica
source code where the expectation formation, the market clearing, the comparative
statics and the expected utility functions are computed.
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In[1]:= solPrice = 8p → π0 + π1 X − γ Z<; H∗substitution rule for the price∗L
In[2]:= para = :ρ → 5, σX → 1, X → 5, Z → 5, ∆ → 1, σε →
1
10
, w0 → 1>; H∗set of parameters∗L
Type A
In[3]:= VA = 99σX2, π1 σX2=, 9π1 σX2, π12 σX2 + γ2 ∆2==;
H∗variance−covariance−matrix of the vector HX pLt∗L
In[4]:= MatrixForm@VAD
Out[4]//MatrixForm=
σX
2 π1 σX
2
π1 σX
2 γ2 ∆2 + π1
2 σX
2
In[5]:= Alpha0A = :αA0 −> X −
VA@@1, 2DD
VA@@2, 2DD
Iπ0 + π1 X − γ ZM> H∗α0 for agents of type A∗L
Out[5]= :αA0 → X −
π1 I−γ Z + π0 + X π1M σX2
γ2 ∆2 + π1
2 σX
2
>
In[6]:= Alpha2A = :αA2 −>
VA@@1, 2DD
VA@@2, 2DD
> H∗α2 for agents of type A∗L
Out[6]= :αA2 →
π1 σX
2
γ2 ∆2 + π1
2 σX
2
>
In[7]:= betaA = :βA → VA@@1, 1DD −
VA@@1, 2DD
VA@@2, 2DD
VA@@1, 2DD> êê Simplify
H∗conditional variance of the payoff X given the price p of the type A agents∗L
Out[7]= :βA →
γ2 ∆2 σX
2
γ2 ∆2 + π1
2 σX
2
>
In[8]:= shareA =
αA0 + HαA2 − 1L p
ρ βA
; H∗number of shares an agent of type A holds∗L
Type B
In[9]:= VB = 99σX2, σX2, π1 σX2=, 9σX2, σX2 + σε2, π1 σX2=, 9π1 σX2, π1 σX2, π12 σX2 + γ2 ∆2==;
H∗variance−covariance−matrix of the vector HX yi pLt∗L
In[10]:= MatrixForm@VBD
Out[10]//MatrixForm=
σX
2 σX
2 π1 σX
2
σX
2 σX
2 + σε
2 π1 σX
2
π1 σX
2 π1 σX
2 γ2 ∆2 + π1
2 σX
2
In[11]:= Alpha0B = 9αB0 −> X − VB@@1, 2 ;; 3DD.Inverse@VB@@2 ;; 3, 2 ;; 3DDD.9X, π0 + π1 X − γ Z== êê
Simplify H∗α0 for agents of type B∗L
Out[11]= 9αB0 → IIγ2 ∆2 X + Iγ Z − π0M π1 σX2M σε2M ë Iγ2 ∆2 σε2 + σX2 Iγ2 ∆2 + π12 σε2MM=
In[12]:= Alpha1B = 8αB1 −> VB@@1, 2 ;; 3DD.Inverse@VB@@2 ;; 3, 2 ;; 3DDD@@1DD< êê
Simplify H∗α1 for agents of type B∗L
Out[12]= :αB1 →
γ2 ∆2 σX
2
γ2 ∆2 σε
2 + σX
2 Iγ2 ∆2 + π12 σε2M
>
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In[13]:= Alpha2B = 8αB2 −> VB@@1, 2 ;; 3DD.Inverse@VB@@2 ;; 3, 2 ;; 3DDD@@2DD< êê
Simplify H∗α2 for agents of type B∗L
Out[13]= :αB2 →
π1 σX
2 σε
2
γ2 ∆2 σε
2 + σX
2 Iγ2 ∆2 + π12 σε2M
>
In[14]:= betaB = 9βB → σX2 − VB@@1, 2 ;; 3DD.Inverse@VB@@2 ;; 3, 2 ;; 3DDD.VB@@1, 2 ;; 3DD= êê
Simplify H∗conditional variance of the payoff X given
the private signal yi and the price p of the type B agents∗L
Out[14]= :βB →
γ2 ∆2 σX
2 σε
2
γ2 ∆2 σε
2 + σX
2 Iγ2 ∆2 + π12 σε2M
>
In[15]:= shareB =
1
ρ βB
HαB0 + αB1 HX + εiL + HαB2 − 1L pL;H∗number of shares an agent of type B holds∗L
In[16]:= aggshareB =
αB0 + αB1 X + HαB2 − 1L p
ρ βB
;
H∗number of shares all agents of type B hold together∗L
Market Clearing 
In[17]:= Marketclearing = τ aggshareB + H1 − τL shareA
H∗market clearing condition with τ type−B agents and H1−τL type−A agents∗L
Out[17]=
H1 − τL HαA0 + p H−1 + αA2LL
ρ βA
+
τ HαB0 + X αB1 + p H−1 + αB2LL
ρ βB
In[18]:= Solve@Marketclearing  Z, pD@@1DD H∗solving the market clearing condition for p∗L
Out[18]= 8p →
H−τ αB0 βA − X τ αB1 βA − αA0 βB + τ αA0 βB + Z ρ βA βBL ê H−τ βA + τ αB2 βA − βB + τ βB + αA2 βB − τ αA2 βBL<
In[19]:= Collect@H−τ αB0 βA − X τ αB1 βA − αA0 βB + τ αA0 βB + Z ρ βA βBL ê
H−τ βA + τ αB2 βA − βB + τ βB + αA2 βB − τ αA2 βBL, 8X, Z<D
H∗solving the market clearing price for X and Z to get the
coefficients in the price function p = π0+π1 X − γ Z∗L
Out[19]= −HX τ αB1 βAL ê H−τ βA + τ αB2 βA − βB + τ βB + αA2 βB − τ αA2 βBL +
HZ ρ βA βBL ê H−τ βA + τ αB2 βA − βB + τ βB + αA2 βB − τ αA2 βBL +
H−τ αB0 βA − αA0 βB + τ αA0 βBL ê H−τ βA + τ αB2 βA − βB + τ βB + αA2 βB − τ αA2 βBL
In[20]:= Pi0 =
H−τ αB0 βA − αA0 βB + τ αA0 βBL ê H−τ βA + τ αB2 βA − βB + τ βB + αA2 βB − τ αA2 βBL êê. 8Alpha0A@@1DD,
Alpha2A@@1DD, Alpha0B@@1DD, Alpha1B@@1DD, Alpha2B@@1DD, betaA@@1DD, betaB @@1DD< êê
Simplify H∗defining π0 and plugging in the values of the α's and β's∗L
Out[20]= IIγ2 ∆2 X + Iγ Z − π0M π1 σX2M σε2M ë Iγ2 ∆2 σε2 + σX2 Iγ2 ∆2 τ + H−1 + π1L π1 σε2MM
In[21]:= Pi1 = −Hτ αB1 βAL ê H−τ βA + τ αB2 βA − βB + τ βB + αA2 βB − τ αA2 βBL êê. 8Alpha0A@@1DD, Alpha2A@@1DD,
Alpha0B@@1DD, Alpha1B@@1DD, Alpha2B@@1DD, betaA@@1DD, betaB @@1DD< êê
Simplify H∗defining π1 and plugging in the values of the α's and β's∗L
Out[21]= Iγ2 ∆2 τ σX2M ë Iγ2 ∆2 σε2 + σX2 Iγ2 ∆2 τ + H−1 + π1L π1 σε2MM
In[22]:= Gam = − ρ βA βB ê H−τ βA + τ αB2 βA − βB + τ βB + αA2 βB − τ αA2 βBL êê. 8Alpha0A@@1DD, Alpha2A@@1DD,
Alpha0B@@1DD, Alpha1B@@1DD, Alpha2B@@1DD, betaA@@1DD, betaB @@1DD< êê
Simplify H∗defining γ and plugging in the values of the α's and β's∗L
Out[22]= Iγ2 ∆2 ρ σX2 σε2M ë Iγ2 ∆2 σε2 + σX2 Iγ2 ∆2 τ + H−1 + π1L π1 σε2MM
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In[23]:= Pi0sol1 = Solve@Pi0  π0, π0D@@1DD êê Simplify H∗solving the upper π0 function for π0∗L
Out[23]= 9π0 → Iγ Iγ ∆2 X + Z π1 σX2M σε2M ë Iγ2 ∆2 σε2 + σX2 Iγ2 ∆2 τ + π12 σε2MM=
In[24]:= Pi1Gammasol = Solve@8Pi1  π1, Gam  γ<, 8π1, γ<D@@1DD êê Simplify
H∗solving the upper π1 and γ function for π1 and γ simultaneously∗L
Out[24]= :π1 →
τ σX
2 Iτ + ∆2 ρ2 σε2M
∆2 ρ2 σε
4 + τ σX
2 Iτ + ∆2 ρ2 σε2M
, γ →
ρ σX
2 σε
2 Iτ + ∆2 ρ2 σε2M
∆2 ρ2 σε
4 + τ σX
2 Iτ + ∆2 ρ2 σε2M
>
In[25]:= Pi0sol = Pi0sol1 êê. Pi1Gammasol êê Simplify H∗plugging π1 and γ in π0∗L
Out[25]= :π0 →
ρ σε
2 Iτ Z σX2 + ∆2 ρ X σε2M
∆2 ρ2 σε
4 + τ σX
2 Iτ + ∆2 ρ2 σε2M
>
In[26]:= Pi1sol = 8Pi1Gammasol@@1DD< H∗defining π1∗L
Out[26]= :π1 →
τ σX
2 Iτ + ∆2 ρ2 σε2M
∆2 ρ2 σε
4 + τ σX
2 Iτ + ∆2 ρ2 σε2M
>
In[27]:= Gammasol = 8Pi1Gammasol@@2DD< H∗defining γ∗L
Out[27]= :γ →
ρ σX
2 σε
2 Iτ + ∆2 ρ2 σε2M
∆2 ρ2 σε
4 + τ σX
2 Iτ + ∆2 ρ2 σε2M
>
Comparative Statics on γ ∆2
In[28]:= γ ∆2 êê. Gammasol êê. ∆2 → x H∗replacing ∆2 for the derivative∗L
Out[28]=
x ρ σX
2 σε
2 Iτ + x ρ2 σε2M
x ρ2 σε
4 + τ σX
2 Iτ + x ρ2 σε2M
In[29]:= D@%, xD êê Simplify H∗deriving with respect to x = ∆2∗L
Out[29]= Ix2 ρ5 σX2 σε8 + ρ τ σX4 σε2 Iτ + x ρ2 σε2M2M ë Ix ρ2 σε4 + τ σX2 Iτ + x ρ2 σε2MM2
In[30]:= % êê. x → ∆2 H∗resubstituting ∆2∗L
Out[30]= I∆4 ρ5 σX2 σε8 + ρ τ σX4 σε2 Iτ + ∆2 ρ2 σε2M2M ë I∆2 ρ2 σε4 + τ σX2 Iτ + ∆2 ρ2 σε2MM2
In[31]:= DAγ ∆2 êê. Gammasol êê. σX2 → x, xE êê Simplify
H∗deriving γ∆2 with respect to σX2 after substitution∗L
Out[31]=
∆4 ρ3 σε
6 Iτ + ∆2 ρ2 σε2M
Ix τ2 + x ∆2 ρ2 τ σε2 + ∆2 ρ2 σε4M2
In[32]:= % êê. x → σX2H∗resubstituting σX2∗L
Out[32]= I∆4 ρ3 σε6 Iτ + ∆2 ρ2 σε2MM ë Iτ2 σX2 + ∆2 ρ2 τ σX2 σε2 + ∆2 ρ2 σε4M2
In[33]:= DAγ ∆2 êê. Gammasol, τE êê Simplify H∗deriving γ∆2 with respect to τ∗L
Out[33]= −I∆2 ρ σX2 σε2 I−∆2 ρ2 σε4 + σX2 Iτ + ∆2 ρ2 σε2M2MM ë I∆2 ρ2 σε4 + τ σX2 Iτ + ∆2 ρ2 σε2MM2
Expected Utility of agents of type A
ü variant 1
In[34]:= testA1 = −ρ Iw0 + p Z + zi HX − pLM; H∗expression in the exponent of the utility function∗L
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In[35]:= vecwA1 = 9zi − ZA, X − p − Xmp, p − p=; H∗vector for the decomposition∗L
In[36]:= matAA1 = ::0,
−ρ
2
, 0>, :
−ρ
2
, 0, 0>, 80, 0, 0<>; H∗matrix A∗L
In[37]:= vecbA1 = 9−ρ Xmp, −ρ ZA, −ρ Z=; H∗vector b∗L
In[38]:= skadA1 = −ρ Iw0 + p Z + ZA HXmpLM; H∗scalar d∗L
In[39]:= testA1 − vecwA1.matAA1.vecwA1 − vecwA1.vecbA1 − skadA1 êê
Simplify H∗test, whether the decomposition was correct∗L
Out[39]= 0
In[40]:= I3 = 881, 0, 0<, 80, 1, 0<, 80, 0, 1<<; H∗identity matrix∗L
In[41]:= ΣA1 = ::
HαA2 − 1L π1
ρ βA
2
σX
2 +
HαA2 − 1L γ
ρ βA
2
∆2,
HαA2 − 1L π1
ρ βA
H1 − π1L σX2 −
HαA2 − 1L γ
ρ βA
γ ∆2,
HαA2 − 1L π1
ρ βA
π1 σX
2 +
HαA2 − 1L γ
ρ βA
γ ∆2>,
:
HαA2 − 1L π1
ρ βA
H1 − π1L σX2 −
HαA2 − 1L γ
ρ βA
γ ∆2, H1 − π1L2 σX2 + γ2 ∆2, H1 − π1L π1 σX2 − γ2 ∆2>,
:
HαA2 − 1L π1
ρ βA
π1 σX
2 +
HαA2 − 1L γ
ρ βA
γ ∆2, H1 − π1L π1 σX2 − γ2 ∆2, π12 σX2 + γ2 ∆2>>;
H∗variance−covariance−matrix∗L
In[42]:= EUA1 =
−1
ρ
1
Det@I3 − 2 ΣA1.matAA1D
ExpB
1
2
vecbA1.Inverse@I3 − 2 ΣA1.matAA1D.ΣA1.vecbA1 + skadA1F êê Simplify;
H∗computation of the expected utility∗L
In[43]:= EUA11 = EUA1 êê. :ZA →
1
ρ βA
IαA0 + I−Z γ + π0 + X π1M H−1 + αA2LM,
Xmp → H1 − π1L X − π0 + γ Z, p → π0 + π1 X − γ Z> êê Simplify;
H∗substitutiong the means of ziA, X−p and p∗L
In[44]:= EUA12 = EUA11 êê. 8Alpha0A@@1DD, Alpha2A@@1DD, Alpha0B@@1DD,
Alpha1B@@1DD, Alpha2B@@1DD, betaA@@1DD, betaB @@1DD< êê Simplify;
H∗plugging the α's and the β's in the expected utility function∗L
In[45]:= EUA13 = EUA12 êê. 8Pi0sol@@1DD, Pi1sol@@1DD, Gammasol@@1DD< êê Simplify;
H∗plugging π0, π1 and γ in the expected utility ∗L
In[46]:= EUA14 = EUA13 êê. para;
H∗plugging the parameter example in the expected utility function∗L
ü variant 2
In[47]:= testA2 = −ρ Iw0 + p Z + zi HX − pLM êê. 8zi −> shareA< êê.
solPrice H∗expression in the exponent of the utility function∗L
Out[47]= −ρ Z H−Z γ + π0 + X π1L + w0 +
1
ρ βA
HX + Z γ − π0 − X π1L HαA0 + H−Z γ + π0 + X π1L H−1 + αA2LL
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In[48]:= Collect@testA2, 8X, Z<DH∗collecting all expressions with X and Z∗L
Out[48]= X −Z ρ −
γ H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
+
2 γ π1 H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
−
ρ Z π1 +
αA0
ρ βA
−
π1 αA0
ρ βA
+
π0 H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
−
2 π0 π1 H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
−
Z ρ −γ Z +
γ αA0
ρ βA
+
2 γ π0 H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
− ρ Z π0 + w0 −
π0 αA0
ρ βA
−
π0
2 H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
−
X2 ρ
π1 H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
−
π1
2 H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
+
Z2 γ2 H−1 + αA2L
βA
In[49]:= vecwA2 = 9X − X, Z − Z=; H∗vector for the decomposition∗L
In[50]:= matAA2 = ::−ρ
π1 H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
−
π1
2 H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
,
−ρ
2
−
γ H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
+
2 γ π1 H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
>,
:
−ρ
2
−
γ H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
+
2 γ π1 H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
,
γ2 H−1 + αA2L
βA
>>; H∗matrix A∗L
In[51]:= vecbA2 = :−ρ Z π1 +
αA0
ρ βA
−
π1 αA0
ρ βA
+
π0 H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
−
2 π0 π1 H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
−
Z ρ −
γ H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
+
2 γ π1 H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
− 2 X ρ
π1 H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
−
π1
2 H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
,
− ρ −γ Z +
γ αA0
ρ βA
+
2 γ π0 H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
− X ρ −
γ H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
+
2 γ π1 H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
+
2 Z γ2 H−1 + αA2L
βA
>; H∗vector b∗L
In[52]:= skadA2 = X −Z ρ −
γ H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
+
2 γ π1 H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
−
ρ Z π1 +
αA0
ρ βA
−
π1 αA0
ρ βA
+
π0 H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
−
2 π0 π1 H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
−
Z ρ −γ Z +
γ αA0
ρ βA
+
2 γ π0 H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
− ρ Z π0 + w0 −
π0 αA0
ρ βA
−
π0
2 H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
−
X
2
ρ
π1 H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
−
π1
2 H−1 + αA2L
ρ βA
+
Z
2
γ2 H−1 + αA2L
βA
; H∗scalar d∗L
In[53]:= testA2 − vecwA2.matAA2.vecwA2 − vecwA2.vecbA2 − skadA2 êê
Simplify H∗test, whether the decomposition was correct∗L
Out[53]= 0
In[54]:= I2 = 881, 0<, 80, 1<<; H∗identity matrix∗L
In[55]:= ΣA2 = 99σX2, 0=, 90, ∆2==; H∗variance−covariance−matrix∗L
In[56]:= EUA2 =
−1
ρ
1
Det@I2 − 2 ΣA2.matAA2D
ExpB
1
2
vecbA2.Inverse@I2 − 2 ΣA2.matAA2D.ΣA2.vecbA2 + skadA2F êê Simplify;
H∗computation of the expected utility∗L
In[57]:= EUA21 = EUA2 êê. 8Alpha0A@@1DD, Alpha2A@@1DD, Alpha0B@@1DD,
Alpha1B@@1DD, Alpha2B@@1DD, betaA@@1DD, betaB @@1DD< êê Simplify;
H∗plugging the α's and the β's in the expected utility function∗L
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In[58]:= EUA22 = EUA21 êê. 8Pi0sol@@1DD, Pi1sol@@1DD, Gammasol@@1DD< êê Simplify;
H∗plugging π0, π1 and γ in the expected utility ∗L
In[59]:= EUA23 = EUA22 êê. para;
H∗plugging the parameter example in the expected utility function∗L
In[60]:= Plot@8EUA14, EUA23<, 8τ, 0, 1<DH∗mutual plot of variant 1 and variant
2 to check whether both decompositions lead to the same result∗L
Out[60]=
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
-3.62µ 1078
-3.60µ 1078
-3.58µ 1078
-3.56µ 1078
-3.54µ 1078
-3.52µ 1078
Expected Utility of agents of type B
ü variant 1
In[61]:= testB1 = −ρ Iw0 + p Z + zi HX − pLM;H∗expression in the exponent of the utility function∗L
In[62]:= vecwB1 = 9zi − ZB, X − p − Xmp, p − p=; H∗vector for the decomposition∗L
In[63]:= matAB1 = ::0,
−ρ
2
, 0>, :
−ρ
2
, 0, 0>, 80, 0, 0<>; H∗matrix A∗L
In[64]:= vecbB1 = 9−ρ Xmp, −ρ ZB, −ρ Z=; H∗vector b∗L
In[65]:= skadB1 = −ρ Iw0 + p Z + ZB HXmpLM; H∗scalar d∗L
In[66]:= testB1 − vecwB1.matAB1.vecwB1 − vecwB1.vecbB1 − skadB1 êê
SimplifyH∗test, whether the decomposition was correct∗L
Out[66]= 0
In[67]:= ΣB1 = ::
αB1
ρ βB
2
σε
2 +
HαB2 − 1L π1 + αB1
ρ βB
2
σX
2 +
HαB2 − 1L γ
ρ βB
2
∆2,
HαB2 − 1L π1 + αB1
ρ βB
H1 − π1L σX2 −
HαB2 − 1L γ
ρ βB
γ ∆2,
HαB2 − 1L π1 + αB1
ρ βB
π1 σX
2 +
HαB2 − 1L γ
ρ βB
γ ∆2>,
:
HαB2 − 1L π1 + αB1
ρ βB
H1 − π1L σX2 −
HαB2 − 1L γ
ρ βB
γ ∆2, H1 − π1L2 σX2 + γ2 ∆2, H1 − π1L π1 σX2 − γ2 ∆2>,
:
HαB2 − 1L π1 + αB1
ρ βB
π1 σX
2 +
HαB2 − 1L γ
ρ βB
γ ∆2, H1 − π1L π1 σX2 − γ2 ∆2, π12 σX2 + γ2 ∆2>>;
H∗variance−covariance−matrix∗L
In[68]:= EUB1 =
−1
ρ
1
Det@I3 − 2 ΣB1.matAB1D
ExpB
1
2
vecbB1.Inverse@I3 − 2 ΣB1.matAB1D.ΣB1.vecbB1 + skadB1F êê Simplify;
H∗computation of the expected utility∗L
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In[69]:= EUB11 = EUB1 êê. :ZB →
1
ρ βB
IαB0 + X αB1 + I−Z γ + π0 + X π1M H−1 + αB2LM,
Xmp → H1 − π1L X − π0 + γ Z, p → π0 + π1 X − γ Z> êê Simplify;
H∗substitutiong the means of ziB, X−p and p∗L
In[70]:= EUB12 = EUB11 êê. 8Alpha0A@@1DD, Alpha2A@@1DD, Alpha0B@@1DD,
Alpha1B@@1DD, Alpha2B@@1DD, betaA@@1DD, betaB @@1DD< êê Simplify;
H∗plugging the α's and the β's in the expected utility function∗L
In[71]:= EUB13 = EUB12 êê. 8Pi0sol@@1DD, Pi1sol@@1DD, Gammasol@@1DD< êê Simplify;
H∗plugging π0, π1 and γ in the expected utility ∗L
In[72]:= EUB14 = EUB13 êê. para êê Simplify;
H∗plugging the parameter example in the expected utility function∗L
ü variant 2
In[73]:= testB2 = −ρ Iw0 + p Z + zi HX − pLM êê. zi → shareB êê.
solPrice H∗expression in the exponent of the utility function∗L
Out[73]= −ρ
Z H−Z γ + π0 + X π1L + w0 +
1
ρ βB
HX + Z γ − π0 − X π1L HαB0 + H−Z γ + π0 + X π1L H−1 + αB2L + αB1 HX + εiLL
In[74]:= Collect@%, 8X, Z, εi<D H∗collecting all expressions with X, Z and εi∗L
Out[74]= −ρ Z π0 + w0 −
π0 αB0
ρ βB
−
π0
2 H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
− X2 ρ
αB1
ρ βB
−
π1 αB1
ρ βB
+
π1 H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
−
π1
2 H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
+
Z2 γ2 H−1 + αB2L
βB
+
π0 αB1 εi
βB
+ X −Z ρ
γ αB1
ρ βB
−
γ H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
+
2 γ π1 H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
−
ρ Z π1 +
αB0
ρ βB
−
π1 αB0
ρ βB
−
π0 αB1
ρ βB
+
π0 H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
−
2 π0 π1 H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
− ρ
αB1
ρ βB
−
π1 αB1
ρ βB
εi +
Z −ρ −γ Z +
γ αB0
ρ βB
+
2 γ π0 H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
−
γ αB1 εi
βB
In[75]:= vecwB2 = 9X − X, Z − Z, εi=; H∗vector for the decomposition∗L
In[76]:= matAB2 = ::−ρ
αB1
ρ βB
−
π1 αB1
ρ βB
+
π1 H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
−
π1
2 H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
,
−ρ
2
γ αB1
ρ βB
−
γ H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
+
2 γ π1 H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
,
−ρ
2
αB1
ρ βB
−
π1 αB1
ρ βB
>,
:
−ρ
2
γ αB1
ρ βB
−
γ H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
+
2 γ π1 H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
,
γ2 H−1 + αB2L
βB
,
−1
2
γ αB1
βB
>,
:
−ρ
2
αB1
ρ βB
−
π1 αB1
ρ βB
,
−1
2
γ αB1
βB
, 0>>; H∗matrix A∗L
In[77]:= vecbB2 = :−2 X ρ
αB1
ρ βB
−
π1 αB1
ρ βB
+
π1 H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
−
π1
2 H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
−
Z ρ
γ αB1
ρ βB
−
γ H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
+
2 γ π1 H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
−
ρ Z π1 +
αB0
ρ βB
−
π1 αB0
ρ βB
−
π0 αB1
ρ βB
+
π0 H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
−
2 π0 π1 H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
,
2 Z γ2 H−1 + αB2L
βB
− X ρ
γ αB1
ρ βB
−
γ H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
+
2 γ π1 H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
−
ρ −γ Z +
γ αB0
ρ βB
+
2 γ π0 H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
,
π0 αB1
βB
− ρ
αB1
ρ βB
−
π1 αB1
ρ βB
X −
γ αB1
βB
Z>; H∗vector b∗L
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In[78]:= skadB2 = −ρ Z π0 + w0 −
π0 αB0
ρ βB
−
π0
2 H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
− X
2
ρ
αB1
ρ βB
−
π1 αB1
ρ βB
+
π1 H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
−
π1
2 H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
+
Z
2
γ2 H−1 + αB2L
βB
+ X −Z ρ
γ αB1
ρ βB
−
γ H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
+
2 γ π1 H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
−
ρ Z π1 +
αB0
ρ βB
−
π1 αB0
ρ βB
−
π0 αB1
ρ βB
+
π0 H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
−
2 π0 π1 H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
+
Z −ρ −γ Z +
γ αB0
ρ βB
+
2 γ π0 H−1 + αB2L
ρ βB
; H∗scalar d∗L
In[79]:= testB2 − vecwB2.matAB2.vecwB2 − vecwB2.vecbB2 − skadB2 êê
SimplifyH∗test, whether the decomposition was correct∗L
Out[79]= 0
In[80]:= ΣB2 = 99σX2, 0, 0=, 90, ∆2, 0=, 90, 0, σε2==; H∗variance−covariance−matrix∗L
In[81]:= EUB2 =
−1
ρ
1
Det@I3 − 2 ΣB2.matAB2D
ExpB
1
2
vecbB2.Inverse@I3 − 2 ΣB2.matAB2D.ΣB2.vecbB2 + skadB2F êê Simplify;
H∗computation of the expected utility∗L
In[82]:= EUB21 = EUB2 êê. 8Alpha0A@@1DD, Alpha2A@@1DD, Alpha0B@@1DD,
Alpha1B@@1DD, Alpha2B@@1DD, betaA@@1DD, betaB @@1DD< êê Simplify;
H∗plugging the α's and the β's in the expected utility function∗L
In[83]:= EUB22 = EUB21 êê. 8Pi0sol@@1DD, Pi1sol@@1DD, Gammasol@@1DD< êê Simplify;
H∗plugging π0, π1 and γ in the expected utility ∗L
In[84]:= EUB23 = EUB22 êê. para êê Simplify;
H∗plugging the parameter example in the expected utility function∗L
In[85]:= Plot@8EUB14, EUB23<, 8τ, 0, 1<DH∗mutual plot of variant 1 and variant
2 to check whether both decompositions lead to the same result∗L
Out[85]=
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
-3.0µ 1078
-2.5µ 1078
-2.0µ 1078
-1.5µ 1078
-1.0µ 1078
-5.0µ 1077
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Mutual Plot
In[86]:= Plot@8EUB14, EUB23, EUA14, EUA23<, 8τ, 0, 1<D
H∗mutual plot of type−A and type−B agents' expected utility∗L
Out[86]=
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
-3.5µ 1078
-3.0µ 1078
-2.5µ 1078
-2.0µ 1078
-1.5µ 1078
-1.0µ 1078
-5.0µ 1077
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3 Positive Feedback Traders
This section presents an extended version of Arnold & Brunner (2012). As mentioned
in the introduction, the noise traders we consider here are positive feedback traders.
Recall that these are agents whose demand depends on past price changes. At first
sight one might think that the presence of rational speculators in markets with posit-
ive feedback traders eliminates arbitrage opportunities and therefore stabilizes prices.
De Long et al. (1990) present a model with positive feedback traders where the pres-
ence of utility maximizing rational speculators rather destabilizes asset prices. The
reason why they destabilize the prices is because they anticipate the behavior of noise
traders and therefore drive prices to a higher or lower level. When arbitrageurs receive
a positive signal, they demand the asset. This demand results in a price increase.
Rational speculators anticipate that positive feedback traders will have a positive de-
mand tomorrow so they drive the price to an even higher level. When positive feedback
traders demand the asset tomorrow, rational speculators sell their holdings. This effect
disappears in the absence of rational speculators.
We consider a generalized version of the DSSW model with a noiseless signal. We have
additional trading dates and a second (also noiseless) informative signal. This allows
us to check how the results in DSSW depend on the timing (how many trading dates;
when does information arrive).
In section 3.1 we present the model setup. Section 3.2 derives the solution of the
rational speculators’ maximization problem. Section 3.3 describes the case with one
signal and the different results that come from different time setups. In section 3.4 we
consider the case with two signals and examine the different price reactions.
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3.1 Model
Following De Long et al. (1990), we have three groups of agents in our model: positive
feedback traders (measure one), rational speculators (measure µ, where 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1)
and passive investors (measure 1 − µ). To distinguish variables referring to positive
feedback traders, rational speculators and passive investors, we use the superscripts
f ,r and e, respectively.
There are T + 2 (where T ≥ 2) dates, starting with period 0 and ending with period
T + 1.
In the model we have one consumption good, which agents consume at T + 1 and two
assets, where one is risky and one is safe. The safe asset is in perfect elastic supply
and has zero net return. The supply of the risky asset is S ≥ 0, which is exogenously
given. The return on the risky asset at T + 1 is
v + Φ + θ,
where v ≥ 0 is certain and Φ and θ are random variables. The first random variable Φ
is the sum of two i.i.d. shocks φ′ and φ′′. Both shocks have mean zero, a finite variance
and a symmetric density. Since we also want to analyze the case where investors receive
only one signal, we allow for σ2φ′ = 0. In contrast to DSSW we only concentrate on
the case with noiseless signals, which means that rational speculators learn about the
realizations of φ′ and φ′′ at tr
′
and tr
′′
, respectively.1 We assume 1 ≤ tr′ < tr′′ ≤ T .
Passive investors observe the realizations of φ′ and φ′′ at te
′
and te
′′
. Since we do not
want that passive investors know the realization of φ′ and φ′′ before rational speculators
do, we assume that tr
′
< te
′
and tr
′′
< te
′′ ≤ T . The second random variable θ also has
mean zero and a finite variance.2 θ is realized in the last period and none of the agents
1DSSW consider the two cases where the signal is noiseless and where it has some noise. Rational
speculators receive a noisy signal about the realization of Φ. After they have received this signal
they can exclude certain realizations of Φ but they do not know exactly which state will be realized.
Using a noisy signal may be an objective for future research.
2In their paper, DSSW assume that θ is normal. They need this assumption to transform their CARA
utility function into a mean-variance utility function. We drop this assumption and assume that
rational speculators maximize a mean-variance utility function.
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receives a signal about it before T + 1. This ensures that the price in the last period
has an uncertain component and therefore rational agents have a finite demand.
The price of the asset at date t = 0, 1, . . . , T+1 is pt and the demand of the positive feed-
back traders, the rational speculators and the passive investors at date t = 0, 1, . . . , T
are denoted Dft , D
r
t and D
e
t , respectively. The demand of the positive feedback traders
consists of two parts. We assume that if the price is constant their demand is equal
to the supply of the risky asset S. After price changes in the past, they choose their
demand depending on whether the price has risen (higher demand) or fallen (lower
demand). Current price changes have no impact on the demand of positive feedback
traders.
Dft =

S t = 0, 1,
S +
t−1∑
l=1
βl∆pt−l t = 2, . . . , T,
(3.1)
where ∆pt = pt − pt−1 and βl ≥ 0 for l = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1.
The demand of the passive investors is driven by the difference of the current price and
their expectations of the fundamental value. In other words, if the asset is too cheap
from their point of view they buy the asset, if it is too expensive they sell it. Note that
they only use their signals to form their expectation so
Det =

α(v − pt) 0 ≤ t < te′
α(v + φ′ − pt) te′ ≤ t < te′′
α(v + φ′ + φ′′ − pt) te′′ ≤ t ≤ T,
(3.2)
where α is a constant. Since we want that the demand functions of the passive investors
and the rational speculators are the same at T + 1, we set α = 1
2γσ2θ
.3
The third group are the rational speculators. Their preferences are given by the mean-
variance-utility function µW − γσ2W , where γ > 0 is a risk aversion coefficient and µW
and σ2W are the mean and the variance of the final wealth.
Definition 1. Prices pt (t = 0, 1, . . . , T ) and demands D
f
t (t = 0, 1, . . . , T ), D
r
t , and
Det (t = 0, 1, . . . , T ) are an equilibrium if
3We will see in section 3.2 that passive investors’ demand then coincides with rational speculators’
demand at date T .
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• Dft satisfies (3.1),
• Det satisfies (3.2),
• Drt (t = 0, 1, . . . , T ) is the time-consistent solution of the mean-variance utility
maximization problem, given current information, and
• the market for the risky asset clears at each date so
Dft + µD
r
t + (1− µ)Det = S, t = 0, 1, . . . , T. (3.3)
We consider equilibria where the asset prices are linear functions of the realized
shocks with intercept v for µ > 0:
pt =

v 0 ≤ t < tr′
v + (1 + ν ′)φ′ tr
′ ≤ t < tr′′
v + (1 + λ′)φ′ + (1 + λ′′)φ′′ tr
′′ ≤ t < T.
(3.4)
The parameters ν ′, λ′ and λ′′ will be specified later. Considering linear price functions
makes it easier for us to solve the rational speculators’ utility maximization problem in
section 3.2 and therefore characterizing the equilibrium. However, we will show later
that the equilibrium is unique (section 3.4.7). Using the parameters ν ′, λ′ and λ′′ we
can define what it means for the price to under- and to overreact.
Definition 2. If ν ′ > 0 (ν ′ < 0) at tr
′
or λ′ > 0 (λ′ < 0) at tr
′′
, then the price overreacts
(underreacts) to the date-tr
′
signal. It overreacts (underreacts) to the date-tr
′′
signal
if λ′′ > 0 (λ′′ < 0).
Note, that the price reaction to contemporary shocks is not predictable, however the
price change from tr
′′ − 1 to tr′′
ptr′′ − ptr′′−1 = (λ′ − ν ′)φ′ + (1 + λ′)φ′′ (3.5)
contains a predictable component (λ′− ν ′)φ′ for rational speculators who observe φ′ in
tr
′
.
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3.2 Investment behavior
As mentioned above, rational speculators choose their demand by maximizing their
mean-variance utility function. Let W rt denote the rational speculators’ wealth and C
r
t
denote their investment in the safe asset in period t = 0, . . . , T . Therefore their date-t
wealth is W rt = C
r
t + ptD
r
t−1. So rational speculators’ final wealth
W rT+1 = C
r
t−1 −
T∑
τ=t
pτ
(
Drτ −Drτ−1
)
+ (v + Φ + θ)DrT , t = 1, . . . , T − 1
is the current holding of the safe asset plus the gains from trading the risky asset
between t and T and the return from clearing their position at date T . Rearranging
and using W rt = C
r
t + ptD
r
t−1 yields
W rT+1 = C
r
t−1 −
T∑
τ=t
pτ
(
Drτ −Drτ−1
)
+ (v + Φ + θ)DrT
= Crt−1 + ptD
r
t−1 +
T−1∑
t′=t
(pt′+1 − pt′)Drt′ + (v + φ′ + φ′′ + θ − pT )DrT
= W rt +
T−1∑
t′=t
(pt′+1 − pt′)Drt′ + (v + φ′ + φ′′ + θ − pT )DrT , (3.6)
for t′ = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1. We solve this maximization problem recursively.
Proposition 1. The demand of rational speculators at date T is
DrT =
v + φ′ + φ′′ − pT
2γσ2θ
= α(v + φ′ + φ′′ − pT ). (3.7)
Proof. The final wealth in the last period can be written as
W rT+1 = W
r
T + (v + φ
′ + φ′′ + θ − pT )DrT .
Since the realizations of φ′ and φ′′ are already known at T , the mean is
ErTW
r
T+1 = W
r
T + (v + φ
′ + φ′′ − pT )DrT
and the variance is
σ2WT+1|T = E
r
T (WT+1 − ErTW rT+1)2 = σ2θ(DrT )2.
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So the mean-variance utility function of the rational speculators is
U = W rT + (v + φ
′ + φ′′ − pT )DrT − γσ2θ(DrT )2.
The first order condition for the maximization problem is
∂U
∂DrT
= (v + φ′ + φ′′ − pT )− 2γσ2θDrT = 0.
Solving for DrT yields
DrT =
v + φ′ + φ′′ − pT
2γσ2θ
= α(v + φ′ + φ′′ − pT ).
Since we defined α = 1
2γσ2θ
before, the utility functions of the rational speculators and
the passive investors in the last period are the same. Note, that the date-T demand of
rational speculators is bounded since we have fundamental risk at T + 1 via θ.
Before solving for the demand at other dates, we recall (3.4). Since the prices are the
constant when no new information arrives, the final wealth (3.6) does not depend on
the demand at these dates. Therefore we only solve for Dr
tr′−1 and D
r
tr′′−1.
Proposition 2. The demand functions of a rational speculator at tr
′ − 1 and tr′′ − 1
are given by
Dr
tr′−1 =
v − ptr′−1
2γ(1 + ν ′)2σ2φ′
(3.8)
if σ2φ′ > 0, and,
Dr
tr′′−1 =
v + (1 + λ′)φ′ − ptr′′−1
2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
− 2αλ
′λ′′φ′
1 + λ′′
. (3.9)
Proof. Using (3.4) for t = T , (3.6) for t = tr
′′ − 1 and (3.7), we get
W rT+1 = W
r
tr′′−1 + (ptr′′ − ptr′′−1)Drtr′′−1 + α(λ′φ′ + λ′′φ′′ − θ)(λ′φ′ + λ′′φ′′).
Since θ is independent, the expected value of the rational speculators given the inform-
ation in tr
′′ − 1 is
Er
tr′′−1W
r
T+1 = W
r
tr′′−1 + (E
r
tr′′−1ptr′′ − ptr′′−1)Drtr′′−1 + α(λ′2φ′2 + λ′′2σ2φ′′).
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The conditional variance σ2
WT+1|tr′′−1 = E
r
tr′′−1
[(
WT+1 − Ertr′′−1WT+1
)2]
is
σ2
WT+1|tr′′−1 = E
r
tr′′−1
[(
(ptr′′ − Ertr′′−1ptr′′ )Drtr′′−1
+α((λ′φ′ + λ′′φ′′ − θ)(λ′φ′ + λ′′φ′′)− (λ′2φ′2 + λ′′2σ2φ′′))
)2]
= Er
tr′′−1
[
(ptr′′ − Ertr′′−1ptr′′ )2Dr2tr′′−1
]
+2αEr
tr′′−1
[
(ptr′′ − Ertr′′−1ptr′′ )(
(λ′φ′ + λ′′φ′′ − θ)(λ′φ′ + λ′′φ′′)− (λ′2φ′2 + λ′′2σ2φ′′)
)]
Dr
tr′′−1
+Er
tr′′−1
[(
(λ′φ′ + λ′′φ′′ − θ)(λ′φ′ + λ′′φ′′)− (λ′2φ′2 + λ′′2σ2φ′′)
)2]
The first summand is (1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′D
r2
tr′′−1. Expanding the second summand, we get
2αEr
tr
′′−1
[
(1 + λ′′)φ′′Dr
tr′′−1(λ
′′2φ′′2 + 2λ′λ′′φ′φ′′ − θλ′φ′ − θλ′′φ′′ − λ′′2σ2φ′′)
]
= 2αDr
tr′′−1
[
Er
tr′′−1
(
(1 + λ′′)λ′′2φ′′3
)
+ Er
tr′′−1
(
(1 + λ′′)φ′′22λ′φ′λ′′
)
− Er
tr′′−1 ((1 + λ
′′)φ′′θλ′φ′)− Er
tr′′−1
(
(1 + λ′′)θλ′′φ′′2
)
−Er
tr′′−1
(
(1 + λ′′)φ′′λ′′σ2φ′′
)]
= 4α(1 + λ′′)λ′λ′′φ′σ2φ′′D
r
tr′′−1.
All other expectations cancel out since φ′′ has mean zero (E[φ′′] = 0) and is symmetric
(E[φ′′3] = 0) and θ has also mean zero and is not correlated with φ′′ (E[θφ′′] = 0).
The third summand of the conditional variance does not depend on Dr
tr′′−1, so when
we derive the optimal demand, it cancels out.
The mean-variance utility function without constants is
(Er
tr′′−1ptr′′ − ptr′′−1)Drtr′′−1 − γ
[
(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′D
r2
tr′′−1 + 4α(1 + λ
′′)λ′λ′′φ′σ2φ′′D
r
tr′′−1
]
.
The first order condition for maximization at tr
′′
+ 1 is
(Er
tr′′−1ptr′′ − ptr′′−1)− γ
[
[(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′2D
r
tr′′−1 + 4α(1 + λ
′′)λ′λ′′φ′σ2
tr′′−1
]
= 0,
and solving for Dr
tr′′−1 yields (3.9).
We solve for Dr
tr′−1 analogously. Consider final wealth
W rT+1 = W
r
tr′−1 + (ptr′ − ptr′−1)Drtr′−1 + (ptr′′ − ptr′′−1)Drtr′′−1 + (v+φ′+φ′′+ θ− pT )DrT .
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From (3.4) we have
ptr′′ − ptr′′−1 = (λ′ − ν ′)φ′ + (1 + λ′′)φ′′,
and using (3.9) we get
W rT+1 = W
r
tr′−1 + (ptr′ − ptr′−1)Drtr′−1 + Γ(φ′, φ′′, θ)
where we define for simplicity
Γ(φ′, φ′′, θ) = [(λ′ − ν ′)φ′ + (1 + λ′′)φ′′]
[
λ′ − ν ′
2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
− 2αλ
′λ′′
1 + λ′′
]
φ′
+α(λ′φ′ + λ′′φ′′ − θ)(λ′φ′ + λ′′φ′′).
The expectation of the final wealth in tr
′ − 1 is
Er
tr′−1W
r
T+1 = W
r
tr′−1 + (E
r
tr′−1ptr′ − ptr′−1)Drtr′−1 + Ettr′−1Γ(φ′, φ′′, θ)
and the conditional variance is
σ2
WT+1|tr′−1 = E
r
tr′−1
[(
W rT+1 − Ertr′−1W rT+1
)2]
= Er
tr
′−1
[(
W r
tr
′−1 + (ptr′ − ptr′−1)Drtr′−1 + Γ(φ′, φ′′, θ)
− W r
tr′−1 − (Ertr′−1ptr′ − ptr′−1)Drtr′−1 − Ettr′−1Γ(φ′, φ′′, θ)
)2]
= Er
tr′−1
[(
ptr′ − Ertr′−1ptr′
)2
Dr2
tr′−1
]
+2Er
tr′−1
[(
ptr′ − Ertr′−1ptr′
)
Dr
tr′−1
(
Γ(φ′, φ′′, θ)− Et
tr′−1Γ(φ
′, φ′′, θ)
)]
+Er
tr′−1
[(
Γ(φ′, φ′′, θ)− Et
tr′−1Γ(φ
′, φ′′, θ)
)2]
= (1 + ν ′)2σ2φ′D
r2
tr′−1 + E
r
tr′−1
[(
Γ(φ′, φ′′, θ)− Et
tr′−1Γ(φ
′, φ′′, θ)
)2]
+2Er
tr′−1
[
(1 + ν ′)φ′
(
Γ(φ′, φ′′, θ)− Et
tr′−1Γ(φ
′, φ′′, θ)
)]
Dr
tr′−1.
Since φ′ has mean zero, Et
tr′−1
[
φ′Et
tr′−1Γ(φ
′, φ′′, θ)
]
= 0, so the third summand becomes
2(1 + ν ′)Er
tr′−1 [Γ(φ
′, φ′′, θ)φ′]Dr
tr′−1.
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Substituting for Γ(φ′, φ′′, θ), we get
2(1 + ν ′)Dr
tr′−1
[
λ′ − ν ′
1 + λ′′
(
λ′ − ν ′
2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
− 2αλ′λ′′
)
Er
tr′−1(φ
′3)
+
(
λ′ − ν ′
2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
− 2αλ′λ′′
)
Er
tr′−1(φ
′2φ′′) + αλ′2Er
tr′−1(φ
′3)
+ 2αλ′λ′′Er
tr′−1(φ
′2φ′′) + αλ′′2Er
tr′−1(φ
′φ′′2)− αλ′Er
tr′−1(φ
′2θ)− αλ′′Er
tr′−1(φ
′φ′′θ)
]
.
All expected values are zero because of symmetry and independence. Therefore the
mean-variance utility function (without constants) is
(v − ptr′−1)Drtr′−1 − γ(1 + ν ′)2σ2φ′Dr2tr′−1.
Taking the first order condition
(v − ptr′−1)− 2γ(1 + ν ′)2σ2φ′Drtr′−1 = 0
and solving for Dr
tr′−1 yields (3.8).
Equation (3.8) and the first summand of equation (3.9) are the expected price changes
at tr
′
and tr
′′
respectively, divided by 2γ times the price variance. The second summand
of equation (3.9) comes from the fact, that there is positive correlation between the
returns on investment at dates tr
′′ − 1 and T . The returns at these dates are
(ptr′′ − ptr′′−1)Drtr′′−1 = (v + (1 + λ′)φ′ + (1 + λ′′)φ′′ − v − (1 + ν ′)φ′)Drtr′′−1
= ((λ′ − ν ′)φ′ + (1 + λ′′)φ′′)Dr
tr′′−1
and
(v + φ′ + φ′′ + θ − pT )DrT = α(v + φ′ + φ′′ − v − (1 + λ′)φ′ − (1 + λ′′)φ′′)
(v + φ′ + φ′′ − v − (1 + λ′)φ′ − (1 + λ′′)φ′′ + θ)
= α(λ′φ′ + λ′′φ′′ − θ)(λ′φ′ + λ′′φ′′)
= α
(
(λ′φ′)2 + (λ′′φ′′)2 + 2λ′λ′′φ′φ′′ − θλ′φ′ − θλ′′φ′′) ,
respectively. Let us assume that λ′ > 0, λ′′ > 0, φ′ > 0 and φ′′ > −λ′φ′
λ′′ .
4 Then an
increase in φ′′ increases both, returns ((λ′ − ν ′)φ′ + (1 + λ′′)φ′′)Dr
tr′′−1 and α(λ
′φ′ +
4If this holds, the expected payoff λ′φ′ + λ′′φ′′ is positive.
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λ′′φ′′ − θ)(λ′φ′ + λ′′φ′′). To hedge against this covariance effect, rational speculators
reduce their demand even though φ′ and therefore the predictable part of (3.5) is
positive. This may happen when the variance of the second signal becomes too large
(see section 3.4).
We can also show analytically that the second term represents the covariance between
the returns at tr
′′
and T . Let r(t) denote the return at date t. Let us consider again
the mean-variance utility function µW − γσ2W . Since we consider the maximization
problem at tr
′′ − 1, the only stochastic components in WT+1 are the returns at tr′′ − 1
and T . Therefore we can rewrite the mean-variance utility function as
µW − γσ2W = µW − γσ2r(tr′′−1)+r(T )
= µW − γ
(
σ2
r(tr′′−1) + 2σr(tr′′−1),r(T ) + σ
2
r(T )
)
,
where σr(tr′′−1),r(T ) is the covariance of the returns on the investment at t
r′′ − 1 and
T .5 Note, that σ2r(T ) cancels out, when we derive with respect to D
r
tr′′−1. Now, let us
calculate the date-tr
′′ − 1 covariance σr(tr′′−1),r(T ):6
σr(tr′′−1),r(T ) = Cov
(
[(λ′ − ν ′)φ′ + (1 + λ′′)φ′′]Dr
tr′′−1,
α
(
(λ′φ′)2 + (λ′′φ′′)2 + 2λ′λ′′φ′φ′′ − θλ′φ′ − θλ′′φ′′))
= (1 + λ′′)αλ′′2 Cov(φ′′, φ′′2)Dr
tr′′−1
+(1 + λ′′)2αλ′λ′′φ′ Cov(φ′′, φ′′)Dr
tr′′−1
−(1 + λ′′)αλ′φ′ Cov(φ′′, θ)Dr
tr′′−1 − (1 + λ′′)αλ′′ Cov(φ′′, θφ′′)Drtr′′−1
= 2αλ′λ′′(1 + λ′′)φ′σ2φ′′D
r
tr′′−1,
since λ′, λ′′ and φ′ are known at tr
′′ − 1, θ is independent and Cov(φ′′, φ′′2) = E(φ′′3)−
E(φ′′)E(φ′′2) = 0. Since we derived the mean-variance utility function with respect
to the demand, Dr
tr′′−1 cancels out in the covariance and when solving for D
r
tr′′−1 we
divide through 2γ(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′ . This yields
−γ ∂2σr(tr
′′−1),r(T )
∂Dr
tr′′−1
1
2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
= −4γα(1 + λ
′′)λ′λ′′φ′σ1φ′′
2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
= −2αλ
′λ′′φ′
1 + λ′′
,
5Let X,Y be two random variables. Then Var(X + Y ) = Var(X) + 2 Cov(X,Y ) + Var(Y ).
6Let X,Y, Z be random variables and a, b, c ∈ R. Then Cov(aX,bY+cZ) = abCov(X,Y ) +
ac Cov(X,Z).
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Figure 3.1: Destabilizing speculation
which coincides with the second term on the right-hand side in equation (3.9).
In the case of one signal, the second term in (3.9) cancels out and we have again the
expected price change over 2γ times the variance.
3.3 Case with one signal
Now, we want to study if and to what extent the time structure of the model has an
impact on the asset price. Before considering the model with two signals we first turn
to the case with one signal. We therefore set σ2φ′ = 0 so that φ
′ = 0.
3.3.1 Destabilizing rational speculation (the DSSW Model)
We show, that the DSSW model is a special case of our setup. As in DSSW, we consider
the cases where µ = 0 and µ > 0 (absence and presence of rational speculators). A
difference to DSSW is that we allow for v ≥ 0, S ≥ 0 and θ non-normal.7
7As mentioned in Section 3.1, rational speculators maximize mean-variance utility µW − γσ2W . If θ
were normal, one could interpret this as the representation of a CARA utility function. However,
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Proposition 3. Let T = 2, tr
′′
= 1 and te
′′
= 2. Then the equilibrium prices are
p0 = v, p1 = p2 = v +
(
1 +
β1
α− β1
)
φ′′ (3.10)
for µ > 0 and
p0 = p1 = v, p2 = v + φ
′′ (3.11)
for µ = 0.
Proof. First we consider the case µ > 0. From (3.4) we know that p0 = v and p1 = p2.
The demands in period 2 are De2 = S + β1(p1 − p0) and Dr2 = Df2 = α(v + φ′′ − p2).
Then the market clearing condition is
S = S + β1(p1 − p0) + α(v + φ′′ − p2)
⇔ 0 = β1p2 − β1v + α(v + φ′′ − p2)
⇔ (α− β1)p2 = (α− β1)v + αφ′′
⇔ p2 = v + α
α− β1φ
′′ = v +
(
β1
α− β1
)
φ′′.
In period 0 Df0 = S, D
e
0 = α(v − p0) and Df0 = v−p02γ(1+λ′′)2σ2
φ′′
. The market clearing
condition in this case is
S = S + (1− µ)α(v − p0) + µ v − p0
2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
so p0 = v is an equilibrium price. Note, that in contrast to DSSW, we do not treat
period 0 as a “reference period” where “there is no trading” (De Long et al., 1990,
p.387) but as a period where all market agents have the opportunity to trade.
For µ = 0, Det = α(v − pt) and Dft = S for t = 0, 1. Therefore the market clears if
α(v−pt) = 0 so p0 = p1 = v. This yields Df2 = S and together with De2 = α(v+φ′′−p2)
and the market clearing condition S = S + α(v + φ′′ − p2) we have p2 = v + φ′′.
Remark 1. Let φ′′ and θ denote lower bounds for the realizations of φ′′ and θ. By
assuming that
φ′′ + θ ≥ −v ⇔ v + φ′′ + θ ≥ 0
we interpret it just as the representation of their preferences. This allows us to set up a non-
negativity condition for the prices (see remark 1).
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and
φ′′ ≥ −
(
α− β1
α
)
v ⇔ v +
(
1 +
β1
α− β1
)
φ′′ ≥ 0
we make sure that prices do not become negative with certainty. Note that we have to
exclude normality of θ to do this.
As we can see in the upper proposition and in figure 3.1, the presence of arbitrageurs
increases the reaction of the signal on the price (for a positive realization of φ′′). Ra-
tional speculators demand the asset in period 1 since Dr1 = −De1 = −α(v − p1) =(
1 + β1
α−β1
)
φ′′. This demand increases the price at date 1 so positive feedback traders
have a positive demand at date 2. Since rational speculators anticipate this positive
demand they push the price to an even higher level because they know that there will
be someone who buys the asset from them.
In the absence of rational speculators (µ = 0), passive investors receive the signal at
date 2 and have therefore a positive demand that increases the price. Since this is the
last trading period, positive feedback traders have no further opportunities to react on
that price change. This changes when we add another trading period. Next, we will
see that a small change in the time structure leads to a different result.
3.3.2 Stabilizing rational speculation
Now we consider the same setup as above with one slight difference: we have another
trading period at the end. As in DSSW, we assume that positive feedback traders’
demand in period t only depends on the price change from t − 2 to t − 1, i.e. βk =
0 ∀ k = 2, 3, . . .. Since we still consider the case with one signal we have σ2φ′ = 0 so
φ′ = 0.
Proposition 4. Let T = 3, tr
′′
= 1 and te
′′
= 2. The equilibrium asset prices are
p0 = v and pt = v + φ
′′, t = 1, 2, 3, (3.12)
for µ > 0 and
p0 = p1 = v, p2 = v + φ
′′, p3 = v +
(
1 +
β1
α
)
φ′′ (3.13)
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Figure 3.2: Stabilizing speculation
for µ = 0.
Proof. For µ > 0 with tr
′′
= 1 we have p1 = p2 = p3 from (3.4). The demand functions
in the last period are De3 = S and D
r
3 = D
f
3 = α(v + φ
′′ − p3). Rearranging the market
clearing condition in period 3 and using p1 = p2 = p3 yields
S = S + α(v + φ′′ − p3)
⇔ 0 = v + φ′′ − p3
⇔ p3 = v + φ′′.
The market clearing condition in period 0 is
S = S + (1− µ)α(v − p0) + µ v − p0
2γ(1 + ν ′)2σ2φ′
0 =
[
(1− µ)α + µ 1
2γ(1 + ν ′)2σ2φ′
]
(v − p0)
so p0 = v. This is again consistent with (3.4).
For µ = 0, the demands of positive feedback traders in period 0 and 1 are S. The
demand of passive investors in these periods are De0 = α(v − p0) and De1 = α(v − p1),
60
Positive Feedback Traders
respectively. The market clearing condition with these demands yields p0 = p1 = v.
Therefore Df2 = S. Passive investors receive the signal in period 2 (= t
e′′) so their
demand is De2 = α(v+φ
′′− p2). Plugging the demand functions in the market clearing
condition we get
S = S + α(v + φ′′ − p2)
⇔ 0 = (v + φ′′ − p2)
⇔ p2 = v + φ′′.
Since the passive investors do not get any new signal in the last period, their demand
function is again De3 = α(v + φ
′′ − p3). Since the period-1 and period-2 prices are not
identical, the demand function of the positive feedback traders is Df3 = S+β1(p2−p1) =
β1φ
′′. Plugging this in the market clearing condition, we get
S = S + β1φ
′′ + α(v + φ′′ − p3)
⇔ 0 = β1
α
φ′′ + v + φ′′ − p3
⇔ p3 = v +
(
1 +
β1
α
)
φ′′.
This proposition shows that rational speculation may also be stabilizing. Figure 3.2
depicts the two price paths in the presence (filled dots) and in the absence (non-filled
dots) of rational speculators with a positive realization of φ′′.
If rational speculators are present in the market (µ > 0), they receive the signal at
date 1 and therefore demand the asset so the price increases. Positive feedback traders
have a positive demand in period 2 due to this price rise. Since the price is constant
when no new information arrives (i.e. at dates 2 and 3; otherwise rational speculators’
demand would be ±∞), positive feedback traders’ date-2 demand is absorbed by ra-
tional speculators. Therefore positive feedback traders’ demand at date 3 is equal to
zero and the price stays at v + φ′′.8
8If we allowed for β2 6= 0, the situation would change since positive feedback traders’ date-3 demand
would not be equal to S. We discuss this case in subsection 3.3.4.
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Figure 3.3: Neutral speculation
This changes in the absence of rational speculators (µ = 0). Then, passive investors
receive the signal at date 2, so they demand the asset and the price rises. In contrast
to the situation with T = 2, positive feedback traders now have time to react to the
price change from date 1 to date 2. This price change yields a positive demand of the
positive feedback traders at date 3 so the price exceeds v + φ′′ since passive investors
satisfy positive feedback traders’ demand.
3.3.3 Neutral rational speculation
We have seen so far that rational speculation can either be destabilizing (as in DSSW)
or stabilizing. In this subsection we show that neutral speculation (there is overreaction
to the signal neither in the case when rational speculators are present nor when they
are absent) is also possible. The only difference to the proposition above is the date
when passive investors receive their signal.
Proposition 5. Let T = 3, tr
′′
= 1, te
′′
= 3 and β2 = 0. The equilibrium asset prices
are p0 = v and
pt = v + φ
′′, t = 1, 2, 3,
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for µ > 0 and
p0 = p1 = p2 = v, p3 = v + φ
′′
for µ = 0.
Proof. For µ > 0 the proof is identical to the proof of (3.12). Since in the case with
µ = 0 no one receives a signal before date 3, the demand functions are Det = α(v − pt)
for t = 0, 1, 2. With Df0 = S we get S = S + α(v − p0)⇔ p0 = v. For the same reason
p1 = v. Since p0 = p1 = v, D
f
2 = S so p2 = v. At date 3, D
e
3 = α(v + φ
′′ − p3) and
Df3 = S + β1(p2 − p1) = S so the market clearing condition S = S + α(v + φ′′ − p3)
yields p3 = v + φ
′′.
As mentioned above, there is no overreaction to the signal passive investors on the one
hand side and rational speculators on the other hand side receive. The development of
the price is depicted in figure 3.3 (for φ′′ > 0). The reason why there is no overreaction
if µ > 0 is the same as in the stabilizing case: from (3.4) we know that price is constant
except when rational speculators receive their signal. Since this price change is too far
in the past, it has no impact on the demand of the positive feedback traders (β2 = 0).
In the absence of rational speculators (µ = 0), the price change occurs in the last
period so positive feedback traders do not react on it since it is too recent. So in this
case there is also no overreaction and we have neutral speculation.
3.3.4 The general case
We have seen so far that small changes in the time setup have a large impact on the
behavior of equilibrium prices. The only difference between the DSSW model and
the model with stabilizing speculation is that we added another trading period in
the end. Giving the signal to passive investors one period later led to the case with
neutral speculation. The three different results special cases of the generalization in
this section. We first analyze when and how prices overreact in the presence of rational
speculators before we consider the cases when they are absent.
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Proposition 6. The equilibrium asset prices are pt = v for t = 0, 1, . . . , t
r′′ − 1 and
pt = v +
(
1 +
βT−tr′′
α− βT−tr′′
)
φ′′, t = tr
′′
, . . . , T, (3.14)
for µ > 0.
Proof. Let µ > 0. From (3.4), we know that pt = v for t = 0, 1, . . . , t
r′′ − 1 and
ptr′′ = . . . = pT . From (3.7) we have D
r
T = α(v+φ
′′−pT ). Since passive investors receive
their signal before T (te
′′ ≤ T ), their demand function is also DeT = α(v + φ′′ − pT ).
Since there is only one price change from period tr
′′−1 to tr′′ , positive feedback traders’
demand is DfT = S + βT−tr′′ (ptr′′ − ptr′′−1). Thus the market clearing condition in T is
S = S + βT−tr′′ (ptr′′ − ptr′′−1) + α(v + φ′′ − pT ).
Rearranging this we get
0 = βT−tr′′ (pT − v) + α(v + φ′′ − pT )
⇔ (α− βT−tr′′ )pT = (α− βT−tr′′ )v + αφ′′
⇔ pT = v + α
α− βT−tr′′
φ′′ = v +
(
1 +
βT−tr′′
α− βT−tr′′
)
φ′′,
which proves (3.14).
Note that pt = v for t = 0, 1, . . . , t
r′′ − 1 is actually an equilibrium:
Det = α(v − pt) = α(v − v) = 0
and
Dft =
v − ptr′′−1
2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
=
v − v
2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
= 0
so the market clears for t = 0, 1, . . . , tr
′′ − 1.
We see from (3.14) that in the case when rational investors are present (µ > 0),
the extent of overreaction depends only on one feedback parameter βT−tr′′ . If this
parameter is positive there is overreaction (for a positive realization of φ′′). In the
DSSW model, βT−tr′′ = β2−1 = β1 > 0 so prices overshoot. If βT−tr′′ = 0 the price goes
to v+φ′′ and stays there. In the latter two models with T = 3 and tr
′′
= 1 (stabilizing
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and neutral speculation) we have βT−tr′′ = β3−1 = β2 = 0 (by assumption) so there is
no overreaction.
When we assume that βl is a decreasing sequence (that means price changes further
back in the past have a weaker impact on the current demand of positive feedback
traders), the degree of overreaction is decreasing when the time span T−tr′′ between the
arrival of the signal and the final trading date is increasing. In other words: The earlier
the information arrives (holding the number of trading dates constant), the smaller is
the extent of overshooting. Or: The more trading dates we have (holding the date
when the signal arrives fixed), the smaller is the degree of overreaction. Therefore,
the model is better used to explain price overshooting over short than in long time
horizons.
Next we consider two setups where rational speculators are absent (µ = 0). Although
both cases only differ in the values of βl they lead to very different results.
Proposition 7. For µ = 0, the asset prices obey pt = v for t = 0, 1, . . . , t
e′′ − 1 and
pt = v +
t−te′′∑
τ=0
(
β
α
)τφ′′, t = te′′ , . . . , T, (3.15)
if βl = β ∀l is constant.
Proof. For µ = 0 and βl = β ∀l the market clearing condition before the arrival of
the signal in te
′′
(so at dates t = 0, 1, . . . , te
′′ − 1) is just S = S + α(v − pt). Therefore
pt = v for t = 0, 1, . . . , t
e′′ − 1.
Now we prove (3.15). Consider the market clearing condition at t = te
′′
, . . . , T
S = S + β(pt−1 − pt−2) + . . .+ β(pte′′ − pte′′−1) + α(v + φ′′ − pt)
⇔ 0 = βpt−1 − βv + α(v + φ′′ − pt)
⇔ 0 = β
α
pt−1 − β
α
v + v + φ′′ − pt
⇔ pt = α− β
α
v + φ′′ +
β
α
pt−1.
To solve this differential equation, we first have to eliminate the constant. Let pt =
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pt−1 = p¯. Then
p¯ =
α− β
α
v + φ′′ +
β
α
p¯
⇔ p¯
(
α−β
β
)
=
α− β
α
v + φ′′
⇔ p¯ = v + α
α− βφ
′′.
Next we define p˜t = pt− p¯⇔ pt = p˜t + p¯. Using this in the upper differential equation,
we get
p˜t + v +
α
α−βφ
′′ =
α− β
α
v + φ′′ +
β
α
p˜t−1 +
β
α
(
v +
α
α− βφ
′′
)
⇔ p˜t = β
α
p˜t−1.
This is a homogenous linear differential equation of degree one, so its solution is
p˜t =
(
β
α
)t−te′′
p˜te′′ .
Substituting p˜t = pt − p¯ and using that pte′′ = v + φ′′ and footnote 9 yields
pt − v − αα−βφ′′ =
(
β
α
)t−te′′ (
pte′′ − v −
α
α− βφ
′′
)
⇔ pt = v + α
α− βφ
′′ +
(
β
α
)t−te′′ (
v + φ′′ − v − α
α− βφ
′′
)
⇔ pt = v + α
α− βφ
′′ +
(
β
α
)t−te′′ (
− β
α− β
)
φ′′
⇔ pt = v + α
α− βφ
′′ +
(
β
α
)t−te′′+1(
− α
α− β
)
φ′′
⇔ pt = v + α
α− βφ
′′
[
1−
(
β
α
)t−te′′+1]
⇔ pt = v +
1− (β
α
)t−te′′+1
1− β
α
φ′′
⇔ pt = v +
t−te′′∑
τ=0
(
β
α
)τφ′′,
which proves (3.15).
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We see that a change in the time setup has again an impact on the price. The more
trading periods we have (keeping the date when the information arrives fixed), the
higher is the final price. On the other hand, the earlier the signal arrives (keeping the
number of trading dates constant), the higher is the price at the final date. This is in
contrast with the results from proposition 6 where it was the other way around.
Considering the infinite geometric series we get
pt < v +
[ ∞∑
τ=0
(
β
α
)τ]
φ′′ = v +
(
1 +
β
α− β
)
φ′′
for φ′′ > 0.9 That means that the price is always increasing and moves to the price
level we have in the presence of rational speculators (although it never reaches it).
Another conclusion we draw from proposition 7 is that there is no overreaction in the
absence of rational speculators when the signal arrives at date T .
Corollary 1. Let µ = 0 and β 6= 0. If te′′ = T then
pt = v for t = 0, . . . , T − 1 and pT = v + φ′′.
Proof. Before the signal arrives, the demand functions of the positive feedback traders
and the passive investors are Dft = S and D
e
t = α(v − pt), respectively. Therefore the
market clearing condition is
S = S + α(v − pt)
9Since β < α, βα < 1. By definition
k∑
τ=0
(
β
α
)τ
= 1+
(
β
α
)
+
(
β
α
)2
+. . .+
(
β
α
)k
and
(
β
α
) k∑
τ=0
(
β
α
)τ
=
(
β
α
)
+
(
β
α
)2
+. . .+
(
β
α
)k+1
.
Subtracting these two and rearranging leads to
k∑
τ=0
(
β
α
)τ
−
(
β
α
) k∑
τ=0
(
β
α
)τ
= 1−
(
β
α
)k+1
⇔
k∑
τ=0
(
β
α
)τ
=
1−
(
β
α
)k+1
1−
(
β
α
) .
Since lim
k→∞
1−
(
β
α
)k+1
1−
(
β
α
) = 1
1−
(
β
α
) we have ∞∑
τ=0
(
β
α
)τ
=
1
1−
(
β
α
) = α
α− β = 1 +
β
α− β .
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which yields pt = v for t = 0, . . . , T − 1. When passive investors learn about φ′′ in
period T , their demand function becomes DeT = α(v+φ
′′−pt). Since there has been no
price change in the past, positive feedback traders’ demand is again DfT = S. Plugging
this in the market clearing condition S = S + α(v + φ′′ − pT ) yields pT = v + φ′′.
In this setup, positive feedback traders have “no time” to react on the price change
that results from new information passive investors receive. Positive feedback traders
want to buy the asset but do not have the possibility to do so. That is the reason why
there is no overreaction in the DSSW model and in the case with neutral speculation
since passive investors learn about φ′′ in T .
Changing the values of βl leads to another interesting result:
Proposition 8. For µ = 0, the asset prices obey pt = v for t = 0, 1, . . . , t
e′′ − 1 and
pt = v + φ
′′ +
β1
α
(pt−1 − pt−2), t = te′′ , . . . , T, (3.16)
if βl = 0 for l ≥ 2.
Proof. For µ = 0 and 0 = β2 = β3 = . . . the market clearing in each period t is
0 = β1(pt−1 − pt−2) + α(v + φ′′ − pt)
⇔ pt = v + φ′′ + β1
α
(pt−1 − pt−2)
which proves (3.16).
Corollary 2. The price response to the signal in the setup of proposition 8 is charac-
terized by damped fluctuations.
Proof. From proposition 8 we have the difference equation
pt = v + φ
′′ +
β1
α
(pt−1 − pt−2).
To find a solution, we first eliminate the constant. We set pt = pt−1 = pt−2 = p¯. Then
p¯ = v + φ′′ +
β1
α
(p¯− p¯)
= v + φ′′.
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Now we define pt = p˜t+ p¯ = p˜t+v+φ
′′. Plugging this into (3.16) yields a homogeneous
difference equation of degree 2:
p˜t + v + φ
′′ = v + φ′′ +
β1
α
(p˜t−1 + v + φ′′ − p˜t−2 − v − φ′′)
= v + φ′′ +
β1
α
(p˜t−1 − p˜t−2)
⇔ p˜t = β1
α
(p˜t−1 − p˜t−2). (3.17)
We try a solution of the form p˜t = Aξ
t for some A and some ξ. Plugging this into
(3.17) yields
Aξt =
β1
α
Aξt−1 − β1
α
Aξt−2
⇔ 0 = ξ2 − β1
α
ξ +
β1
α
.
Solving for this quadratic function for ξ we obtain
ξ1/2 =
β1
α
±
√
β21
α2
− 4β1
α
2
.
ξ1 and ξ2 are complex numbers if and only if the expression under the square root is
negative. This follows from our assumption 0 ≤ β1 < α since
β1 < α
⇒ β1 < 4α
β1
α
< 4
β21
α2
− 4β1
α
< 0.
Therefore
ξ1/2 =
β1
2α
± i
√
4β1
α
− β21
α2
2
,
where i =
√−1. The solution of (3.17) is of the form
p˜t = A1ξ
t
1 + A2ξ
t
2.
It converges to zero for all values ofA1 andA2 if lim
t→∞
ξt1 = 0 and lim
t→∞
ξt2 = 0. To calculate
ξt1/2, rewrite ξ1/2 = a1/2 + b1/2i in polar coordinates r1/2(cos(ϕ1/2) + i sin(ϕ1/2)) where
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r1/2 =
√
a2 + b2. Since ξt1/2 = r
t
1/2(cos(tϕ1/2) + i sin(tϕ1/2)) it is sufficient to show that
lim
t→∞
rt1/2 = 0. Since r1/2 is real, this is true if |r1/2| < 1.
r1/2 =
√
β21
4α2
+
4β1
α
− β21
α2
4
=
√
β21
4α2
+
4αβ1
α2
− β21
α2
4
=
√
β21 + 4αβ1 − β21
4α2
=
√
4αβ1
4α2
=
√
β1
α
Since we assumed β1 < α,
⇒ r1/2 < 1
⇒ lim
t→∞
rt1/2 = 0
⇒ lim
t→∞
ξt1 = 0 and lim
t→∞
ξt2 = 0
⇒ lim
t→∞
p˜t = 0.
With lim
t→∞
p˜t = 0 and pt = p˜t + p¯ the price converges to v + φ
′′.
This price behavior can be explained as follows: passive investors demand a positive
quantity of the asset when they receive the signal, so the price rises (for φ′′ > 0) until
pte′′ = v + φ
′′. Positive feedback traders’ demand at te
′′
+ 1 is positive due to this
price increase and therefore the price increases even further. Passive investors have
a negative demand (since pte′′+1 > v + φ
′′) so they satisfy positive feedback traders’
demand. However there is a date t, where Det exceeds D
f
t . At that point, the price
falls and both, passive investors and rational speculators sell the asset until its price
falls below v + φ′′. When the price is below v + φ′′, only positive feedback traders sell
the asset (due to the price decrease before) and passive investors buy the asset (since
it is too cheap now). Therefore the price decrease weakens until, at some point, the
price goes up again. When it exceeds v + φ′′ the cycle starts again. Note, that this
only works when we assume α > β. If β exceeded α, the price would go to infinity.
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3.3.5 The effect of measure in the presence of rational speculators
As we have seen in proposition 6 and as remarked by DSSW, the “path of prices in
the case of a noiseless signal is discontinuous: µ = 0 and 0 < µ << 1 are not nearly
equivalent” (De Long et al., 1990, p.388). This is true since after the signal arrived
the price is determined by the date−T market clearing conditions which coincide for
rational speculators and passive investors in the case with one signal. We will see in
section 3.4 that this changes when we add a second signal.
A point one could think about is whether the sizes of the three groups of investors
have an impact on the preceding results. In this section, we show that it has (un-
der certain assumptions) no impact on the direction but on the extent of the effect.
Therefore we define the measures η1, η2µ and η2(1 − µ) for positive feedback traders,
rational speculators and passive investors, respectively. With this choice of η1 and η2,
we follow DSSW “since changes in µ keep the risk-bearing capacity of the economy
constant” (De Long et al., 1990, p.386), because the total of passive investors and
rational speculators stays constant.
Proposition 9. Let η1, η2µ and η2(1−µ) be the measures of positive feedback traders,
rational speculators and passive investors, respectively. Then the equilibrium asset
prices are pt = v for t = 0, 1, . . . , t
r′′ − 1 and
pt = v +
(
1 +
η1βT−tr′′
η2α− η1βT−tr′′
)
φ′′, t = tr
′′
, . . . , T (3.18)
for µ > 0.
Proof. Since we want positive feedback traders to absorb the supply of the asset if
there is no price change we set S = 0 for the remainder of this section.10 Then the
market clearing condition becomes
0 = η1D
f
t + η2µD
r
t + η2(1− µ)Det .
10We could also modify the supply to η1S or the positive feedback traders’ demand function by
replacing S by Sη1 .
71
Positive Feedback Traders
We have p0 = p1 = . . . = ptr′′−1 and ptr′′ = . . . = pT from equation (3.4). Then the
period−T demand function of positive feedback traders is DfT = βT−tr′′ (ptr′′ − ptr′′−1).
Both passive investors’ and rational speculators’ demand function is DeT = D
r
T =
α(v + φ′′ − pT ). Plugging this into the market clearing condition yields (3.18), since
0 = η1βT−tr′′ (ptr ′′ − ptr′′−1) + η2α(v + φ′′ − pT )
= η1βT−tr′′ (pT − v) + η2α(v + φ′′ − pT )
⇔ (η2α− η1βT−tr′′ )pT = (η2α− η1βT−tr′′ )v + η2αφ′′
⇔ pT = v + η2α
η2α− η1βT−tr′′
φ′′ = v +
(
1 +
η1βT−tr′′
η2α− η1βT−tr′′
)
φ′′.
In order to have overreaction (for a positive realization of φ′′) it is necessary that
η2α − η1βT−tr′′ > 0 ⇔ η2η1 >
β
T−tr′′
α
. If this inequality is violated, there is either no
equilibrium price (η2α− η1βT−tr′′ = 0) or underreaction (η2α− η1βT−tr′′ < 0).
To understand why we need this assumption we define the total market demand
mdt = D
f
t +D
e
t +D
p
t .
Note, that the market clears if mdt = 0. Considering the market demand at date T
and using (3.4) we have11
mdT = η1βT−tr′′ (ptr′′ − ptr′′−1) + η2α(v + φ′′ − pT )
= η1βT−tr′′ (pT − v) + η2α(v + φ′′ − pT )
= (η2α− η1βT−tr′′ )v + αφ′′ − (η2α− η1βT−tr′′ )pT .
So the market demand is a linear function of pT with slope −(η2α − η1βT−tr′′ ). For
η2α > η1βT−tr′′ the intercept of the market demand is greater than zero and the slope
is negative so there exists a positive equilibrium price (see left panel of figure 3.4). As
η2 decreases or η1 increases, the slope becomes smaller and the intercept approaches
αφ′′ so the price increases (middle panel of figure 3.4). This can be shown analytically
11For the demand functions see proof of proposition 9.
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pT
mdT
αφ′′
pT
mdT
αφ′′
pT
mdT
αφ′′
Figure 3.4: The market demand as η2α > η1β1 (left panel), as η2 decreases (or η1
increases or both)(middle panel) and as η2α = η1βT−tr′′ (right panel).
by deriving the degree of overreaction with respect to η1 and η2 since
∂
∂η1
η1βT−tr′′
η2α− η1βT−tr′′
=
(η2α− η1βT−tr′′ )βT−tr′′ − η1βT−tr′′ (−βT−tr′′ )
(η2α− η1βT−tr′′ )2
=
η2αβT−tr′′ − η1β2T−tr′′ + η1β2T−tr′′
(η2α− η1βT−tr′′ )2
=
η2αβT−tr′′
(η2α− η1βT−tr′′ )2
> 0
and
∂
∂η2
η1βT−tr′′
η2α− η1βT−tr′′
=
−η1αβT−tr′′
(η2α− η1βT−tr′′ )2
< 0.
When η2α = η1βT−tr′′ then the market demand is constant (mdT = αφ
′′) and the
market never clears (right panel of figure 3.4). If we increased η1 (decrease η2) further
this would yield negative prices which we do not consider.
One interpretation is to consider η2α and η1βl as “trading power” of the market
agents. Positive feedback traders’ demand at date T is
η1D
f
T = η1βT−tr′′ (ptr′′ − ptr′′−1) = η1βT−tr′′ (pT − v).
It is driven by two components: the price change (pT−v) and the reaction to it (βT−tr′′ )
multiplied by the measure of the group (η1). At date T , passive investors’ and rational
speculators’ demand function is
η1(µD
r
T + (1− µ)DeT ) = η2α(v + φ′′ − pT ).
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Again, this demand is driven by two components: the price change (v+φ′′−pT ) and the
reaction to it (α) multiplied by the size of the group (η2). Note that if v ≤ pT ≤ v+φ′′
then both, pT − v and v + φ′′ − pT are positive so all date−T demand functions are
greater than zero (for η1, η2, α and βT−tr′′ positive) and the market never clears. So a
price between v and v + φ′′ is never realized.
Let us assume for the remainder of this subsection that φ′′ ≥ 0.
If η2α > η1βT−tr′′ , then rational speculators and passive investors can satisfy positive
feedback traders’ demand if the price change that affects positive feedback traders’
demand is (in absolute value but with opposite sign) larger than the price change that
drives rational speculators’ and passive investors’ demand (i.e. v+φ′′−pT < 0 < pT−v).
This is true if pT > v + φ
′′, so we have overreaction.
If η2α = η1βT−tr′′ , the reaction to the price changes is the same for both groups (pos-
itive feedback traders on the one hand and passive and rational investors on the other
hand). Since the market has to clear, both price changes also have to be equal (with
opposite sign). This is only possible if φ′′ = 0 (⇔ pT −v = v+φ′′−pT ). Then the slope
and the intercept of the market demand are both equal to zero so every price satisfies
the market clearing condition.
If η2α < η1βT−tr′′ , positive feedback traders react stronger to price changes than ra-
tional speculators and passive investors do. If we had pT > v + φ
′′, then positive
feedback traders’ demand would exceed passive and rational investors’ demand and
there would be no equilibrium price. To have market clearing at T , the price change
that affects positive feedback traders must be smaller (and of opposite sign) than the
price change of passive and rational investors (i.e. pT − v < 0 < v + φ′′ − pT ). This is
the case if pT < v. Then, rational speculators short the asset even though they receive
a positive signal and buy it in the last period whereas positive feedback traders sell it.
Therefore we have underreaction in this case. It might happen that prices get negative
but we exclude these cases.
Note, that if we set η1 = η2, then both cancel out in equation (3.18) and we have the
same overreaction as in the case when the measures are 1, µ and 1− µ.
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3.3.6 The effect of measure in the absence of rational speculators
The measure also may have an impact on the results in the absence of rational specu-
lators. Let us therefore take the setup from above (measure of positive feedback traders
is η1, measure of passive investors is η2) and set µ = 0. We apply this setup to the two
propositions 7 and 8.
Corollary 3. Let η1 be the measure of positive feedback traders and η2 be the measure
of passive investors. The behavior of the price pt in propositions 7 and 8 is the same
for t = 0, 1, . . . , te
′′ − 1 and does not change qualitatively if
η1
η2
<
α
β
and
η1
η2
<
α
β1
, (3.19)
respectively.
Proof. The price behavior before the signal arrives is the same as in both proposition
7 and 8. The demand functions are Dft = S and D
e
t = α(v−pt) for t = 0, 1, . . . , te′′−1.
As in proof of proposition 9, we set S = 0 so the market clearing condition is
0 = η1D
f
t + η2D
e
t = η2α(pt − v)
and we have pt = v.
For t ≥ te′′ we first consider the situation in proposition 7. The market clears if
0 = η1
(
β(pt−1 − pt−2) + . . .+ β(pte′′ − pte′′−1)
)
+ η2α(v + φ
′′ − pt)
⇔ 0 = η1βpt − η1βv + η2α(v + φ′′ − pt)
⇔ 0 = η1β
η2α
pt−1 − η1β
η2α
v + v + φ′′ − pt
⇔ pt = η2α− η1β
η2α
v + φ′′ +
η1β
η2α
pt−1.
The proof of proposition 7 applies here if
η1β
η2α
< 1⇔ η1
η2
<
α
β
.
Now we turn to the situation in proposition 8. The market clearing condition is
0 = η1β1(pt−1 − pt−2) + η2α(v + φ′′ − pt)
⇔ pt = v + φ′′ + η1β1
η2α
(pt−1 − pt−2).
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As in the proof proposition 8 we assume
η1β1
η2α
< 1⇔ η1
η2
<
α
β1
.
This proposition tells us essentially the same as proposition 9. If the measure of
positive feedback traders is not too large (compared to the measure of passive investors),
then the price functions are almost the same as with measure one.
Remark 2. If equation (3.19) is violated in the situation of proposition 7, then prices
go to infinity.
Proof. Applying the proof from proposition 7 and replacing β
α
by η1β
η2α
we get the ho-
mogenous linear differential equation
p˜t =
η1β
η1α
p˜t−1.
The solution to this differential equation is
p˜t =
(
η1β
η1α
)t−te′′
p˜te′′ ,
so p˜t and therefore pt go to infinity as t increases if
η1β
η2α
> 1.
If η1β > η2α (η1β1 > η2α), then positive feedback traders have more “trading power”
than passive investors. Their demand after the initial price change is always larger than
the absolute value of passive investors’ demand so the price goes to ∞.
Note that if η1 = η2, then equation (3.19) becomes α > β and α > β1, respectively and
we are again in the situation of proposition 7 and 8.
3.3.7 Fundamental value and bubbles
We have seen in this section that slight changes in the time setup and different as-
sumptions on the values of βl can change the price response to the signal dramatically.
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But in which cases is there a bubble?
In the original model with destabilizing speculation, DSSW say that “informed ra-
tional speculators can push prices away from fundamentals” (De Long et al., 1990,
p.388). They are talking in this context about a “positive-feedback bubble” (De Long
et al., 1990, p.392) which they distinguish from a rational bubble. But to have a
positive-feedback bubble one must know what the fundamental value is. Following the
definition of the bubble in DSSW, one might think that the fundamental value is the
equilibrium price in the absence of rational speculators. So a bubble is the difference
between the equilibrium price in the presence (µ > 0) and in the absence (µ = 0) of
rational speculators. The bubble in their model would therefore be
p1,µ>0 − p1,µ=0 = v + (1 + β1
α− β1 )φ
′′ − v = α
α− β1
at date 1 and
p2,µ>0 − p2,µ=0 = v + (1 + β1
α− β1 )φ
′′ − v − φ′′ = β1
α− β1
at date 2. When we consider the case with stabilizing speculation, we have a bubble
with
p1,µ>0 − p1,µ=0 = v + φ′′ − v = φ′′
at date 1 and
p3,µ>0 − p3,µ=0 = v + φ′′ − v −
(
1 +
β1
α
)
φ′′ = −β1
α
φ′′
at date 3. So in that case we first have a positive and then a negative bubble after
a positive signal was realized. This raises doubts to the upper definition of a bubble.
The definition of the fundamental value is also worth discussing. Consider βl = β for
all l. In the presence of rational speculators the price immediately rises to
pt,µ>0 = v +
(
1 +
β
α− β
)
φ′′
(see proposition 6). In the absence of rational speculators in this setup the price is
pt,µ=0 = v +
t−te′′∑
τ=0
(
β
α
)τφ′′
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(see proposition 7) and for a large t − te′′ it converges to v +
(
1 + β
β−α
)
φ′′. So in
the presence of rational speculators the price jumps to the higher level whereas in the
absence it slowly converges to it. One could therefore think that the fundamental value
is v +
(
1 + β
β−α
)
φ′′. This is in line with Loewenstein & Willard (2006). They argue
that the consumption risk which is caused by noise traders is fundamental and should
therefore be reflected in the price. When rational speculators invest in the asset they
have to be compensated for the risk they carry. Let us consider Dr2 in the DSSW
model. Solving for the period−T price yields
pT = v + φ
′′ − D
r
T
α
.
The price therefore contains a premium or a discount when rational speculators’ de-
mand is not equal to zero.
Next, we consider rational bubbles. Let us think of the fundamental value as the dis-
counted sum of future payoffs. When we have another equilibrium price, then we define
the difference between this price and the fundamental value as a rational bubble. To
have such a bubble, we need two equilibrium prices. By showing that the equilibrium
price is unique, we can exclude these kind of bubbles. We will show in section 3.4.7
that the equilibrium price we consider is actually unique.
The final sort of a bubble we want to consider is a “speculative bubble”. An agent
does not necessary buy an asset to hold it to maturity but rather sells it earlier for
a higher price (De Long et al., 1990, p.380). Define a buy-and-hold strategy that
begins at date t as a marginal change in the holdings of the asset from date t to T
(dDrt = dD
r
t+1 = . . . = dD
r
T 6= 0). The fundamental value at date t is the price with
which the buy-and-hold strategy does not affect rational speculators’ utility. The spec-
ulative bubble is then the difference between the equilibrium price and the fundamental
value.
Proposition 10. A speculative bubble does not exist in the model with one signal.
Proof. Let U rt = E
r
tW
r
T+1−γσr2W rt+1|t denote rational speculators’ utility function at date
t. Deriving the utility with respect to dDrt (we understand this as the total derivative
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since dDrt = dD
r
T+1 = . . . = dD
r
T ), we have
dU rt
dDrt
=
dErtW
r
T+1
dDrt
− γ
dσr2W rt+1|t
dDrt
.
Let us first consider
dErtW
r
T+1
dDrt
. The date-t expectation of the final wealth (3.6) is
ErtW
r
T+1 = W
r
t +E
r
t [(pt+1 − pt)Drt ]+. . .+Ert
[
(pT − pT−1)DrT−1
]
+Ert [(v + Φ− pT )DrT ] .
Taking the total derivative we have
dErtW
r
T+1 = E
r
t (pt+1 − pt)dDrt + . . .+ Ert (pT − pT−1)dDrT−1
+Ert (v + Φ− pT )dDrT
= (−pt + v + Ert Φ)dDrt
⇔ dE
r
tW
r
T+1
dDrt
= −pt + v + Ert Φ.
Plugging the derivative of U rt in that function and solving for pt, we have
pt = v + E
r
t Φ− γ
dσr2W rt+1|t
dDrt
− dU
r
t
dDrt
. (3.20)
If the buy-and-hold strategy is unprofitable (i.e.
dUrt
dDrt
= 0), then the equilibrium price
equals the fundamental value and therefore a speculative bubble does not exist. So we
have to show that
dUrt
dDrt
= 0. We therefore need to calculate
dErtW
r
T+1
dDrt
and
dσr2
Wrt+1|t
dDrt
. Note
that
dσr2W rt+1|t
dDrt
= 2Ert
[
(W rT+1 − ErtW rT+1)
d(W rT+1 − ErtW rT+1)
dDrt
]
. (3.21)
For t = tr
′′
, tr
′′
+ 1, . . . , T equation (3.6) becomes W rT+1 = W
r
t + (v + φ
′′ + θ − pT )DrT .
The date−t expectation of the final wealth is ErtW rT+1 = W rt + (v + φ′′ − pT )DrT so
d(W rT+1 − ErtW rT+1)
dDrT
=
dθDrt
dDrt
= θ.
Together with
dErtW
r
T+1
dDrt
= (v + φ′′ − pT ), we have
dU rt
dDrt
= (v + φ′′ − pT )− 2γErt [θDrT θ]
= (v + φ′′ − pT )− 2γErt
[
α(v + φ′′ − pT )θ2
]
= (v + φ′′ − pT )(1− 2γασ2θ)
= 0,
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since α = 1
2γσ2θ
.
For t = 0, 1, . . . , tr
′′ − 1, final wealth is
W rT+1 = W
r
t + (ptr′′ − ptr′′−1)Drtr′′−1 + (v + φ′′ + θ − pT )DrT .
The date−t expectation is
ErtW
r
T+1 = W
r
t + E
r
t
[
(ptr′′ − ptr′′−1)Drtr′′−1
]
+ Ert [(v + φ
′′ + θ − pT )DrT ]
and the total derivative is
dErtW
r
T+1 = E
r
t
(
ptr′′ − ptr′′−1
)
dDr
tr′′−1 + E
r
t (v + φ
′′ + θ − pT ) dDrT .
Together with (3.4) and dDrt = dD
r
T+1 = . . . = dD
r
T , we have
dErtW
r
T+1
dDrt
= (Ert pT − v) + (v + Ert φ′′ + Ert θ − Ert pT )
= 0.
The total derivative of the difference between final wealth and its expectation is
d(W rT+1 − ErtW rT+1) = (ptr′′ − ptr′′−1)dDrtr′′−1 + (v + φ′′ + θ − pT )DrT
−Ert
[
pr′′ − ptr′′−1
]
dDr
tr′′−1 − Ert [v + φ′′ + θ − pT ] dDrT
so
d(W rT+1 − ErtW rT+1)
dDrt
= ptr′′ − ptr′′−1 + (v + φ′′ + θ − pT )
−Ert
[
ptr′′ − ptr′′−1
]− Ert [v + φ′′ + θ − pT ]
= −v + (v + φ′′ + θ)− (v − v)− (v − v)
= φ′′ + θ.
Since φ′ = 0 and ptr′′−1 = v we have D
r
tr′′−1 = 0 (see equation (3.9)). Therefore the
derivative of the variance is
dσ2T+1|t
dDrt
= 2Ert [((v + φ
′′ + θ − v − (1 + λ′′)φ′′)α(v + φ′′ − v − (1 + λ′′)φ′′)
−Ert [(v + φ′′ + θ − v − (1 + λ′′)φ′′)α(v + φ′′ − v − (1 + λ′′)φ′′)]) (φ′′ + θ)]
= 2Ert
[(−αλ′′φ′′(θ − λ′′φ′′)− Ert [−αθλ′′φ′′ + αλ′′2φ′′2]) (φ′′ + θ)]
= 2Ert
[(−αθλ′′φ′′ + αλ′′2φ′′2 − αλ′′2σ2φ′′) (φ′′ + θ)]
= 0,
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since θ is has mean zero and is independent (Ert [θφ
′′] = Ert [θφ
′′2] = 0) and φ′′ has
also mean zero and is symmetric (Ert [φ
′′3] = 0). Therefore dU
r
t
dDrt
= 0, which proves the
proposition.
Although a speculative bubble does not exist in the case with one signal, we will see
in section 3.4.8 that such a speculative bubble may exist in the case with two signals
(between the arrival of both signals).
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3.4 Case with two signals
After the discussion of the model with one signal, we now turn to the case with two
signals. In this section we assume that σ2φ′ > 0 so we have two signals. We first derive
a general formula for the price reaction and then specify the different results in certain
time setups. After that we show that the equilibrium is unique and that a speculative
bubble may exist.
3.4.1 The general case
Other than in the case with one signal, we first show the general case and then discuss
several special time setups that lead to different price pathes.
Proposition 11. Let σ2φ′′ > 0 and D = 1te′<tr′′ . For µ > 0, the equilibrium asset
prices satisfy (3.4) with
ν ′ =
βT−tr′ − (α− βT−tr′′ )λ′
βT−tr′′ − βT−tr′
(3.22)
=
2γσ2φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2
[
(1− µ)α(D − 1) + β(tr′′−1)−tr′
]
µ+
[
(1− µ)α− β(tr′′−1)−tr′
]
2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
+
µ
[
1− 4αλ′′γ(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′
]
λ′
µ+
[
(1− µ)α− β(tr′′−1)−tr′
]
2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
(3.23)
and
λ′′ =
βT−tr′′
α− βT−tr′′
. (3.24)
Proof. To prove this proposition we plug the demand functions of the three types of
agents into the market clearing condition and solve for the prices pt. We look at the
market clearing conditions at dates before information arrives (tr
′ − 1, tr′′ − 1 and T ).
For simplicity we set S = 0.
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From equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.9), the market clears at tr
′ − 1 if
0 = Df
tr′−1 + µD
r
tr′−1 + (1− µ)Detr′−1
= µ
v − ptr′−1
2γ(1 + ν ′)2σ2φ′
+ (1− µ)α(v − ptr′−1)
=
(
µ
2γ(1 + ν ′)2σ2φ′
+ (1− µ)α
)
(v − ptr′−1).
Therefore ptr′−1 = v since
µ
2γ(1+ν′)2σ2
φ′
+ (1− µ)α > 0
We get the demand functions at tr
′′ − 1 again from equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.9).
However, we have to consider different cases. If rational speculators receive both signals
in sequent periods (i.e. tr
′
= tr
′′ − 1) then positive feedback traders have no time to
react to the first price change. Their demand is equal to zero in this case. If there is
at least one trading period between the arrival of the two signals (i.e. tr
′
< tr
′′ − 1)
then positive feedback traders’ demand is
Df
tr′′−1 = βtr′′−1−tr′ (ptr′ − ptr′−1). (3.25)
By defining β0 = 0, equation (3.25) also holds for t
r′ = tr
′′ − 1. Passive investors’
demand depends on weather they have already received their signal at tr
′′ − 1. If this
is the case (i.e. te
′ ≤ tr′′ − 1) then De
tr′′−1 = α(v+φ
′− ptr′′−1). If not (i.e. te′ > tr′′ − 1)
then De
tr′′−1 = α(v − ptr′′−1). We have defined
D = 1te′<tr′′ =
 0 if te
′
> tr
′′ − 1
1 if te
′ ≤ tr′′ − 1
and therefore combine these two cases in
De
tr′′−1 = α(v +Dφ
′ − ptr′′−1).
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With (3.4) and (3.9), the market clearing condition is
0 = βtr′′−1−tr′ (ptr′ − ptr′−1) + (1− µ)α(v +Dφ′ − ptr′′−1)
+µ
[
v + (1 + λ′)φ′ − ptr′′−1
2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
− 2αλ
′λ′′φ′
1 + λ′′
]
= −
[
(1− µ)α− βtr′′−1−tr′ +
µ
2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
]
ptr′′−1
+
[
(1− µ)α− βtr′′−1−tr′ +
µ
2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
]
v
+
[
(1− µ)αD + µ(1 + λ
′)− 4αγµλ′λ′′(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′
2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
]
φ′
= −
[
µ+ 2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
[
(1− µ)α− βtr′′−1−tr′
]
2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
]
ptr′′−1
+
[
µ+ 2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
[
(1− µ)α− βtr′′−1−tr′
]
2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
]
v
+
[
µ+ 2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′D(1− µ)α + (µ− 4αγµλ′′(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′)λ′
2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
]
φ′.
Therefore
ptr′′−1 = v +
[
µ+ 2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
[
(1− µ)α− βtr′′−1−tr′
]
µ+ 2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
[
(1− µ)α− βtr′′−1−tr′
]]φ′
+
[
2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′D(1− µ)α− 2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
[
(1− µ)α− βtr′′−1−tr′
]
µ+ 2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
[
(1− µ)α− βtr′′−1−tr′
] ]φ′
+
[ (
µ− 4αγµλ′′(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′
)
λ′
µ+ 2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
[
(1− µ)α− βtr′′−1−tr′
]]φ′
= v +
[
1 +
2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
[
(1− µ)α(D − 1) + βtr′′−1−tr′
]
µ+ 2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
[
(1− µ)α− βtr′′−1−tr′
]
+
(
µ− 4αγµλ′′(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′
)
λ′
µ+ 2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
[
(1− µ)α− βtr′′−1−tr′
]]φ′′
so
ν ′ =
2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
[
(1− µ)α(D − 1) + βtr′′−1−tr′
]
µ+ 2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
[
(1− µ)α− βtr′′−1−tr′
]
+
µ− 4αγµλ′′(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′
µ+ 2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
[
(1− µ)α− βtr′′−1−tr′
]λ′
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which proves (3.23).
The demand functions in period T are given by the equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.7).
Plugging these into the market clearing condition and using (3.4) we get
0 = βT−tr′ (ptr′ − ptr′−1) + βT−tr′′ (ptr′′ − pr′′−1) + α(v + φ′ + φ′′ − pT )
= βT−tr′ (1 + ν
′)φ′ + βT−tr′′ (pT − v − (1 + ν ′)φ′) + α(v + φ′ + φ′′ − pT )
= −(α− βT−tr′′ )pT + (α− βT−tr′′ )v + (α− βT−tr′′ )φ′
+βT−tr′ (1 + ν
′)φ′ − βT−tr′′ν ′φ′ + αφ′′
= −(α− βT−tr′′ )pT + (α− βT−tr′′ )v + (α− βT−tr′′ )φ′ + (α− βT−tr′′ )φ′′
+βT−tr′φ
′ + (βT−tr′ − βT−tr′′ )ν ′φ′ + βT−tr′′φ′′.
Solving for the price yields to
pT = v +
(
1 +
βT−tr′ + (βT−tr′ − βT−tr′′ )ν ′
α− βT−tr′′
)
φ′ +
(
1 +
βT−tr′′
α− βT−tr′′
)
φ′′
So
λ′ =
βT−tr′ + (βT−tr′ − βT−tr′′ )ν ′
α− βT−tr′′
and
λ′′ =
βT−tr′′
α− βT−tr′′
which proves (3.24). To get (3.22), we solve the upper equation for ν ′.
λ′ =
βT−tr′ + (βT−tr′ − βT−tr′′ )ν ′
α− βT−tr′′
⇔ (α− βT−tr′′ )λ′ = βT−tr′ + (βT−tr′ − βT−tr′′ )ν ′
⇔ (βT−tr′′ − βT−tr′ )ν ′ = βT−tr′ − (α− βT−tr′′ )λ′
⇔ ν ′ = βT−tr′ − (α− βT−tr′′ )λ
′
βT−tr′′ − βT−tr′
This proves (3.22).
Before considering special time setups we can draw some general conclusions from
proposition 11.
We see that the response to the second signal (3.24) is essentially the same as in the
general case with one signal. When we assume again that βl is a decreasing sequence
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then the response to the second signal is again smaller, the earlier the second signal
arrives (or the more trading periods there are).
The reaction to the first signal is given by the two equations (3.22) and (3.23). Since
the relation between λ′ and ν ′ is linear and since we have two equations, we can solve
for both parameters. Note, that when we maintain the assumptions that βl > βk for
l < k and α > βl ∀l, then equation (3.22) tells us that λ′ and ν ′ are inversely related.
An increase in ν ′ leads to a decrease in λ′ and vice versa. In other words, the stronger
the reaction to the first signal when rational speculators receive it, the weaker the
reaction to it when the second signal arrives. In the extreme case, when one of the two
parameters is negative, then the other is positive. So it might be the case that we have
underreaction to the first signal in the beginning (i.e. ν ′ < 0) and overreaction after
the second signal arrives (λ′ > 0). The opposite case is of course also possible (first
overreaction (ν ′ > 0), then underreaction (λ′ < 0)).
We will see in the following subsections that the equilibrium price can be obtained by
finding the intersection of the two lines given by equations (3.22) and (3.23). So it may
happen for certain parameter conditions that an equilibrium price does not exist. This
happens when the lines are parallel or, mathematically speaking, when their slopes are
the same, that is if
−(α− βT−tr′′ )
βT−tr′′ − βT−tr′
=
µ
[
1− 4αγλ′′(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′
]
µ+ 2γ(1 + λ′′)2
[
(1− µ)α− βtr′′−tr′−1
]
σ2φ′′
. (3.26)
Another point worth mentioning is that the variance of the first signal σ2φ′ does not
affect the prices. This is due to the fact that both rational speculators and passive
investors have zero demand (since pt = v for t = 0, 1, . . . , t
r′− 1, Dr
tr′−1 = 0) before the
arrival of of the first signal.
In the next three subsections we consider different time setups that lead to different
results. In the proof of proposition 11 we considered different demand functions of
passive investors and positive feedback traders which depended on the time structure
of the model. We allowed D to be either zero or one and βtt′′−1−tr′ to be equal to zero
or not equal to zero. Since we have two cases for D and two cases for βtt′′−1−tr′ we
have four cases overall:
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Figure 3.5: The three different time setups.
• te′ < tr′′ and tr′′ − 1− tr′ = 0 (⇒ D = 1, β(tr′′−1)−tr′ = 0)
• te′ < tr′′ and tr′′ − 1− tr′ > 0 (⇒ D = 1, β(tr′′−1)−tr′ ≥ 0)
• te′ ≥ tr′′ and tr′′ − 1− tr′ = 0 (⇒ D = 0, β(tr′′−1)−tr′ = 0)
• te′ ≥ tr′′ and tr′′ − 1− tr′ > 0 (⇒ D = 0, β(tr′′−1)−tr′ ≥ 0)
The first case is by assumption not possible. Let te
′
< tr
′′
and tr
′′ − 1− tr′ = 0⇔ tr′′ =
tr
′
+ 1. Then
te
′
< tr
′′
= tr
′
+ 1.
But this means that passive investors receive their first signal at least at the same date
or even before rational speculators learn about the first signal. This contradicts our
model assumption tr
′
< te
′
so only three cases are left.
These cases are discussed in the next three subsections. For simplicity we consider
specific dates instead of using tr
′
, tr
′′
, te
′
, te
′′
and T . The time structure of these three
setups is depicted in figure 3.5.
3.4.2 Setup 1
Corollary 4. Let T = 3, tr
′
= 1, tr
′′
= 2, te
′
= 2 and te
′′
= 3. Then equations (3.22)
and (3.23) become
ν ′ =
β2 − (α− β1)λ′
β1 − β2 =
−2αγ(1− µ)(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′ + µ
[
1− 4αλ′′γ(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′
]
λ′
µ+ 2αγ(1− µ)(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
.
(3.27)
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σ2φ′′ = 0
σ2φ′′ ↓
ν′
λ′
β2
α−β1
β2
α−β2
β2
α−β2
b
b
Figure 3.6: Determination of λ′ and ν ′
Proof. Since te
′
= tr
′′
= 2⇒ D = 0 and since tr′ = tr′′ − 1 = 1⇒ β1−1 = β0 = 0. Then
(3.27) follows immediately from proposition 11.
We solve for λ′ and ν ′ graphically. We therefore draw the two lines
ν ′ =
β2 − (α− β1)λ′
β1 − β2
and
ν ′ =
−2αγ(1− µ)(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′ + µ
[
1− 4αλ′′γ(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′
]
λ′
µ+ 2αγ(1− µ)(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
from equation (3.27) in a λ′-ν ′−diagram. The intersection of the two functions gives
us the equilibrium values of λ′ and ν ′. Both functions are linear in λ′ which means
that they are both lines. We first consider
ν ′ =
β2 − (α− β1)λ′
β1 − β2 . (3.28)
If we assume that earlier news have a weaker impact on positive feedback traders’
demand (i.e. β1 > β2), then (3.28) is a decreasing function with positive intercept
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β2
β1−β2 . It intersects the λ
′−axis at β2
α−β1 since
0 =
β2 − (α− β1)λ′
β1 − β2
⇔ (α− β2)λ′ = β2
⇔ λ′ = β2
α− β1 .
To draw
ν ′ =
−2αγ(1− µ)(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′ + µ
[
1− 4αλ′′γ(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′
]
λ′
µ+ 2αγ(1− µ)(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
, (3.29)
we first consider the case σ2φ′′ = 0. Then (3.29) becomes ν
′ = 0
µ
+ µ
µ
λ′ = λ′ so it is the
line through the origin with slope 1. This line intersects (3.28) at β2
α−β2 since
λ′ =
β2 − (α− β1)λ′
β1 − β2
⇔ (β1 − β2)λ′ = β2 − (α− β1)λ′
⇔ (α− β2)λ′ = β2
⇔ λ′ = β2
α− β2 .
To see how an increase in σ2φ′′ affects λ
′ and ν ′, we derive the intercept and the slope
with respect to σ2φ′′ :
∂
∂σ2φ′′
−2αγ(1− µ)(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
µ+ 2αγ(1− µ)(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
=
(µ+ 2αγ(1− µ)(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′)(−2αγ(1− µ)(1 + λ′′)2)[
µ+ (1− µ)α2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
]2
−2αγ(1− µ)(1 + λ
′′)2(−2αγ(1− µ)(1 + λ′′)2)σ2φ′′[
µ+ 2αγ(1− µ)(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
]2
=
−2αγµ(1− µ)(1 + λ′′)2[
µ+ 2αγ(1− µ)(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
]2 < 0
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and
∂
∂σ2φ′′
µ
(
1− 4αγλ′′(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′
)
µ+ 2αγ(1− µ)(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
=
(µ+ 2αγ(1− µ)(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′)(−4αγλ′′µ(1 + λ′′))[
µ+ 2αγ(1− µ)(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
]2
−
(
µ− 4αγλ′′µ(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′
)
2αγ(1− µ)(1 + λ′′)2[
µ+ 2αγ(1− µ)(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
]2
=
−4αγλ′′µ2(1 + λ′′)− 2αγµ(1− µ)(1 + λ′′)2[
µ+ 2αγ(1− µ)(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
]2 < 0
since 0 < µ < 1, α > 0, γ > 0 and λ′′ > 0. Therefore, as σ2φ′′ rises, the intercept and
the slope decrease so ν ′ < β2
α−β2 < λ
′. We can show that the intercept converges to −1
and the slope to − 2µλ′′
(1−µ)(1+λ′′) as σ
2
φ′′ →∞. Since the denominator and the numerator
of (3.29) are linear functions in σ2φ′′ , they both go to ±∞ as σ2φ′′ → ∞ and we can
apply l’Hospital’s rule12. Therefore
lim
σ2
φ′′→∞
−2(1− µ)αγσ2φ′′(1 + λ′′)2
µ+ 2(1− µ)αγ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
= lim
σ2
φ′′→∞
−2(1− µ)αγ(1 + λ′′)2
2(1− µ)αγ(1 + λ′′)2 = −1 (3.30)
and
lim
σ2
φ′′→∞
µ
(
1− 4αλ′′γ(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′
)
µ+ (1− µ)α2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
= lim
σ2
φ′′→∞
−4αλ′′γµ(1 + λ′′)
(1− µ)α2γ(1 + λ′′)2 = −
2µλ′′
(1− µ)(1 + λ′′) .
(3.31)
So for σ2φ′′ large enough ν
′ < −1. That means there there may be underreaction to
a positive signal. If the realizations of φ′ and φ′′ are both positive then two possible
price paths are depicted in figure 3.7. The solid line represents the case where the
variance of the second signal is close to zero. In this case, the intersection of the two
lines represented by (3.28) and (3.29) is in the first quadrant in the λ′ − ν ′−diagram.
Since σ2φ′′ > 0 they intersect below the 45
◦-line (see figure 3.6). Therefore λ′ > ν ′. We
have relatively little overreaction to the first signal after it arrived but a much stronger
reaction to it when the second signal arrives. Note that there exists σ2φ′′ > 0 for which
ν ′ = 0 so we have neither under- nor overreaction after the first signal arrived. As
12Let f(x) = m(x)n(x) . As x→ a, then m(x) and n(x) go both to 0 or ±∞. Then limx→a
m(x)
n(x) = limx→a
m′(x)
n′(x)
(Chiang & Wainwright, 2005, p.399).
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Figure 3.7: Possible prices reactions
σ2φ′′ increases, the intersection of (3.28) and (3.29) moves to the fourth quadrant in
the λ′-ν ′−coordinate system (see figure 3.6). Then ν ′ < 0 < λ′. That means there is
underreaction to the first signal when it is realized but overreaction when the second
signal arrives. The dashed line in figure 3.7 illustrates the price path in this case.
Another point worth mentioning is that it might be the case that there exists no
equilibrium. This is true when the slopes of equations (3.28) and (3.29) are equal.
To see that this might happen, we consider the limit of the slope of (3.29) which is
− 2µλ′′
(1−µ)(1+λ′′) = − 2µβ1(1−µ)α as σ2φ′′ →∞. As long as
− 2µβ1
(1− µ)α > −
α− β1
β1 − β2
⇔ − 2µ
1− µ > −
α− β1
β1 − β2
α
β1
,
the slope of equation (3.28) is steeper than the slope of equation (3.29). The left-hand
side of this inequality is equal to zero for µ = 0 and as µ increases, µ
1−µ increases and
goes to ∞ as µ goes to 1. So the left-hand side of the upper inequality lies between
−∞ and zero for µ ∈ [0, 1]. Since α−β1
β1−β2
α
β1
> 0 (we assumed α > β1 and β1 > β2), there
are values of µ such that
− 2µ
1− µ = −
α− β1
β1 − β2
α
β1
91
Positive Feedback Traders
and
− 2µ
1− µ < −
α− β1
β1 − β2
α
β1
.
In the case of equality, the slopes of (3.28) and (3.29) are equal so both lines are
parallel. Since they have no intersection point, there exists no equilibrium (they cannot
be identical since the intercept of (3.28) is positive ( β2
β1−β2 ) and the intercept of (3.29) is
negative (in the interval (−1, 0])). If the inequality holds, then the line given by (3.29)
is steeper than the line given by (3.28). Since the intercept of (3.28) is greater than
zero ( β2
β1−β2 ) and the intercept of (3.29) is in (−1, 0] , the lines intersect in the second
quadrant of the λ′ − ν ′−diagram. Therefore λ′ < 0 < ν ′. So we have overreaction to
the first signal when it arrives, but underreaction when the second signal arrives.
But why is it that an increase in the variance of the second signal (σ2φ′′) has an influence
on the degree and even the direction of under- and overreaction of the reaction to the
first signal? The reason is the covariance effect mentioned in section 3.2. Recall that
Dr
tr′′−1 =
v + (1 + λ′)φ′ − ptr′′−1
2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
− 2αλ
′λ′′φ′
1 + λ′′
.
We have shown that the covariance between the returns on investment at date tr
′′ − 1
and T is given by the second summand. As σ2φ′′ increases, the first part
(
v+(1+λ′)φ′−p
tr
′′−1
2γ(1+λ′′)2σ2
φ′′
)
of the demand decreases13 whereas the second term
(
2αλ′λ′′φ′
1+λ′′
)
increases. Therefore the
demand decreases and can even becomes negative. So if the variance of the second
signal is large, rational speculators are willing to hedge against the impact of φ′′ at
date T .
3.4.3 Setup 2
Corollary 5. Let T = 4, tr
′
= 1, tr
′′
= 3, te
′
= 2 and te
′′
= 4. Then equations (3.22)
and (3.23) become
ν ′ =
β3 − (α− β1)λ′
β1 − β3 (3.32)
13Note that an increase in σ2φ′′ also increases λ
′. But since λ′ (and therefore the numerator) is bounded
(this comes from equations (3.30) and (3.31)), there exists σ2φ′′ above which every increase in the
variance decreases the first term of the demand.
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and
ν ′ =
2γσ2φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2β1 + µ
(
1− 4αλ′′γ(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′
)
λ′
µ+ [(1− µ)α− β1] 2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
. (3.33)
Proof. Since te
′
= 2 and tr
′′
= 3⇒ D = 1 and since tr′ = 1 and tr′′ = 3⇒ β3−1−1 = β1.
Then (3.33) follows immediately from proposition 11.
The determination of λ′ and ν ′ is a little bit more complicated in this setup. This
is because, in contrast to the setup in the previous section, it may happen that the
denominator becomes zero or negative. We therefore have to distinguish different
parameter combinations that lead to very different results. Instead of starting with
σ2φ′′ = 0 and increasing it, we assume that is positive and constant and only vary the
measure µ of rational speculators.
Let us begin with decomposing the linear function in λ′ (3.33) in its intercept
2γσ2φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2β1
µ+ [(1− µ)α− β1] 2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
(3.34)
and its slope
µ− 4αγµλ′′(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′
µ+ [(1− µ)α− β1] 2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
. (3.35)
We first examine the intercept a little closer. The numerator is constant in µ, so in
our case µ affects only the denominator of the intercept. The denominator is a linear
function in µ
µ+ 2γσ2φ′′(1 +λ
′′)2 [(1− µ)α− β1] = µ
(
1− 2αγσ2φ′′(1 + λ′′)2
)
+ (α−β1)2γσ2φ′′(1 +λ′′)2
and greater than zero for µ = 0 since α > β1, γ > 0, σ
2
φ′′ > 0 and λ
′′ > 0. It is
increasing (function I in the left panel of figure 3.8) if
1 > 2αγσ2φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2
and decreasing (functions II and III in the left panel of figure 3.8) if
1 < 2αγσ2φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2.
We have to distinguish two different cases when it is decreasing. It may be positive
for µ = 1 (and therefore positive for all µ ∈ (0, 1]; function II in the left panel of
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Figure 3.8: Shape of the denominator (left panel) and of (3.34) (right panel).
figure 3.8) or negative for µ = 1 (in that case ∃ µ˜ ∈ (0, 1] such that the denominator is
equal to zero; function III in the left panel of figure 3.8). To see that, we calculate the
denominator for µ = 1 and get 1− 2β1γσ2φ′′(1 + λ′′)2. If
1 > 2β1γσ
2
φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2,
the denominator is positive for µ = 1, if
1 < 2β1γσ
2
φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2,
it is negative. Since α > β1, we have
2αγσ2φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2 > 2β1γσ2φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2,
so there are three different cases to consider:
I 2β1γσ
2
φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2 < 2αγσ2φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2 < 1
II 2β1γσ
2
φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2 < 1 < 2αγσ2φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2
III 1 < 2β1γσ
2
φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2 < 2αγσ2φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2.
Therefore we have three different shapes of the intercept as a function of µ depending
on the parameter constellation. In case I, the denominator is positive and increasing in
µ so the intercept is positive, bounded and decreasing in µ (function I in the right panel
of figure 3.8). If the denominator is positive and decreasing (case II), the intercept is
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also positive, bounded but increasing (function II in the right panel of figure 3.8). In
the third case (III), the intercept is always increasing14 but it is positive (and goes to
∞) for µ < µ˜ and negative (comes from −∞) for µ˜ < µ (function III in the right panel
of figure 3.8).
For the determination of λ′ and ν ′ we have to check whether the intercept of (3.33)
for µ = 0 is smaller or larger than the intercept of (3.32). The intercept of (3.33) for
µ = 0 is
2β1γ(1 + λ
′′)2σ2φ′′
(α− β1)2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
=
β1
α− β1 .
Then
β1
α− β1 ≶
β3
β1 − β3
⇔ β1(β1 − β3) ≶ β3(α− β1)
⇔ β21 − β1β3 ≶ αβ3 − β1β3
⇔ β21 ≶ αβ3,
so the intercept of (3.33) with µ = 0 is smaller than the intercept of (3.32) if β21 < αβ3
and larger if β21 > αβ3.
Next, we consider the slope
µ− 4αγµλ′′(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′
µ+ [(1− µ)α− β1] 2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
of equation (3.33). The denominator coincides with the denominator of the intercept
so the the results from above apply here.15 We therefore still have to examine the nu-
14This can be validated by taking the derivative of the intercept with respect to µ
∂(3.34)
∂µ
= −2γσ
2
φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2β1(1− 2αγσ2φ′′(1 + λ′′)2)(
µ+ [(1− µ)α− β1] 2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
)2 > 0.
15Recall the three cases
I 2β1γσ
2
φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2 < 2αγσ2φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2 < 1
II 2β1γσ
2
φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2 < 1 < 2αγσ2φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2
III 1 < 2β1γσ
2
φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2 < 2αγσ2φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2.
The behavior of the denominator in these cases is as depicted in the left panel of figure 3.8.
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Figure 3.9: Shape of the numerator of the slope (left panel) and of (3.35) (right panel).
merator to characterize the behavior of the slope. Like the denominator, the numerator
is a linear function in µ. For µ = 0 it is equal to zero and for µ = 1 we have
1− 4αγλ′′(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′
which is also the slope of the numerator. We therefore have to consider two cases. The
numerator is positive and increasing (case A in the left panel of figure 3.9) if
1 > 4αγλ′′(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′
and negative and decreasing (case B in the left panel of figure 3.9) if
1 < 4αγλ′′(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′ .
Note, that
αλ′′ = α
β1
α− β1 = β1
α
α− β1 = β1(1 + λ
′′),
so
4αγλ′′(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′ = 4β1γ(1 + λ
′′)2σ2φ′′ > 2β1γσ
2
φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2.
This yields five different cases:16
IA 2β1γσ
2
φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2 < 2αγσ2φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2 < 1 and 4αγλ′′(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′ < 1
16In case III, we have 1 < 2β1γσ
2
φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2. Since 4αγλ′′(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′ > 2β1γσ
2
φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2 we have
1 < 4αγλ′′(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′ so case III together with case A is not possible.
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IB 2β1γσ
2
φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2 < 2αγσ2φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2 < 1 and 1 < 4αγλ′′(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′
IIA 2β1γσ
2
φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2 < 1 < 2αγσ2φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2 and 4αγλ′′(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′ < 1
IIB 2β1γσ
2
φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2 < 1 < 2αγσ2φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2 and 1 < 4αγλ′′(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′
IIIB 1 < 2β1γσ
2
φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2 < 2αγσ2φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2 and 1 < 4αγλ′′(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′ .
In the following we will characterize these cases. The slope is a rational function of the
form
aµ
b+ cµ
, (3.36)
where a = 1−4αγλ′′(1+λ′′)σ2φ′′ , b is positive and constant and c = 1−2αγσ2φ′′(1+λ′′)2.
Therefore a is positive (negative) if 1 > 4αγλ′′(1+λ′′)σ2φ′′ (1 < 4αγλ
′′(1+λ′′)σ2φ′′) and c
is positive (negative) if 1 > 2αγσ2φ′′(1+λ
′′)2 (1 < 2αγσ2φ′′(1+λ
′′)2). The first derivative
of the rational function is(
aµ
b+ cµ
)′
=
(b+ cµ)a− aµc
(b+ cµ)2
=
ab
(b+ cµ)2
and the second derivative is(
aµ
b+ cµ
)′′
=
−ab2c(b+ cµ)
(b+ cµ)4
=
−2abc
(b+ cµ)3
.
Note that all cases have in common that the numerator is zero for µ = 0 so all slope-
functions go through the origin.
Case IA
In this case we have 2αγσ2φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2 < 1 and 4αγλ′′(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′ < 1. Therefore a and
c in (3.36) are both positive. Hence, the first derivative is also positive and the second
derivative is negative (since the denominator is positive) so the slope is increasing and
concave. The function is depicted in the the right panel of figure 3.9.
So overall, the intercept decreases and the slope increases.
Case IB
As in case IA, c is again positive but a is negative since 1 < 4αγλ′′(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′ . The
first derivative is therefore negative and the second derivative is positive (since the
denominator is positive). The resulting convex and decreasing function is also depicted
in the the right panel of figure 3.9.
97
Positive Feedback Traders
As in case IA, the intercept decreases in this case, whereas the slope decreases.
Case IIA
We now consider the case where 2β1γσ
2
φ′′(1+λ
′′)2 < 1 < 2αγσ2φ′′(1+λ
′′)2 and 4αγλ′′(1+
λ′′)σ2φ′′ < 1 so a is now positive and c is negative. The slope is therefore increasing and
convex (since the denominator is positive; see right panel of figure 3.9).
In this case both the slope and the intercept increase as µ increases. This may lead to
mean reversion which we will discuss after the consideration of all cases.
Case IIB
If we have 1 < 4αγλ′′(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′ instead of 4αγλ
′′(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′ < 1, then both a and
c are negative so the slope is a decreasing concave (since the denominator is positive)
function (again right panel in figure 3.9).
Now, the intercept is increasing as above, but the slope decreases as µ increases. This
may lead to a overreaction in the beginning and to a underreaction afterwards. We
will discuss this example subsequently.
Case IIIB
As in case IIB, we have 1 < 2αγσ2φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2 and 1 < 4αγλ′′(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′ so a and
c are again both negative. Therefore the slope is again decreasing. But since the
denominator of the slope is positive for µ < µ˜ and negative for µ˜ < µ, the slope is
concave for µ < µ˜ and convex for µ˜ < µ. For µ → µ˜±, the slope goes to ∓∞. As all
other cases, this is also depicted in the right panel of figure 3.9.
So overall, the intercept increases as µ increases but is positive as long as µ < µ¯
and negative otherwise. In this parameter constellation almost all price reactions are
possible for different values of µ.
Note, that it is very important for the results whether the intercept of (3.32) lies above
or below the intercept of (3.33) for µ = 0.
We will now pick out two examples of price reactions. We have seen in the discussion
of setup 1 that it might happen that the reaction to the first signal is smaller when it
arrives than when the second signal arrives (0 < ν ′ < λ′). For a large variance we even
had underreaction of the first signal when it arrived and a strong overreaction later
(ν ′ < 0 < λ′). But other price reactions are also possible. We will now discuss the
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Figure 3.10: Determination of ν ′ and λ′ in the case IIB with αβ3 < β21 (left panel) and
in the case IIA with β21 < αβ3 (right panel).
remaining two possible price reactions (λ′ < 0 < ν ′ and 0 < λ′ < ν ′).
Let us consider case IIB, where the intercept of equation (3.32) is smaller than the
intercept of equation (3.33) so αβ3 < β
2
1 . For µ = 0, the line given by equation (3.33)
has slope zero and lies above the intercept of the ν ′-axis and the line given by equation
(3.32). We have seen above that if µ increases, the intercept of (3.33) increases and
its slope decreases. Therefore the intersection of (3.32) and (3.33) lies in the second
quadrant of the coordinate system so λ′ < 0 < ν ′. This situation is depicted in the
left panel of figure 3.10. If rational speculators receive a positive signal in that case
(φ′ > 0), the price increases to a higher level before it falls very strongly when the
second signal arrives. A possible price path is depicted by the dashed line in figure
3.11.
The next case we take a closer look at is case IIA where β21 < αβ3. In that case, the
line given by equation (3.33) lies below the intersection of (3.32) with the ν ′-axis for
µ = 0. As µ increases both, the slope and the intercept of (3.33) increase and for small
values of µ, both lines intersect in the first quadrant of the coordinate system (see
right panel of figure 3.10). In that case 0 < λ′ < ν ′, so we have mean reversion. There
is a strong overreaction to the first signal that weakens (but stays positive) when the
second signal arrives. A possible price path is depicted by the solid line in figure 3.11.
99
Positive Feedback Traders
pt
t
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v
v + φ′
Figure 3.11: Possible price pathes for λ′ < 0 < ν ′ (dashed line) and 0 < λ′ < ν ′ (solid
line) if φ′′ = 0.
3.4.4 Setup 3
For completeness, we also consider the third time setup.
Corollary 6. Let T = 4, tr
′
= 1, tr
′′
= 3, te
′
= 3 and te
′′
= 4. Then equations (3.22)
and (3.23) become
ν ′ =
β3 − (α− β1)λ′
β1 − β3 =
−2γσ2φ′′(1 + λ′′)2 ((1− µ)α− β1) + µ
(
1− 4αλ′′γ(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′
)
λ′
µ+ ((1− µ)α− β1) 2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
.
(3.37)
Proof. Since te
′
= tr
′′
= 3 ⇒ D = 0 and since tr′ = 1 and tr′′ = 3 ⇒ β3−1−1 = β1.
Then (3.37) follows immediately from proposition 11.
We decompose the right hand side of (3.37) again in its intercept
−2γσ2φ′′(1 + λ′′)2 ((1− µ)α− β1)
µ+ ((1− µ)α− β1) 2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
(3.38)
and its slope
µ
(
1− 4αλ′′γ(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′
)
λ′
µ+ ((1− µ)α− β1) 2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
.
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Figure 3.12: Shape of the numerator of the intercept (left panel) and the intercept
(right panel).
The slope is equal to the slope in setup 2, so the cases discussed there apply here. The
only difference to section 3.4.3 is that the numerator of the intercept differs. It is not
constant as before but a linear function in µ with intercept −2γσ2φ′′(1 + λ′′)2(α − β1)
and slope 2γσ2φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2αµ. For µ = 0, the numerator of (3.38) is
−2γσ2φ′′(1 + λ′′)2(α− β1) < 0,
since α > β1 and
2γσ2φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2β1 > 0
for µ = 1. The numerator is therefore a linear increasing function that is equal to zero
if
−2γσ2φ′′(1 + λ′′)2 [(1− µ)α− β1] = 0
⇔ (1− µ)α− β1 = 0
⇔ α− β1 = αµ
⇔ µ = α− β1
α
.
The numerator is depicted in the left panel of figure 3.12. The slope is therefore a
rational function of the form aµ+b
cµ+d
, where a = 2γσ2φ′′α(1 + λ
′′)2 > 0, b = −2γσ2φ′′(1 +
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λ′′)2(α− β1) < 0, c = 1− 2αγσ2φ′′(1 + λ′′)2 and d = (α− β1)2γσ2φ′′(1 + λ′′)2 > 0. Note,
that d = −b and a = 1− c. The first and second derivatives are(
aµ+ b
cµ+ d
)′
=
(cµ+ d)a− (aµ+ b)c
(cµ+ d)2
=
da− bc
(cµ+ d)2
=
d
(cµ+ d)2
> 0
and (
d
(cµ+ d)2
)′
=
(cµ+ d)2 0− 2d(cµ+ d)c
(cµ+ d)4
=
−2dc
(cµ+ d)3
.
So the intercept of the second equality in (3.37) is always increasing. Its curvature
however depends on the parameters. Recall the three cases I, II and III from section
3.4.3 when we discussed the numerator of equation (3.34). In case I, c > 0. In case II,
c < 0 but cµ + d > 0 for µ ∈ (0, 1] and in case III we also had c < 0 but cµ + d > 0
for µ ∈ (0, µ¯) and cµ+ d < 0 for µ ∈ (µ¯, 1]. Therefore the intercept is concave in case
I and case III for µ > µ¯ and convex in case II and case III for µ < µ¯. For µ = 0, the
intercept is always negative since its numerator is then negative and the denominator
positive. The shape of the intercept in the three cases is depicted in the right panel of
figure 3.12.
Combining the intercept and the slope from section 3.4.3 yields the following cases:
Cases IA and IIA
In this case we have ν ′ < 0 < λ′ for small values of µ. As µ increases, the intercept
becomes positive and we first have 0 < ν ′ < λ′ and then 0 < λ′ < ν ′. If the intercept
of the second equation of (3.37) exceeds the intercept of the first equation of (3.37) we
have λ′ < 0 < ν ′. The difference between the cases IA and IIA is the growth rate of
the intercept and the slope and therefore the values for large µ.
Cases IB and IIB
For small values of µ, the intersection of the two lines given by equation (3.37) lies
again in the fourth quadrant so ν ′ < 0 < λ′. As µ increases, the slope decreases and
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the intercept increases. Therefore it is possible that we have 0 < ν ′ < λ′ or 0 < λ′ < ν ′,
but for large slopes also λ′ < 0 < ν ′. If the intercept of the second equation of (3.37)
exceeds the intercept of the first equation of (3.37) we have λ′ < 0 < ν ′ (if the slope of
the second equality of equation (3.37) is smaller than the slope of the first equality).
Again, the difference between IB and IIB lies in the growth rate of the slope and the
intercept.
Case IIIB
In this case, both the slope and the intercept go to ±∞ and come from ±∞ as µ
increases. Therefore all kinds of price reactions are possible in this parameter constel-
lation (ν ′ < 0 < λ′, 0 < ν ′ < λ′, 0 < λ′ < ν ′ and λ′ < 0 < ν ′).
3.4.5 The possibility of non-existence of an equilibrium
In this section we discuss why it is possible that there exists a value of µ for which
no equilibrium price exists. Recall therefore from section 3.3.5 where we discussed the
effect of measure in the case with one signal. There, we defined the date−t market
demand as
mdt = D
f
t + (1− µ)Det + µDrt .
Now we turn to the case with two signals. The definition of the market demand also
applies here. The situation after the arrival of the second signal is essentially the same
as in section 3.3.5. The response to the first signal however may not exist. So we take
a closer look at the solution for the price in period tr
′′ − 1. With equation (3.4) and
the demand functions (3.1), (3.2) and (3.9) the market demand at tr
′′ − 1 is
mdtr′′−1 = β(tr′′−1)−tr′ (ptr′ − ptr′−1) + (1− µ)α(v − ptr′′−1)
+µ
(
v + (1 + λ′)φ′ − ptr′′−1
2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
− 2αλ
′λ′′φ′
1 + λ′′
)
(3.39)
= −
(
(1− µ)α− β(tr′′−1)−tr′ + µα′
)
ptr′′−1 + Υ
where Υ does not depend on ptr′′−1. We remember that we defined α as 1 over 2γ times
the variance of the price in the next period (= 1
2γσ2θ
). Defining α′ = 1
2γ(1+λ′′)2σ2
φ′′
, the
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slope of mdtr′′−1 is
(1− µ)α− β(tr′′−1)−tr′ + α′µ.
We assumed that α > βl for all l. Assuming additionally that α
′ > βl for all l, the
slope is always greater zero since
(1− µ)α− βl + µα′ > (1− µ)βl − βl + µβl = 0
for 0 < µ < 1. This changes if we allow for α′ < βl < α. Then it may happen that
there exists a µ for which
(1− µ)α− βl + µα′ = (α− βl) + µ(α′ − α) = 0
since α′−α < 0 and α−βl > 0. So the slope of md is equal to zero and there exists no
equilibrium in this case. The interpretation is the same as in the case with one signal.
If the “trading power” of passive investors ((1 − µ)α) and rational speculators (µα′)
together is smaller than the “trading power” of positive feedback traders (βtr′′−tr′−1),
we do not have an equilibrium.
3.4.6 Price behavior in the absence of rational speculators
In the preceding sections we have analyzed the price behavior in the presence of rational
speculators. In this section we consider the model with two signals in the absence of
rational speculators (µ = 0). For simplicity, we consider again only the two special
cases with βl = β = const. for all l and β2 = β3 = . . . = 0.
Proposition 12. For µ = 0, the asset prices obey pt = v for 0, 1, . . . , t
e′ − 1,
pt = v +
t−te′∑
τ=0
(
β
α
)τφ′ for t = te′ , . . . , te′′ − 1
and
pt = v +
t−te′∑
τ=0
(
β
α
)τφ′ +
t−te′′∑
ς=0
(
β
α
)ςφ′′ for t = te′′ , . . . , T, (3.40)
if βl = β is constant.
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Proof. The proof that pt = v for 0, 1, . . . , t
e′ − 1 and
pt = v +
t−te′∑
τ=0
(
β
α
)τφ′ for t = te′ , . . . , te′ − 1,
is essentially the same as the proof of proposition 7 (replace φ′′ by φ′ and te
′′
by
te
′
), so we only have to show (3.40). Consider the market clearing condition at date
t = te
′′
, te
′′
+ 1, . . . , T
S = S + β(pt−1 − pt−2) + . . .+ β(pte′ − pte′−1) + α(v + φ′ + φ′′ − pt)
⇔ 0 = βpt−1 − βv + α(v + φ′ + φ′′ − pt)
⇔ 0 = β
α
pt−1 − β
α
v + v + φ′ + φ′′ − pt
⇔ pt = β
α
pt−1 +
α− β
α
v + φ′ + φ′′.
To solve the differential equation, we first have to eliminate the constant. Set pt =
pt−1 = p¯ so
p¯ =
α− β
α
v + φ′ + φ′′ +
β
α
p¯
⇔ α−β
α
p¯ =
α− β
α
v + φ′ + φ′′
⇔ p¯ = v + α
α− βφ
′ +
α
α− βφ
′′.
Next, we decompose the price in the steady state and the deviation from it so pt = p˜t+p¯.
Then we get a differential equation without constant since
p˜t + v +
α
α− βφ
′ +
α
α− βφ
′′ =
β
α
(
p˜t−1 + v +
α
α− βφ
′ +
α
α− βφ
′′
)
+
α− β
α
v + φ′ + φ′′
⇔ p˜t = β
α
p˜t−1.
Its solution is
p˜t =
(
β
α
)t−te′′
p˜te′′ .
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Substituting p˜t = pt − p¯ and using footnote 9 yields pt − p¯ =
(
β
α
)t−te′′
(pt−1 − p¯)⇔
pt = v +
α
α− βφ
′ +
α
α− βφ
′′
+
(
β
α
)t−te′′ v + te′′−te′∑
τ=0
(
β
α
)τ
φ′ + φ′′ − v − α
α− βφ
′ − α
α− βφ
′′

= v +
α
α− βφ
′ +
α
α− βφ
′′
+
(
β
α
)t−te′′ (
α
α− β
(
1−
(
β
α
)te′′−te′+1)
φ′ − α
α− βφ
′ − β
α− βφ
′′
)
= v +
α
α− βφ
′ +
α
α− βφ
′′ −
(
β
α
)t−te′′ (
β
α
)te′′−te′+1
φ′ −
(
β
α
)t−te′′+1
α
α− βφ
′′
= v +
1− (β
α
)t−te′+1
1− β
α
φ′ +
1− (β
α
)t−te′′+1
1− β
α
φ′′
= v +
t−te′∑
τ=0
(
β
α
)τφ′ +
t−te′′∑
ς=0
(
β
α
)ςφ′′
which proves (3.40).
The results here are essentially the same as in the setup with one signal. After the
first signal arrives, the price increases monotonically to v + (1 + β
α−β )φ
′ for te
′ ≤ t ≤
te
′′ − 1 (see discussion that follows proposition 7). As the price is expressed in (3.40)
it can be decomposed into the two effects caused by φ′ on the one hand side and φ′′ on
the other hand side. The effect of φ′ on the price is described by
[
t−te′∑
τ=0
(
β
α
)τ]
φ′, the
effect of φ′′ by
[
t−te′′∑
ς=0
(
β
α
)ς]
φ′′. If the realizations of φ′ and φ′′ are positive then both
effects on pt are positive (since β, α > 0) so the price increases as t increases. After
the arrival of the second signal the price moves towards
v + (1 +
β
α− β )φ
′ + (1 +
β
α− β )φ
′′
since the limit of (3.40) is (see footnote 9)
lim
t→∞
v+
t−te′∑
τ=0
(
β
α
)τφ′+
t−te′′∑
ς=0
(
β
α
)ςφ′′ = v+(1 + β
α− β
)
φ′+
(
1 +
β
α− β
)
φ′′.
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Proposition 13. For µ = 0, the asset prices obey pt = v for t = 0, . . . , t
e′ − 1,
pt = v + φ
′ +
β1
α
(pt−1 − pt−2) for t = te′ , . . . , te′′ (3.41)
and
pt = v + φ
′ + φ′′ +
β1
α
(pt−1 − pt−2) for t = te′′ , . . . , T (3.42)
if βl = 0 for all l ≥ 2. The price response in this case is characterized by damped
fluctuations.
Proof. For µ = 0 and 0 = β2 = β3 = . . . the market clearing condition for dates
between te
′
and te
′′ − 1 (after passive investors received the first signal but before they
receive the second) is
0 = β1 (pt−1 − pt−2) + α(v + φ′ − pt)
⇔ pt = v + φ′ + β1
α
(pt−1 − pt−2) .
After passive investors receive the second signal (between te
′′
and T ), the market clear-
ing condition is
0 = β1 (pt−1 − pt−2) + α (v + φ′ + φ′′ − pt)
⇔ pt = v + φ′ + φ′′ + β1
α
(pt−1 − pt−2) .
This proves (3.41) and (3.42).
To see that these differential equations characterize damped fluctuations, we eliminate
the constants (3.41) and (3.42). We set p¯′ = pt = pt−1 = pt−2 in (3.41) and p¯′′ = pt =
pt−1 = pt−2 in (3.42). Then
p¯′ = v + φ+
β1
α
(p¯′ − p¯′)
= v + φ′
and
p¯′′ = v + φ′ + φ′′ +
β1
α
(p¯′′ − p¯′′)
= v + φ′ + φ′′.
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Replacing pt in (3.41) by p˜
′
t + p¯
′ and pt in (3.42) by p˜′′t + p¯
′′, we get
p˜′t + v + φ
′ = v + φ′ +
β1
α
(
p˜′t−1 + v + φ
′ − p˜′′t−2 − v − φ′
)
= v + φ′ +
β1
α
(
p˜′t−1 − p˜′′t−2
)
⇔ p˜′t =
β1
α
(
p˜′t−1 − p˜′′t−2
)
and
p˜′′t + v + φ
′ + φ′′ = v + φ′ + φ′′ +
β1
α
(
p˜′′t−1 + v + φ
′ + φ′′ − p˜′′t−2 − v − φ′ − φ′′
)
= v + φ′ + φ′′
β1
α
(
p˜′′t−1 − p˜′′t−2
)
⇔ p˜′′t =
β1
α
(
p˜′′t−1 − p˜′′t−2
)
.
Now we have two homogeneous linear differential equations of degree two so the rest
of the proof is identical to the proof in corollary 2.
The price reaction is again essentially the same as in the case with one signal. The
price is equal to v before the first signal arrives. Since passive investors demand a
positive quantity of the asset after they learn about the signal, the price increases to
v+φ′. This price change leads to a positive demand two periods after the signal arrived
so the price overshoots. The further the price moves away from v+φ′, the larger is the
negative demand of the passive investors in absolute value. There is a point where their
negative demand exceeds positive feedback traders’ demand. At that date the price
falls. This price decrease leads to a negative demand of positive feedback traders. Since
passive investors may also have a negative demand in this case, the price falls below
v + φ′. Now passive investors’ demand becomes positive since the asset is too “cheap”
from their point of view. This weakens the decrease of the price so positive feedback
traders’ negative demand decreases. At some point, passive investors’ demand exceeds
positive feedback traders’ demand so the price increases and the cycle starts again.
Note that prices only move to v + φ′ and v + φ′ + φ′′, respectively because β1
α
< 1.
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3.4.7 Uniqueness
We have seen in the previous sections that prices of the form given by (3.4) are an
equilibrium. However, there might in principle exist another price sequence that leads
to an equilibrium and does not satisfy (3.4). We show in this section that the equilib-
rium formed by the considered prices is unique.
To show uniqueness we use the concept of an information partition that can be found
for example in Magill & Quinzii (1998). Let there be a well-defined probability space
and a (finite) state space Ω.
Definition 3. A partition of Ω is a collection of mutually disjoint subsets of Ω whose
union is Ω. A partition Ft is said to be finer than Ft−1 if for σ ∈ Ft and σ′ ∈ Ft−1,
either σ ⊂ σ′ or σ ∩ σ′ = ∅.
We can describe the unfolding of information by a sequence of partitions of Ω,
F = (F0,F1, . . . ,FT )
where F0 = Ω, Ft is a finer partition than Ft−1 and FT = {{s}}s∈Ω. When information
increases, then certain states may be excluded so a partition becomes finer since σ ⊂
σ′. In period 0, an agent has no information about which state will be realized. As
time unfolds, his information increases and he has full information in period T . This
unfolding of information can be illustrated graphically by an event tree. Figure 3.13
depicts an example with 6 states and 4 periods. The partitions in this example are F0 =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, F1 = {{1} , {2, 3, 4} , {5, 6}}, F2 = {{1} , {2, 3} , {4} , {5, 6}} and F3 =
{{1} , {2} , {3} , {4} , {5} , {6}}. This figure also illustrates the concept of consistency
that is given by our definition of a finer partition: We say that the revealed information
is consistent if an agent cannot deduce information at date t about the realization of
a state by observing past paths. When we take two states s, s′ ∈ σt from a subset
σt ∈ Ft, then both paths in the event tree have to be equal. Consider {2, 3} ∈ F2 in
our example. An agent cannot decide whether state 2 or state 3 will be realized by
looking at their price paths up to date 2. Both states 2 and 3 were in the same subsets
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Figure 3.13: An example for the unfolding of information.
at date 0 ({1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} ∈ F0) and at date 1 ({2, 3, 4} ∈ F1 ).
Now we come back to our model setup. Let (Ft)t=0,1,...,T be the sequence of information
partitions that is getting finer as t increases. We denote the value of a random variable
in state s ∈ Ω by adding the subscript s. When rational speculators learn about φ′ at
date tr
′
, then φ′s = φ
′
s′ for s, s
′ ∈ σt if σt ⊂ σtr′ for tr′ < t. The same is true for φ′′. In
other words, if rational speculators receive the realization of a signal it stays constant
over all possible states.
Proposition 14. Let (pt,s, D
f
t,s, D
p
t,s, D
e
t,s)t=0,1,...,T,s∈Ω be an equilibrium. Then the equi-
librium is generically unique.
Proof. This follows with lemmas 2, 3 and 4 below.
We show the uniqueness of the equilibrium by backward induction. First, by using
the date−T market clearing condition, we show that pT is a function of the realiza-
tions of the two signals and the past prices. Since φ′, φ′′ and p0, . . . , pT−1 are known
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to rational speculators at T − 1, pT is uniquely determined. Repeating this argu-
ment at date tr
′′ − 1 (tr′ − 1), where we show that ptr′′−1 (ptr′−1) is a function of φ′
and p0, . . . , ptr′′−2 (p0, . . . , ptr′−2), proves that ptr′′−1 (ptr′−1) is uniquely determined.
That all prices stay constant when no information arrives follows from the absence of
arbitrage opportunities.
Lemma 2.
pt,s = pT,s for t = t
r′′ , tr
′′
+ 1, . . . , T and all s ∈ Ω.
Proof. For each state s, the market clearing condition at date T is
0 =
T−1∑
l=1
βl∆pT−l,s + α(v + φ′s + φ
′′
s − pT,s).
Solving for pT leads to
pT,s = v + φ
′
s + φ
′′
s +
1
α
T−1∑
l=1
βl∆pT−l. (3.43)
Let us assume that tr
′′
< T . Then rational speculators have already observed both
signals φ′s and φ
′′
s at T − 1. That means that the realization of both signals is uniform
in all states s ∈ σT−1 ∈ FT−1. Consistency of information revelation implies that the
prices pt,s are also identical in all states in σT−1 for all t = 0, 1, . . . , T−1. So all variables
on the right hand side of equation (3.43) are identical over all states s ∈ σT ∈ FT with
σT ⊂ σT−1. Therefore
pT,s = pT,s′
for s ∈ σT ⊂ σT−1 and s′ ∈ σT ⊂ σT−1.
Next, we show that the price is constant for t = tr
′′
, . . . , T . Let us assume that there
is a state s ∈ σT for which pT,s 6= pT−1,s. Then the capital gains (pT,s − pT−1,s)DrT−1,s
are increasing (if pT,s > pT−1,s) or decreasing (if pT,s < pT−1,s) in rational speculators’
demand so there exists no solution to the optimization problem. Therefore pT,s =
pT−1,s. By replacing pT,s by pT−1,s in equation (3.43) and using the argument from
above we get pT−1,s = pT−2,s. Repeating this argument recursively we get
pt,s = pT,s for t = t
r′′ , tr
′′
+ 1, . . . , T and s ∈ Ω.
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Note that the case tr
′′
= T is trivial.
Lemma 3.
pt,s = ptr′′−1,s for t = t
r′ , . . . , tr
′′ − 1 and s ∈ Ω.
Proof. We consider the date tr
′′−1 utility maximization problem of rational speculators.
For simplicity we drop the subscript s when it is not relevant for the calculation.
Rational speculators’ final wealth is
W rT+1 = W
r
tr′′−1 + (ptr′′ − ptr′′−1)Drtr′′−1 + α(pT − v − φ′ − φ′′ − θ)(pT − v − φ′ − φ′′).
Before calculating the mean and the variance of the final wealth to derive the optimal
demand, we rewrite pT using pt = pT for t = t
r′′ , tr
′′ − 1, . . . , T .
pT = v + φ
′ + φ′′ +
1
α
T−1∑
l=1
βl∆pT−l
= v + φ′ + φ′′ +
1
α
T−1∑
l=T−(tr′′−1)
βl∆pT−l +
βT−tr′′
α
(
ptr′′ − ptr′′−1
)
⇔ pT (1−
βT−tr′′
α
) = v + φ′ + φ′′ +
1
α
T−1∑
l=T−(tr′′−1)
βl∆pT−l −
βT−tr′′
α
ptr′′−1
⇔ pT = 1
α− βT−tr′′α(v + φ′ + φ′′) + T−1∑
l=T−(tr′′−1)
βl∆pT−l − βT−tr′′ptr′′−1
 .
The mean of pT = pT−1 = . . . = ptr′′ at date t
r′′ − 1 is
Etr′′−1ptr′′ =
1
α− βT−tr′′
α(v + φ′) + T−1∑
l=T−(tr′′−1)
βl∆pT−l − βT−tr′′ptr′′−1
 .
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Then the expected final wealth is
Er
tr′′−1W
r
T+1 =
(
Er
tr′′−1ptr′′ − ptr′′−1
)
Dr
tr′′−1 + C
=
1
α− βT−tr′′
(
α(v + φ′)− (α− βT−tr′′ )ptr′′−1
+
T−1∑
l=T−(tr′′−1)
βl∆pT−l − βT−tr′′ptr′′−1
Dr
tr
′′−1 + C
=
1
α− βT−tr′′
α(v + φ′ − ptr′′−1) + T−1∑
l=T−(tr′′−1)
βl∆pT−l
Dr
tr′′−1 + C,
where C is a constant that does not depend on Dr
tr′′−1 and therefore is not relevant
for our optimization problem. Next, we determine the conditional variance of the final
wealth
σr2
WT+1|tr′′−1 = E
r
tr
′′−1
(
W rT+1 − Ertr′′−1W rT+1
)2
= Er
tr′′−1
(
W rt+1 + (ptr′′ − ptr′′−1)Drtr′′−1 + αp2T − 2αvpT − 2αφ′pT
−2αφ′′pT + αv2 + 2αφ′v + 2αφ′′v + αφ′2 + 2αφ′φ′′ + αφ′′2 − αθpT
+αvθ + αθφ′ + αθφ′′
−W rt+1 − (Ertr′′−1ptr′′ − ptr′′−1)Drtr′′−1 − αErtr′′−1p2T + 2αvErtr′′−1pT
+2αφ′Er
tr′′−1pT − 2αErtr′′−1(φ′′pT )− αv2 − 2αφ′v − 2αvErtr′′−1φ′′
−αφ′2 − 2αφ′Er
tr′′−1φ
′′ − αEr
tr′′−1φ
′′2 + αEr
tr′′−1(θpT )− αvErtr′′−1θ
− αφ′Er
tr′′−1θ − αErtr′′−1(θφ′′)
)2
= Er
tr′′−1((ptr′′ − Ertr′′−1ptr′′ )Drtr′′−1 + α(p2T − Ertr′′−1p2T )
−2αv(pT − Ertr′′−1pT )− 2αφ′(pT − Ertr′′−1pT )
−2α(φ′′pT − Ertr′′−1(φ′′pT )) + 2αv(φ′′ − Ertr′′−1φ′′)
+2αφ′(φ′′ − Er
tr′′−1φ
′′) + α(φ′′2 − Er
tr′′−1φ
′′2)− α(θpT − Ertr′′−1(θpT ))
+αv(θ − Er
tr′′−1θ) + αφ
′(θ − Er
tr′′−1θ)) + α(θφ
′′ − Er
tr′′−1(θφ
′′)))2.
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To simplify this expression, we calculate
pT − Ertr′′−1pT =
1
α− βT−tr′′
α(v + φ′ + φ′′) + T−1∑
l=T−(tr′′−1)
βl∆pT−l − βT−tr′′ptr′′−1

− 1
α− βT−tr′′
α(v + φ′) + T−1∑
l=T−(tr′′−1)
βl∆pT−l − βT−tr′′ptr′′−1

=
α
α− βT−tr′′
φ′′.
Plugging this into the conditional variance and together with Er
tr′′−1φ
′′ = 0, Er
tr′′−1φ
′′3 =
0 (symmetry), Er
tr′′−1θ = 0, Cov(θ, pT ) = Cov(θ, φ
′′) = 0 (independence of θ),
Er
tr′′−1(φ
′′p2T ) = E
r
tr′′−1
{(
1
α− βT−tr′′
)2
α2φ′′3 + 2αφ′′2(αv + αφ′ + T−1∑
l=T−(tr′′−1)
βl∆pT−l − βT−tr′′ )
+ (αv + αφ′ +
T−1∑
l=T−(tr′′−1)
βl∆pT−l − βT−tr′′ )2

=
(
1
α− βT−tr′′
)2
2ασ2φ′′αv + αφ′ + T−1∑
l=T−(tr′′−1)
βl∆pT−l − βT−tr′′ptr′′−1

and
Er
tr′′−1(φ
′′2pT ) =
1
α− βt−tr′′
(αvEr
tr′′−1φ
′′2 + αφ′Er
tr′′−1φ
′′2 + αEr
tr′′−1φ
′′3
+Er
tr′′−1φ
′′2
T−1∑
l=T−(tr′′−1)
βl∆pT−l − Ertr′′−1βT−tr′′ptr′′−1)
=
1
α− βT−tr′′
σ2φ′′
αv + αφ′ + T−1∑
l=T−(tr′′−1)
βl∆pT−l − βT−tr′′ptr′′−1
 ,
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we have
σr2
WT+1|tr′′−1 = E
r
tr′′−1
(
α
α− βT−tr′′
φ′′
)2 (
Dr
tr′′−1
)2
+ 2
α
α− βt−tr′′
Dr
tr′′−1
Er
tr′′−1
[
αφ′′p2T − 2αφ′′Ertr′′−1p2T − 2αv
(
α
α− βT−tr′′
φ′′
)
φ′′
−2αφ′φ′′
(
α
α− βT−tr′′
φ′′
)
− 2αφ′′2pT + 2αφ′′Ertr′′−1(pTφ′′)
+2αvφ′′2 + 2αφ′φ′′2 + αφ′′3 − αφ′′Er
tr′′−1(φ
′′2)− αφ′′θpT + αvφ′′θ
+αφ′φ′′θ + αφ′′2θ
]
+ C ′
σr2
WT+1|tr′′−1 =
(
α
α− βT−tr′′
)2
σ2φ′′
(
Dr
tr′′−1
)2
+ 2
α
α− βt−tr′′
Dr
tr′′−1[(
1
α− βT−tr′′
)2
2α2σ2φ′′αv +
(
1
α− βT−tr′′
)2
2α2σ2φ′′αφ
′
+
(
1
α− βT−tr′′
)2
2α2σ2φ′′
T−1∑
l=T−(tr′′−1)
βl∆pT−l
−
(
1
α− βT−tr′′
)2
2α2σ2φ′′βT−tr′′ptr′′−1 − 2αv
α
α− βT−tr′′
σ2φ′′
−2αφ′ α
α− βT−tr′′
σ2φ′′ − 2α
1
α− βT−tr′′
σ2φ′′αv − 2α
1
α− βT−tr′′
σ2φ′′αφ
′
−2α 1
α− βT−tr′′
σ2φ′′
T−1∑
l=T−(tr′′−1)
βl∆pT−l
+2α
1
α− βT−tr′′
σ2φ′′βT−tr′′ptr′′−1 + 2αvσ
2
φ′′ + 2αφ
′σ2φ′′
]
+ C ′
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σr2
WT+1|tr′′−1 =
(
α
α− βT−tr′′
)2
σ2φ′′
(
Dr
tr′′−1
)2
+ 4
α2
α− βt−tr′′
Dr
tr′′−1σ
2
φ′′[
α2 − 2α(α− βT−tr′′ ) +
(
α− βT−tr′′
)2(
α− βT−tr′′
)2 v
α2 − 2α(α− βT−tr′′ ) +
(
α− βT−tr′′
)2(
α− βT−tr′′
)2 φ′′
+
α− (α− βT−tr′′ )(
α− βT−tr′′
)2 T−1∑
l=T−(tr′′−1)
βl∆pT−l
−α− (α− βT−tr′′ )(
α− βT−tr′′
)2 βT−tr′′ptr′′−1
]
+ C ′
σr2
WT+1|tr′′−1 =
(
α
α− βT−tr′′
)2
σ2φ′′
(
Dr
tr′′−1
)2
+ 4
α2
α− βt−tr′′
Dr
tr′′−1σ
2
φ′′[
α2 − 2α2 + 2αβT−tr′′ + α2 − 2αβT−tr′′ + β2T−tr′′(
α− βT−tr′′
)2 v
α2 − 2α2 + 2αβT−tr′′ + α2 − 2αβT−tr′′ + β2T−tr′′(
α− βT−tr′′
)2 φ′′
+
βT−tr′′(
α− βT−tr′′
)2 T−1∑
l=T−(tr′′−1)
βl∆pT−l −
βT−tr′′(
α− βT−tr′′
)2βT−tr′′ptr′′−1

+C ′
σr2
WT+1|tr′′−1 =
(
α
α− βT−tr′′
)2
σ2φ′′
(
Dr
tr′′−1
)2
+
4α2βT−tr′′(
α− βT−tr′′
)3σ2φ′′Drtr′′−1βT−tr′′ (v + φ′ − ptr′′−1) + T−1∑
l=T−(tr′′−1)
βl∆pT−l
+ C ′
where C ′ is again a constant that does not depend on Dr
tr′′−1. Setting the derivative of
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the mean-variance utility function with respect to Dr
tr′′−1 equal to zero yields
∂
∂Dr
tr′′−1
(µW − γσ2W ) =
1
α− βT−tr′′
α(v + φ′ − ptr′′−1) + T−1∑
l=T−(tr′′−1)
βl∆pT−l

−2γ
(
α
α− βT−tr′′
)2
σ2φ′′D
r
tr′′−1 − γ
4α2βT−tr′′(
α− βT−tr′′
)3σ2φ′′βT−tr′′ (v + φ′ − ptr′′−1) + T−1∑
l=T−(tr′′−1)
βl∆pT−l

!
= 0.
Solving for Dr
tr′′−1 yields
Dr
tr′′−1 =
(
α− βT−tr′′
2γσ2φ′′
−
2β2
T−tr′′
α− βT−tr′′
)
(v + φ′ − ptr′′−1)
+
(
α− βT−tr′′
2γσ2φ′′
− 2βT−tr′′
α− βT−tr′′
)
T−1∑
l=T−(tr′′−1)
βl∆pT−l.
So the market demand in period tr
′′ − 1 is
mdtr′′−1 = D
f
tr′′−1 + (1− µ)Detr′′−1 + µDrtr′′−1
=
tr
′′−2∑
l=1
βl∆ptr′′−1−l,s + (1− µ)α(v +Dφ′s − ptr′′−1,s)
+µ
(
α− βT−tr′′
2γσ2φ′′
−
2β2
T−tr′′
α− βT−tr′′
)
(v + φ′s − ptr′′−1,s) (3.44)
+µ
(
α− βT−tr′′
2γσ2φ′′
− 2βT−tr′′
α− βT−tr′′
)
T−1∑
l=T−(tr′′−1)
βl∆pT−l,s.
The market clears if mdtr′′−1 = 0. As we saw in section 3.4.5, there exists no equilibrium
price if
∂md
tr
′′−1
∂p
tr
′′−1
= 0. We therefore assume that
∂mdtr′′−1
∂ptr′′−1
= −(1− µ)α + µ
[
−
(
α− βT−tr′′
2αγσ2φ′′
−
2β2
T−tr′′
α− βT−tr′′
)
+ βT−(tr′′−1)
(
α− βT−tr′′
2αγσ2φ′′
− 2βT−tr′′
α− βT−tr′′
)]
6= 0.
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Since md(ptr′′−1,s) is a linear function of the price, the market clears at date t
r′′ − 1 for
a price level ptr′′−1,s. To see that this price level is uniquely determined, we show that
ptr′′−1,s = ptr′′−1,s′ for s ∈ σtr′′−1 ∈ Ftr′′−1 and s′ ∈ σ′tr′′−1 ∈ Ftr′′−1.
Consider σtr′′−1, σ
′
tr′′−1 ⊂ σtr′′−2 with σtr′′−1, σ′tr′′−1 ∈ Ftr′′−1 and σtr′′−2 ∈ Ft′′−2. Since
φ′s is already realized at t
r′′ − 2 ≥ tr′ , it is uniform in every state s ∈ σtr′′−2. The
consistency of information implies that all past prices are also uniform across the states
in σtr′′−2. Therefore the date−tr′′ − 1 price is unique.
Now we show that the price is constant between tr
′
and tr
′′ − 1. This follows from the
absence of arbitrage opportunities. Let us assume that ptr′′−1,s 6= ptr′′−2,s. Then the
capital gains (ptr′′−1,s − ptr′′−2,s)Drtr′′−2,s are monotonically increasing or decreasing in
the rational speculators’ demand. So there exists no solution for their maximization
problem. Thus, ptr′′−1,s = ptr′′−2,s. Applying the arbitrage argument recursively to
earlier dates, we have
pt,s = ptr′′−1,s for t = t
r′ , . . . , tr
′′ − 1 and s ∈ Ω.
Now we can show that the prices in the case with one signal are unique.
Corollary 7. The equilibrium is generically unique in the case with one signal.
Proof. When we have only one signal, then φ′s = 0. Using φ
′
s = 0 and pt,s = ptr′′−1,s
for t = 0, 1, . . . , tr
′′ − 1, s ∈ Ω we can simplify equations (3.43) and (3.44) and get
pT,s = v + φ
′
s + φ
′′
s +
1
α
T−1∑
l=1
βl∆pT−l,s
= v + φ′′s +
1
α
βT−tr′′
(
ptr′′ ,s − p0,s
)
⇔ pT,s =
α(v + φ′′s) + βT−tr′′p0,s
α− βT−tr′′
and the market clearing condition
0 =
[
µ
(
α− βT−tr′′
2αγσ2φ′′
−
2β2
T−tr′′
α− βT−tr′′
)
+ (1− µ)α
]
(v − p0,s).
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By setting p0,s = v, we get the same results as in proposition 6. To have uniqueness,
we have to assume that term before v − p0,s is not equal to zero, i.e.
µ
(
α− βT−tr′′
2αγσ2φ′′
−
2β2
T−tr′′
α− βT−tr′′
)
+ (1− µ)α 6= 0.
One can see that there is a parameter constellation for which any price p0,s together
with pT,s is an equilibrium.
When we considered the different setups in the case with two signals we have seen
that there is a parameter constellation such that there exists no solution for ν ′ and λ′.
This is the case when the two linear functions given by equations (3.22) and (3.23) are
parallel in the λ′− ν ′−diagram which is the case when their slopes are equal. So there
exists no solution if
α− βT−tr′′
βT−tr′′ − βT−tr′
=
µ
[
4γσ2φ′′βT−tr′′ (1 + λ
′′)2 − 1]
µ+ 2γσ2φ′′(1 + λ
′′)2
[
(1− µ)α− βtr′′−tr′−1
] . (3.45)
We can show that this non-existence condition coincides with the condition we get from
equation (3.44) for the existence of an equilibrium.
Corollary 8. There is no equilibrium in equation (3.44) (for an intercept not equal to
zero) if and only if (3.45) holds.
Proof. Equation (3.44) tells us, that the market demand is a linear function of ptr′′−1.
The market clears if the market demand is zero, so if the line given by (3.44) intersects
the ptr′′−1−axis in a ptr′′−1 −mdtr′′−1−diagram. If the slope of mdtr′′−1 is not equal to
zero, an equilibrium always exists. If its slope is equal to zero (and the intercept does
not equal zero), the market never clears and an equilibrium does not exist.
We therefore have to show that when the slope of the market demand is equal to zero
if and only if (3.45) holds. Recall equation (3.44). Using that ptr′ = . . . = ptr′′−1 and
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ptr′′ = . . . = pT , we have
mdtr′′−1 =
tr
′′−2∑
l=tr′′−tr′
βl∆p(tr′′−1)−l + βtr′′−tr′−1(ptr′′−1 − ptr′−1)
+µ
[(
α− βT−tr′′
2αγσ2φ′′
−
2β2
T−tr′′
α− βT−tr′′
)(
v + φ′ − ptr′′−1
)
(3.46)
+
(
α− βT−tr′′
2α2γσ2φ′′
− 2βT−tr′′
α− βT−tr′′
)
 T−1∑
l=T−(tr′+1)
βl∆pT−l + βT−tr′ (ptr′′−1 − ptr′−1)

+(1− µ)α(v +Dφ′ − ptr′′−1).
Deriving this with respect to ptr′′−1, we get
∂(3.46)
∂ptr′′−1
= βtr′′−tr′−1 − (1− µ)α
−µ
[(
α− βT−tr′′
2αγσ2φ′′
−
2β2
T−tr′′
α− βT−tr′′
)
(3.47)
−
(
α− βT−tr′′
2α2γσ2φ′′
− 2βT−tr′′
α− βT−tr′′
)
βT−tr′
]
.
So the slope of the market demand is given by (3.47). Rearranging (3.45) and using
1 + λ′′ = α
α−β
T−tr′′
yields
0 =
(
βT−tr′′ − βT−tr′
)
4γµβT−tr′′ (1 + λ
′′)2 σ2φ′′ −
(
βT−tr′′ − βT−tr′
)
µ
− (α− βT−tr′′)µ− (α− βT−tr′′) 2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′ (1− µ)α
+
(
α− βT−tr′′
)
2γ (1 + λ′′)2 βtr′′−tr′−1σ
2
φ′′
= µ
[(
βT−tr′′ − βT−tr′
)
4γσ2φ′′βT−tr′′ (1 + λ
′′)2 +
(
βT−tr′ − α
)(
α− βT−tr′′
)
2γσ2φ′′ (1 + λ
′′)2
]
+ (1− µ)α + βtr′′−tr′−1
= µ
[(
βT−tr′′ − βT−tr′
)
2βT−tr′′
α− βT−tr′′
−
(
α− βT−tr′
) (
α− βT−tr′′
)
2γα2σ2φ′′
]
+ (1− µ)α + βtr′′−tr′−1
= (1− µ)α + βtr′′−tr′−1
−µ
[(
α− βT−tr′′
2γασ2φ′′
−
2β2
T−tr′′
α− βT−tr′′
)
−
(
α− βT−tr′′
2γα2σ2φ′′
− 2βT−tr′′
α− βT−tr′′
)
βT−tr′
]
.
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This means that if (3.45) holds, (3.47) is equal to zero so there exists no equilibrium.
Note that this proves both directions since all transformations are equivalent.
The final thing we need to show for the proof of proposition 14 is
Lemma 4.
pt,s = ptr′−1,s for t = 0, . . . , t
r′ − 1 and s ∈ Ω.
Proof. To get the price, we have to solve the rational speculators’ utility maximization
problem at tr
′ − 1. Before considering the final wealth we simplify a few expressions
for convenience. Let p˜t = pt − v and rewrite (3.46) as
0 =
tr
′′−2∑
l=tr′′−tr′
βl∆p˜(tr′′−1)−l + βtr′′−tr′−1
(
p˜tr′′−1 − p˜tr′−1
)
+µ
(
α− βT−tr′′
2αγσ2φ′′
−
2β2
T−tr′′
α− βT−tr′′
)(
φ′ − p˜tr′′−1
)
+µ
(
α− βT−tr′′
2α2γσ2φ′′
− 2βT−tr′′
α− βT−tr′′
) T−1∑
l=T−(tr′−1)
βl∆p˜T−l + βT−tr′
(
p˜tr′′−1 − p˜tr′−1
)
+(1− µ)α(Dφ′ − p˜tr′′−1),
where we assume that the right-hand side is not constant in p˜tr′′−1. Solving for p˜tr′′−1
yields to a function that is linear in the first signal φ′, the price differences ∆p˜t and
the price level at tr
′ − 1. We therefore rewrite p˜tr′′−1 as
p˜tr′′−1 = h(φ
′,∆p˜1, . . . ,∆p˜tr′−1, p˜tr′−1) ≡ a′hφ′ +
tr
′−1∑
t=1
bh,t∆p˜t + chp˜tr′−1,
where a′h, bh,t (t = 1, 2, . . . , t
r′ − 1) and ch are constants. The demand of rational
speculators is also linear in the first signal φ′, the past price differences ∆p˜t and the
price levels at tr
′′ − 1 and at tr′ − 1. Since we have seen that p˜tr′′−1 is linear in φ′,
∆p˜t (t = 1, 2, . . . , t
r′ − 1) and p˜tr′−1 we rewrite the demand as
Dr
tr′′−1 = g(φ
′,∆p˜1,∆p˜tr′−1, p˜tr′−1) ≡ a′gφ′ +
tr
′−1∑
t=1
bg,t∆p˜t + cgp˜tr′−1,
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where a′g, bg,t (t = 1, 2, . . . , t
r′ − 1) and cg are again constants. Next we simplify p˜T .
We therefore consider equation (3.43) and use pT = . . . = ptr′′ and ptr′′−1 = . . . = ptr′ .
Then
p˜T = φ
′ + φ′′ +
T−1∑
l=T−tr′+1
βl∆p˜T−l +
βT−tr′′
α
(
p˜T − p˜tr′′−1
)
+
βT−tr′
α
(
p˜tr′′−1 − p˜tr′−1
)
⇔ p˜T
α− βT−tr′′
α
= φ′ + φ′′ +
T−1∑
l=T−tr′+1
βl∆p˜T−l −
βT−tr′′
α
p˜tr′′−1
+
βT−tr′
α
(
p˜tr′′−1 − p˜tr′−1
)
⇔ p˜T = 1
α− βT−tr′′
α(φ′ + φ′′) + T−1∑
l=T−tr′+1
βl∆p˜T−l
−βT−tr′′ p˜tr′′−1 + βT−tr′
(
p˜tr′′−1 − p˜tr′−1
)]
,
so p˜T is linear in the two signals φ
′ and φ′′, ∆p˜t (t = 1, 2, . . . , tr
′ − 1) and p˜tr′−1 (note
that p˜tr′′−1 are linear in φ
′, ∆p˜t (t = 1, 2, . . . , tr
′ − 1) and p˜tr′−1), so we have
p˜T = f(φ
′, φ′′,∆p˜1,∆p˜tr′−1, p˜tr′−1) ≡ a′fφ′ + a′′fφ′′ +
tr
′−1∑
t=1
bf,t∆p˜t + cf p˜tr′−1,
with constants a′f , a
′′
f , bf,t (t = 1, 2, . . . , t
r′−1) and cf . Since we have pT −v−φ′−φ′′ =
p˜T − φ′ − φ′ in the final wealth we define
p˜T − φ′ − φ′ = k(φ, φ′′,∆p˜1, . . . ,∆p˜tr′−1, p˜tr′−1)
≡ a′kφ′ + a′′kφ′′ +
tr
′−1∑
t=1
bf,t∆p˜t + cf p˜tr′−1
= (a′f − 1)φ′ + (a′′f − 1)φ′′ +
tr
′−1∑
t=1
bf,t∆p˜t + cf p˜tr′−1.
By setting both signals φ′ and φ′′ equal to zero, we define
h˜
(
∆p˜1, . . . ,∆p˜tr′−1, p˜tr′−1
)
= h
(
0,∆p˜1, . . . ,∆p˜tr′−1, p˜tr′−1
)
,
g˜
(
∆p˜1, . . . ,∆p˜tr′−1, p˜tr′−1
)
= g
(
0,∆p˜1, . . . ,∆p˜tr′−1, p˜tr′−1
)
,
f˜
(
∆p˜1, . . . ,∆p˜tr′−1, p˜tr′−1
)
= f
(
0, 0,∆p˜1, . . . ,∆p˜tr′−1, p˜tr′−1
)
and
k˜
(
∆p˜1, . . . ,∆p˜tr′−1, p˜tr′−1
)
= k
(
0, 0,∆p˜1, . . . ,∆p˜tr′−1, p˜tr′−1
)
.
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With the linear functions h, g, f and k we can rewrite the final wealth as
WT = Wtr′−1 + (p˜tr′ − p˜tr′−1)Drtr′−1 + (p˜tr′′ − p˜tr′′−1)Drtr′′−1
+α(pT − φ′ − φ′′ −Θ)(pT − φ′ − φ′′)
= Wtr′−1 + (h− p˜tr′−1)Drtr′−1 + (f − h)g + α(k − θ)k.
The expected value of WT at date t
r′ − 1 Er
tr′−1WT is
Er
tr′−1WT = Wtr′−1 + (h˜− p˜tr′−1)Drtr′−1 + Ertr′−1 [(f − h)g] + αErtr′−1k2,
since θ has mean zero and is independently distributed. The conditional variance
σ2
WT |tr′−1 is
σ2
WT |tr′−1 = E
r
tr′−1
[(
WT − Ertr′−1WT
)2]
= Er
tr′−1
[(
Wtr′−1 +
(
h− p˜tr′−1
)
Dr
tr′−1 + (f − h)g + α(k − θ)k
−Wtr′−1 −
(
h˜− p˜tr′−1
)
Dr
tr
′−1 − Ertr′−1 [(f − h)g]− αErtr′−1k2
)2]
= Er
tr′−1
[((
h− h˜
)
Dr
tr′−1 + (f − h)g − Ertr′−1 [(f − h)g]
−α
(
k2 − kθ − Er
tr′−1k
2
))2]
= Er
tr′−1
[(
h− h˜
)2](
Dr
tr′−1
)2
+ C ′′′ + 2Dr
tr′−1 ·
Er
tr′−1
[(
h− h˜
)(
(f − h)g − Er
tr′−1 [(f − h)g] + α(k2 − θk − Ertr′−1k2)
)]
where C ′′′ does not depend on Dr
tr′−1 and is therefore irrelevant for mean-variance
utility maximization. Using again the fact that θ has mean zero and is independently
distributed and that Er
tr′−1(h− h˜) = a′hErtr′−1φ′ = 0 we get
σ2
WT |tr′−1 = E
r
tr′−1
[(
h− h˜
)2](
Dr
tr′−1
)2
+ C ′′′
+2Dr
tr′−1
(
Er
tr′−1
[
(h− h˜)(f − h)g
]
+ Er
tr′−1
[
α(h− h˜)k2
])
.
Since h− h˜ = a′hφ′,
Er
tr′−1
(
h− h˜
)2
= a′hσ
2
φ′ .
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To replace Er
tr′−1
[
(h− h˜)(f − h)g
]
and Er
tr′−1
[
(h− h˜)k2
]
in the variance, we first
calculate (f − h)g and k2:
(f − h)g = (f˜ + a′fφ′ + a′′fφ′′ − h˜− a′hφ′)(g˜ + a′gφ′)
= (f˜ − h˜)g˜ + (f˜ − h˜)a′gφ′ + a′fφ′g˜ + a′fa′g(φ′)2
+a′′fφ
′′g˜ + a′′fφ
′′a′gφ
′ − a′hφ′g˜ − a′ha′g(φ′)2
and
k2 = (a′kφ
′ + a′′kφ
′′ + k˜)2
= (a′kφ
′)2 + (a′′kφ
′′)2 + k˜2 + 2a′ka
′′
kφ
′φ′′ + 2a′kφ
′k˜ + 2a′′kφ
′′k˜.
So
Er
tr′−1
[
(h− h˜)(f − h)g
]
= a′hE
r
tr′−1 [φ
′(f − h)g]
= a′h
(
Er
tr′−1
[
φ′(f˜ − h˜)g˜
]
+ Er
tr′−1
[
(f˜ − h˜)a′g(φ′)2
]
+Er
tr′−1
[
a′f g˜(φ
′)2
]
+ Er
tr′−1
[
a′fa
′
g(φ
′)3
]
+Er
tr′−1
[
a′′fφ
′′g˜φ′
]
+ Er
tr′−1
[
a′′fφ
′′a′g(φ
′)2
]
−Er
tr′−1
[
a′h(φ
′)2g˜
]− Er
tr′−1
[
a′ha
′
g(φ
′)3
])
= a′h
[
(f˜ − h˜)a′g + (a′f − a′h)g˜
]
σ2φ′
since Er
tr′−1φ
′ = Er
tr′−1(φ
′3) = 0 (mean zero and symmetry of the density of φ′) and
Er
tr′−1φ
′′ = Er
tr′−1(φ
′φ′′) = 0 (mean zero and independence of φ′ and φ′′). Moreover,
Er
tr′−1
[
(h− h˜)k2
]
= a′h
(
Er
tr′−1
[
(a′k)
2
(φ′)3
]
+ Er
tr′−1
[
(a′′k)
2
φ′φ′′2
]
+Er
tr′−1
[
k˜2φ′
]
+ Er
tr′−1
[
2a′ka
′′
k(φ
′)2φ′′
]
+Er
tr′−1
[
2a′k(φ
′)2k˜
]
+ Er
tr′−1
[
2a′′kφ
′′k˜φ′
])
= 2a′ha
′
kk˜σ
2
φ′ ,
because of the symmetry of φ′ and the independence of φ′ and φ′′. So
σ2
WT |tr′−1 = a
′
h
[
a′h
(
Dr
tr′−1
)2
+ 2Dr
tr′−1
(
(f˜ − h˜)a′g + (a′f − a′h)g˜ + 2αa′kk˜
)]
σ2φ′ + C
′′′′,
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where C ′′′′ does not depend on Dr
tr′−1. So the mean-variance utility function is
µW − γσ2W = (h˜− p˜tr′−1)Drtr′−1
−γa′h
[
a′h
(
Dr
tr′−1
)2
+ 2Dr
tr′−1
(
(f˜ − h˜)a′g + (a′f − a′h)g˜ + 2αa′kk˜
)]
σ2φ′
+C ′′′′′,
where C ′′′′′ again does not depend on Dr
tr′−1. Deriving with respect to D
r
tr′−1, we get
∂
∂Dr
tr′−1
µW − γσ2W = (h˜− p˜tr′−1)− 2γ (a′h)2Drtr′−1σ2φ′
−2a′hγ
(
(f˜ − h˜)a′g + (a′f − a′h)g˜ + 2αa′kk˜
)
σ2φ′
!
= 0.
Solving for Dr
tr′−1 yields to
Dr
tr′−1 =
h˜− p˜tr′−1
2γ (a′h)
2 σ2φ′
− 1
a′h
(
(f˜ − h˜)a′g + (a′f − a′h)g˜ + 2a′kk˜
)
≡ D˜(∆p˜1, . . . ,∆p˜tr′−1, p˜tr′−1),
where D˜ is linear in ∆pt (t = 1, 2, . . . , t
r′ − 1) and in p˜tr′−1. So the market clearing
condition in period tr
′ − 1 is
0 =
tr
′−2∑
l=1
βl∆p˜tr′−1−l + µD˜ − (1− µ)αp˜tr′−1.
With constants bp,t and cp, we have
p˜tr′−1 = p(∆p˜1, . . . ,∆p˜tr′−2, p˜tr′−2) ≡
tr
′−2∑
t=1
bp,t∆p˜t + cpp˜tr′−2.
Next, we show that
p˜t,s = p˜tr′−1,s for t = 0, 1, . . . , t
r′ − 1 and s ∈ Ω.
The reasoning is the same as before. Let us assume that ptr′−1,s 6= ptr′−2,s for s ∈
σtr′−2. Then the capital gains (ptr′−1 − ptr′−2)Drtr′−2 are monotonically increasing in
Dr
tr′−2. So a solution for their optimization problem does not exist. Therefore p˜tr′−1,s =
125
Positive Feedback Traders
p˜tr′−2,s. Repeating this argument recursively, we get p˜t,s = p˜tr′−1,s for t = 0, 1, . . . , t
r′−
1 and s ∈ Ω. Using this, we get
p˜tr′−1 = p
(
0, . . . , 0, p˜tr′−2
)
= cpp˜tr′−2.
So
p˜t,s = 0, t = 0, 1, . . . , t
r′ − 1, s ∈ Ω
is uniquely determined unless cp = 1.
3.4.8 Bubbles
We now want continue our discussion on bubbles from section 3.3.7. We have seen in
the previous section that the equilibrium is unique so rational bubbles cannot exist.
But how about the speculative bubbles we mentioned earlier? Recall that we defined a
speculative bubble as the difference between the fundamental value and the equilibrium
price, where the fundamental value was the price that made a buy-and-hold strategy
unprofitable. Such a bubble did not exist in the case with one signal but, as we will
see that it may exist in the case with two signals.
Proposition 15. Given that fundamental value is the price that makes a buy-and-hold
strategy unprofitable, the equilibrium price differs from the fundamental value by
λ′′(λ′ − ν ′)
1 + λ′′
φ′′
for dates t = tr
′
, . . . , tr
′′ − 1 (between the arrival of the first and the second signal). At
all other dates, the equilibrium price coincides with the fundamental value.
Proof. The proof is almost in the same manner as the proof of proposition 10 (especially
for dates t = 0, 1, . . . , tr
′ − 1 and t = tr′′ , tr′′ + 1, . . . , T ). Recall that in order to show
that equilibrium price equals fundamental value, we have to show that
dUrt
dDrt
= 0 in
equation (3.20):
pt = v + E
r
t Φ− γ
dσr2W rt+1|t
dDrt
− dU
r
t
dDrt
.
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Final wealth for dates t = tr
′′
, tr
′′
+ 1, . . . , T is W rT+1 = W
r
t + (v + φ
′ + φ′′ + θ− pT )DrT
so
ErtW
r
T+1 = W
r
t + (v + φ
′ + φ′′ − pT )DrT
and
d(W rt − ErtW rT+1)
dDrT
= θ.
Together with (3.21),
dErtW
r
T+1
dDrt
= (v + φ′ + φ′′ − pT ) and α = 12γσ2θ , we have
dU rt
dDrt
=
dErtW
r
T+1
dDrt
− γ
dσr2W rt+1|t
dDrt
= (v + φ′ + φ′′ − pT )− 2γErt [θDrT θ]
= (v + φ′ + φ′′ − pT )− 2γErt
[
θ2α(v + φ′ + φ′′ − pT )
]
= (v + φ′ + φ′′ − pT )(1− 2αγσ2θ)
= 0.
Next we consider the time span between the arrival of the two signals when final wealth
is
W rT+1 = W
r
t + (ptr′′ − ptr′′−1)Drtr′′−1 + (v + φ′ + φ′′ + θ − pT )DrT
for t = tr
′
, tr
′
+ 1, . . . , tr
′′ − 1. Its date−t expectation is
ErtW
r
T+1 = W
r
t + E
r
t
[
(ptr′′ − ptr′′−1)Drtr′′−1
]
+ Ert [(v + φ
′ + φ′′ + θ − pT )DrT ] ,
so together with (3.4) we have
dErtW
r
T+1
dDrt
= Ert
(
ptr′′ − ptr′′−1
)
+ Ert (v + φ
′ + φ′′ + θ − pT )
= −(1 + ν ′)φ′ + φ′
= −ν ′φ′
and
d(W rT+1 − ErtW rT+1)
dDrt
= (ptr′′ − ptr′′−1) + (v + φ′ + φ′′ + θ − pT )
−Ert
(
ptr′′ − ptr′′−1
)− Ert (v + φ′ + φ′′ + θ − pT )
= φ′′ + θ.
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Using again (3.4) and (3.21), we get
dσ2W rT+1|t
dDrt
= 2Ert
[{
(ptr′′ − ptr′′−1)Drtr′′−1 + (v + φ′ + φ′′ + θ)DrT
−Ert
[
(ptr′′ − ptr′′−1)Drtr′′−1
]
− Ert [(v + φ′ + φ′′ + θ)DrT ]
}
(φ′′ + θ)
]
= 2Ert
[{
((λ′ − ν ′)φ′ + (1 + λ′′)φ′′)
(
(λ′ − ν ′)φ′
2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
− 2αλ
′λ′′φ′
1 + λ′′
)
+α(λ′φ′ + λ′′φ′′)(λ′φ′ + λ′′φ′′ − θ)− (λ′ − ν ′)φ′(
(λ′ − ν ′)φ′
2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
− 2αλ
′λ′′φ′
1 + λ′′
)
− α(λ′2φ′2 + λ′′2σ2φ′′)
}
(φ′′ + θ)
]
= 2Ert
[{
(λ′ − ν ′)φ′φ′′
2γ(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′
− 2αλ′λ′′φ′φ′′ + 2αλ′λ′′φ′φ′′
−αλ′φ′θ − αλ′′φ′′θ + αλ′′2φ′′2 − αλ′′2σ2φ′′
}
(φ′′ + θ)
]
= 2
[
λ′ − ν ′
2γ(1 + λ′′)
− αλ′σ2θ
]
φ′,
since φ′′ has mean zero, is symmetric and uncorrelated with θ which has also mean
zero. Therefore,
dU rt
dDrt
=
dErtW
r
T+1
dDrt
− γ dσ
2
θ
dDrt
= −ν ′φ′ − 2γ
[
λ′ − ν ′
2γ(1 + λ′′)
− αλσ2θ
]
φ′
=
[
−ν ′ − λ
′ − ν ′
1 + λ′′
+ λ′
]
φ′
=
[
(λ′ − ν ′)(1 + λ′′)
1 + λ′′
− λ
′ − ν ′
1 + λ′′
]
φ′
=
λ′′(λ′ − ν ′)
1 + λ′′
φ′,
which is the price difference between the fundamental value and the equilibrium price.
Finally we consider the dates before the arrival of the first signal. For t = 0, 1, . . . , tr
′−1,
final wealth is
W rT+1 = W
r
t + (ptr′ − ptr′−1)Drtr′−1 + (ptr′′ − ptr′′−1)Drtr′′−1 + (v + φ′ + φ′′ + θ − pT )DrT .
Its date−t expectation is
ErtW
r
T+1 = W
r
t + E
r
t
[
(ptr′ − ptr′−1)Drtr′−1
]
+ Ert
[
(ptr′′ − ptr′′−1)Drtr′′−1
]
+Ert [(v + φ
′ + φ′′ + θ − pT )DrT ] ,
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so
dErtW
r
T+1
dDrt
= Ert
(
ptr′ − ptr′−1
)
+ Ert
(
ptr′′ − ptr′′−1
)
+ Ert (v + φ
′ + φ′′ + θ − pT )
= −ptr′−1 + v
= 0,
and together with (3.4) we have
d(W rT+1 − ErtW rT+1)
dDrt
=
(
ptr′ − ptr′−1
)
+
(
ptr′′ − ptr′′−1
)
+ (v + φ′ + φ′′ + θ − pT )
−Ert
(
ptr′ − ptr′−1
)− Ert (ptr′′ − ptr′′−1)
−Ert (v + φ′ + φ′′ + θ − pT )
= φ′ + φ′′ + θ.
Hence,
dU rt
dDrt
= −2γ
dσ2W rT+1|t
dDrt
= −2γErt
[{
(ptr′ − ptr′−1)Drtr′−1 + (ptr′′ − ptr′′−1)Drtr′′−1
+(v + φ′ + φ′′ + θ − pT )DrT − Ert
[
(ptr′ − ptr′−1)Drtr′−1
]
−Ert
[
(ptr′′ − ptr′′−1)Drtr′′−1
]
− Ert [(v + φ′ + φ′′ + θ − pT )DrT ]
}
(φ′ + φ′′ + θ)
]
= −2γErt
[{
((λ′ − ν ′)φ′ + (1 + λ′′)φ′′)
(
(λ′ − ν ′)φ′
2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
− 2αλ
′λ′′φ′
1 + λ′′
)
+α(λ′φ′ + λ′φ′′ − θ)(λ′φ′ + λ′′φ′′)− (λ
′ − ν ′)2σ2φ′
2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
+
2αλ′λ′′(λ′ − ν ′)σ2φ
1 + λ′′
− α (λ′2σ2φ′ + λ′′2σ2φ′′)} (φ′ + φ′′ + θ)]
= −2γErt
[{
(λ′ − ν ′)2φ′2
2γ(1 + λ′′)2σ2φ′′
− 2α(λ
′ − ν ′)λ′λ′′φ′2
1 + λ′′
+
(λ′ − ν ′)φ′φ′′
2γ(1 + λ′′)σ2φ′′
−2αλ′λ′′φ′φ′′ + α(λ′2φ′2 + λ′′2φ′′2 + 2λ′λ′′φ′φ′′ − θλ′φ′ − θλ′′φ′′)
−(λ
′ − ν ′)2σ2φ′
2γ(1 + λ′′)2
+
2αλ′λ′′(λ′ − ν ′)σ2φ
1 + λ′′
− α (λ′2σ2φ′ + λ′′2σ2φ′′)} (φ′ + φ′′ + θ)]
= 0,
since φ′ and φ′′ have mean zero, are uncorrelated and symmetric and since θ has mean
zero and is uncorrelated with φ′ and φ′′.
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Proposition 15 shows that, unlike in the case with one signal (see proposition 10), a
speculative bubble may exist in the case with two signals. The reason for the existence
of the bubble is the time inconsistency of the optimal plans in the dynamic mean-
variance setup (see Chen et al. (1971)). Before the arrival of the first and after the
arrival of the second signal there is no scope for time inconsistency. Therefore, there is
no bubble in the case with one signal. But in the case with two signals a buy-and-hold
strategy might become profitable after the arrival of the first signal, so the asset price
deviates from the fundamental value. This bubble is large for a positive realization of
the first signal (φ′ > 0), if the predictable part of the price change (λ′ − ν ′)φ′ is large.
Note that Allen et al. (1993) state that it is a necessary for a finite bubble to exist that
agents are short-sale constrained and there are information asymmetries. Since we do
not have short-sale constraints or information asymmetries in our model, proposition 15
shows that the fact that these conditions are necessary depends on the time consistency
of the optimal plans.
3.5 Results
We have seen in the preceding paragraphs that a different time setup and different
assumptions on the values of βl have a strong impact on the price response to the
signals.
Adding just one additional trading period in the case with one signal led to a very
different result than in DSSW. Instead of destabilizing speculation we had stabilizing
or neutral speculation. Adding more trading dates led to the result that, in the pres-
ence of rational speculators, only one feedback parameter is of interest. Modifying the
measure of the three groups of agents did not change the results qualitatively as long
as certain parameter assumptions hold.
In the case with two signals, there was a wide range of price dynamics. The reactions
to the first signal ranged from over- and then to underreaction (λ′ < 0 < ν ′), over mean
reversion (0 < λ′ < ν ′), and an increasing reaction (0 < ν ′ < λ′) to underreaction at
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the beginning and overreaction in the end (ν ′ < 0 < λ′). Even after good news it may
happen that rational speculators go short and the asset price falls. The reaction to the
second signal was essentially the same as the reaction in the case with one signal. In
contrast to the case with one signal rational speculators’ measure µ was very important
for the reaction to the first signal.
In our discussion of bubbles, we discussed several definitions of bubbles. By proving
that the equilibrium is unique we showed that rational bubbles cannot exist. Consid-
ering speculative bubbles that come from a buy-and-hold strategy, we saw that such a
bubble may exist only in the case with two signals.
A point for future research is to consider the model with more than two signals, al-
though this might prove to be mathematically challenging. Another interesting ques-
tion is, whether and how the results change when the signals become noisy.
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